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Abstract 
Incidents on motorways, such as collisions, broken down vehicles and debris, 
temporarily reduce the capacity of the roadway, disrupting the natural flow of traffic. 
These present serious safety hazards and contribute greatly to congestion which 
causes financial loss and misery to thousands of motorists daily. 
These factors create the need to quickly and efficiently manage incidents. To 
mitigate the effects of non-recurrent congestion on the United Kingdom motorway 
and trunk road network, the Highways Agency (HA) has developed the Incident 
Support Unit (ISU) service. 
This research presents a review of incident management practice in the United 
Kingdom, in particularly on the M25 London Orbital Motorway. An international 
comparison between British incident management operations and those in the United 
States is also provided. The ISU service on the M25 motorway, operated by the 
HA's service provider, Carillion plc, is critically examined, including quantitative 
and qualitative examinations and a benefit-cost estimation. 
To understand fully the influence that ISUs have on the M25 road network, incident 
data was collected and analysed. These incidents have been examined to determine 
their influence on traffic flow. Specifically, their impact on the capacity of the 
roadway and the effect of "rubbernecking" is investigated. Investigations and 
analysis are undertaken to evaluate the delays experienced by motorway users due to 
incidents. 
The effectiveness of motorway matrix signals and signs are then examined including 
compliance rates with mandatory signals and the impact of variable message signs on 
driver route choice. 
Finally, the optimal standby locations of ISUs on the M25 Sphere road network are 
established in order to reduce their response times to incidents. 
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Figure 1.1 Examples of Incidents on the M25. (Source- Mr. Bob Wadsworth) 
Figure 1.1 presents two examples of incidents on the M25 London Orbital 
Motorway. Both of these incidents involved full closure of sections of roadway for 
extended periods. 
One of the key objectives of the Highways Agency, as the executive agency of the 
Department for Transport who operate, maintain and improve the strategic road 
network in England, is to reduce congestion and increase the reliability of journey 
2 
1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the problems addressed in the research study 
and the basic project approach and the methods used to address the problems. An 
outline of each chapter contained within this thesis is also presented. 
The rising demand for use of motorway and trunk road networks has not and can not 
be met with corresponding increases in capacity. This has led to an ever-increasing 
level of daily congestion. Recurring congestion from the excess volume of vehicles 
is expected but non-recurring or "incident" congestion is unpredictable. It has been 
estimated that incidents on motorways and trunk roads in Britain account for 
approximately 25% of all congestion, which costs the British economy an estimated 
£750million a year (National Audit Office, 2005). Incidents represent any non-
recurrent occurrence or unplanned event that creates a temporary reduction in 
roadway capacity, which in turn, impedes the normal flow of traffic (TRB, 2003). 
They can range from broken down vehicles on the hard shoulder to major collisions 
involving fatalities or hazardous material spills. Depending on the severity of the 
incident they can disrupt traffic flow causing congestion, increasing travel time, 
damage to property or even loss of life. They cause bottlenecks, slowing and 
frequently stopping the flow of vehicles. As the flow of traffic slows, a queue builds 
upstream of the incident, and continues until the blockage is cleared and flow 
restored. Due to the backlog of vehicles it can take an extremely long time after the 
incident for the accumulated traffic to dissipate. Incident management programmes 
have been developed to mitigate non-recurring congestion from incidents. 
Incident management is the process by which incidents are cleared from the road 
returning them to normal traffic conditions. The purpose of incident management 
programmes is to rapidly detect, verify and clear temporary obstructions from roads 
to restore normal traffic flow as quickly as possible. Further, non-recurring 
congestion can be minimised by clearing incidents as quickly as possible or by 
diverting traffic before vehicles are caught in the traffic backup. There is now a 
demand for more efficient roadways. 
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times. One way to do this is to work with the Police and other emergency services to 
provide a faster response to incidents and quicker clearance of blocked lanes. The 
Incident Support Unit (ISU) was developed to support the effective management of 
incidents and increase co-ordination between the HA's service providers, the Police 
and other Emergency Services. ISUs are operated on the HA's routes by contractors. 
As of 1st  September 2001 Carillion plc became responsible for the maintenance and 
improvement of motorways and trunk roads of the M25 Sphere, as Term 
Maintenance Contractor, having been appointed by the Highways Agency (HA). 
The M25 Sphere or HA Area 5 network comprises over 2500 km total lane length 
with some sections carrying more than 200,000 vehicles a day. As one of Europe's 
busiest motorway, congestion is a major problem. Each year, traffic congestion leads 
to millions of hours of vehicle delays and causes significant losses in productivity, 
increases in fuel consumption and environmental pollution. Carillion operate a fleet 
of sixteen ISUs on the M25 Sphere on behalf of the HA. These vehicles are ready to 
respond to a call for support from the emergency services, 24 hours a day. They 
assist with incidents, and are manned by specialist crews, equipped with cones, signs, 
environmental protection packs and suitable equipment to deal with most situations. 
1.1 The Problem 
An incident is defined as any non-recurring event that causes a reduction of roadway 
capacity (TRB, 2003). Such events include collisions, broken down vehicles, debris, 
spills, and any other event that could reduce the capacity of the roadway. 
Although the main issue most associated with incidents on motorways is delay, the 
-risk of secondary incidents is also a serious problem. Other secondary effects of 
incidents include: 
• Incident responder personnel exposure, 
• Increased response time by emergency services, 
• Lost time and a reduction in productivity, 
• Increased cost of goods and services, 
• Adverse environmental impacts, 
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• Increased fuel consumption, 
• Reduced air quality, 
• Increased vehicle maintenance costs, 
• Reduced quality of life, 
• Negative public image of organisations involved in incident management. 
Incidents critically limit the operational efficiency of the transportation network and 
put all road users at risk. 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of the research presented in this thesis is to provide a critical examination of 
incidents and the incident management process on the M25 Sphere road network. 
To achieve this aim the following measurable objectives have been set: 
• Present a review of British incident management practices, 
• Produce a critical evaluation of the Incident Support Service on the M25 
Sphere. 
• A comprehensive analysis of incident characteristics, frequency and duration 
on the M25 Sphere. 
• Provide an optimal deployment strategy for Incident Support Units on the 
M25 Sphere. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: 
Chapter 2 presents an examination of the motorway incident management process 
and provides a background to this work on the M25 London Orbital Motorway. The 
five stages of incident management- detection, verification, response, clearance and 
recovery- are detailed, with programme stakeholders identified and their roles and 
responsibilities at motorway incidents examined. An introduction to the M25 
London orbital motorway is also presented, including the history, future and current 
maintenance and management arrangements. The Highways Agency's approach to 
incident management in Britain is also described with their response capabilities 
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through Incident Support Units and Traffic Officers examined in detail. Finally an 
incident management programme comparison between Britain and four US states is 
carried out. 
Chapter 3 presents a review of the ISU service on the M25 motorway, operated by 
the HA's service provider, Carillion plc, including quantitative (analysis of incident 
data) and qualitative examinations (via questionnaire survey), and a benefit-cost 
estimation. An analysis of ISU attended incidents, an estimation of ISU benefits and 
qualitative police and ISU operative survey results will be presented. 
Chapter 4 describes the influence and role of ISUs on the M25 Sphere. A detailed 
study of all incidents which occur on the road network was undertaken. To enable 
this, motorway incident data was collected by the author through observing 
motorway operations at a police control room. 
Chapter 5 examines the influence of motorway incidents on traffic flow. Their 
impact on the capacity of the roadway is studied and the impact of rubbernecking is 
investigated. Investigations and analysis are undertaken to evaluate the impact of 
incidents on motorways including the total delay experienced. 
Chapter 6 presents a review of motorway matrix signals and signs in use on the 
motorway and trunk road network in Britain. Applications of the discussed signals 
and signs will also be detailed. The effectiveness of matrix signals and signs will 
then be examined including compliance rates with mandatory signals and the impact 
of variable messages on driver route choice. 
Chapter 7 examines optimal deployment strategies for incident support units on the 
M25 road network. This will be completed via the development of a computer 
model that will determine the shortest response route for a particular network setup. 
This shortest response route in turn will produce the shortest travel (response) time 
for each ISU vehicle. Four location strategies will then be considered to optimally 
locate ISUs on the M25 and for each strategy the optimal number of ISUs is 
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determined. The objective is to minimise the total travel time to incidents with the 
minimum number of ISU vehicles required to meet the service provider's contractual 
response time. 
Chapter 8 summarises the conclusions that can be drawn from this study. 
Suggestions for future research are also presented. 
2 An Investigation into the Incident Management Process 
2.1 Introduction 
Incident management is the process by which the duration and impact of incidents is 
lessened. By managing incidents effectively the operational efficiency of a facility 
can be enhanced and the safety of incident responders and motorists can be 
improved. The process is involved in every phase of an incident from the detection, 
through verification, response and clearance to recovery. 
As the mitigation of incident related congestion is very important, rapid response and 
clearance is essential. Incident management methods used in Britain include 
Incident Support Units and Highways Agency Traffic Officers, provided by the 
Highways Agency, as the managers of the national strategic road network. These 
programmes are intended to work in partnership with the emergency services to 
manage incidents and mitigate their impacts through quick response, clearance and 
traffic management. 
As dedicated incident management programmes have been in use on freeways in the 
United States since the 1960s there is much that can be learnt by examining their 
operations. A comparison between incident management operations on the M25 and 
four programmes in the US is presented to provide validation of current practices and 
ideas for future implementation. 
This chapter examines the motorway incident management process and provides a 
background to this work on the M25 London Orbital Motorway. 
This chapter is structured as follows: 
. Section Two. Motorway incidents are described and defined. 
. Section Three. The incident management process is detailed. Each of the 
five parts (detection, verification, response, clearance, recovery) of the 
process are examined in detail. A case study of an incident on the M25 
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motorway is detailed to provide clarification of the process. Individual 
incident responder roles and responsibilities are also examined. 
• Section Four. A history and review of current operations on the M25 
London Orbital Motorway is presented. 
• Section Five. A description and background of the Highways Agency is 
described. 
• Section Six. The role of the Highways Agency Incident Support Unit 
programme on the M25 is presented. Details of ISU operative training, 
vehicles and equipment are also shown. 
• Section Seven. The role of the Highways Agency Traffic Officers 
programme on the M25 is presented. Details of ISU operative training, 
vehicles and equipment are also shown. 
• Section Eight. Four US incident management programmes are reviewed and 
a comparison is presented. 
• Section Nine. Chapter summary and conclusions. 
2.2 What is an Incident 
An incident on a motorway represents any non-recurrent occurrence or unplanned 
event that creates a temporary reduction in roadway capacity, which in turn, impedes 
the normal flow of traffic (TRB, 2003). Incidents can range from broken down 
vehicles on the hard shoulder to major collisions involving fatalities or hazardous 
material spills. Depending on the severity of the incident they can disrupt traffic 
flow causing congestion, increased travel time, damage to property or even loss of 
life. Incident management is the process by which incidents are cleared from the 
road returning them to normal traffic conditions. 
2.3 Incident Management 
In the US Traffic Incident Management Handbook (FHWA, 2000) incident 
management is defined as "the systematic, planned and coordinated use of human, 
institutional, mechanical and technical resources to reduce the duration and impact of 
incidents and improve the safety of motorists, crash victims and incident responders. 
Effectively using these resources can also increase the operating efficiency, safety, 
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and mobility of the highway. This results from reducing the time to detect and verify 
an incident occurrence; implementing the appropriate response; safely clearing the 
incident; and managing the affected flow until full capacity is restored". 
Incident management is the coordination of activities undertaken by one or more 
organisations to restore traffic flow to normal conditions after an incident has 
occurred (Ozbay and Kachroo, 1999). Incident management programmes are 
designed to manage incidents on roadways, reduce the associated cost of an incident 
and increase safety for both responders and motorists. 
Incidents on motorways and trunk roads in Britain account for approximately 25% of 
all congestion (National Audit Office, 2005) but the greatest impact of motorway 
incidents concerns the safety of incident responders and motorists. In 2001, 28 law 
enforcement officers and 6 fire fighters and emergency medical technicians died in 
the United States after being struck by another vehicle (TRB, 2003). From 1997 
through 2001, there were 26 fire fighter and emergency medical technician fatalities 
from vehicle strike in the US, some 2.6 times greater than the total number of 
fatalities from the previous 5 year period. Nearly 40% of all law enforcement 
officers who died on duty died in traffic incidents (Qin and Smith, 2001). Similar 
emergency services statistics are regrettably not available for the UK, but the 
Highways Agency recently highlighted the dangers experienced by its staff, with 11 
road workers killed in roadworks on motorways or trunk roads in England, between 
October 2000 and February 2002, which equates to 1 in 1000 (Highways Agency, 
2004a). Also according to research by Dr Stephen Roberts reported in The Lancet 
(Roberts, 2002), road workers have the 16th most hazardous occupation in Great 
Britain; higher even than for military personnel. These statistics demonstrate the 
importance of safety at motorway incidents. 
The overall goals of any incident management programme are to minimise the 
impact of an incident and improve safety. Five objectives of any incident 
management programme should be to: 
0 Reduce incident detection and verification times, 
• Reduce response time, 
• Exercise proper and safe on-scene management of personnel and equipment, 
while keeping as many lanes open to traffic as possible, 
• Reduce incident clearance time, 
• Provide timely, accurate information to the public that enables them to make 
informed choices. 
When achieved, these combined objectives reduce the overall delay incurred by 
motorists using the road network and improve the overall safety of the network. At a 
social level, this translates into gains in economic productivity, reduced fuel 
consumption and air pollution, increased on-time delivery of goods and improved 
public image of transportation agencies (ITS, 2001). 
There are three parts that combine to make a successful incident management 
programme: communication, coordination and cooperation. These components 
combine to create an integrated incident management approach. 
Total Incident Influence Time 
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Figure 2.1 Generic Incident Management Time Line 
Incident management can be categorised broadly into the following five set of 
activities, shown graphically in figure 2.1: 
Incident detection, 
• Incident verification, 
• Incident response, 
• Incident clearance, 
• Incident recovery. 
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2.3.1 Incident Detection 
Incident detection is the process of determining the presence of an incident on the 
motorway and bringing it to the attention of the authorities. Incident detection 
initiates the whole incident management process. Quick incident detection allows 
rapid resource dispatch, allowing responders to arrive at an incident quickly and 
initiate the clearance of the incident thus minimising the overall incident duration 
and impact. Quick detection and response reduces the exposure to those involved in 
the incident. 
In the US, the incident detection is estimated to be between 5 and 15 minutes 
(Cambridge Systematics, 1990) 
There are many methods commonly used to detect incidents including: 
Emergency vehicle patrols, 
• Maintenance vehicles patrols, 
• Notification from a passing motorist, 
- 999 calls, 
- Emergency Roadside Telephones (ERT), SOS boxes, 
• Notification from a party involved in the incident, 
- 999 calls, 
- Emergency Roadside Telephones (ERT), SOS boxes, 
• Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) observations in control rooms, 
• Electronic detection systems (loop detectors, radar detectors or video 
capture), 
• Recovery services. 
In recent years, increasing numbers of incidents are being notified by motorists, 
either by those directly involved or just passing, by use of mobile phone. This 
regularly means that a large number of calls are received very quickly. The 
information however can be lacking, with motorists only having a vague idea of their 
location. Unfortunately this inaccurate information can often increase response times 
to incidents. 
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Detection of incidents can be improved by having more patrols on the road and by 
using enhanced marker posts enabling motorists to accurately inform operators of 
their location. 
Incident detection can take place at the same time as incident verification either from 
a patrol or by using CCTV. 
2.3.2 Incident Verification 
Once an incident has been detected it must be verified. Verification involves 
confirming that an incident has actually occurred, determining the exact location and 
obtaining as many relevant details about the incident as possible, including gathering 
enough information to be able to dispatch the appropriate response. Verification is 
required when initial incident reports are received from an untrained observer, who 
may exaggerate the severity of the incident or give erroneous location information. 
Incidents are usually verified using the following methods: 
• Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) cameras, 
• Dispatch vehicles to the incident site, 
• Combining information from multiple reports. 
Typically, on the M25, CCTV will be used to verify an incident, but where there is 
no coverage a police, Incident Support Unit or Highways Agency Traffic Officer 
vehicle will be sent to verify the incident and asses what resources are required to 
respond. Incident detection and verification can often coincide, for example if a 
police officer or ISU is the first to detect the incident. 
2.3.3 Incident Response 
Incident response involves the deployment of appropriate personnel, equipment and 
motorist information as soon after notification as possible. The complete response 
phase is the period between incident verification and the time that the responders 
arrive at the incident scene. The duration of response is dependent on the location of 
resources and the location of the incident. Depending on the type and severity of the 
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incident, response can occur in stages, with different resources dispatched for various 
phases of the clearance process. 
The response phase is also when traffic management and motorist information should 
commence. Initial traffic management, prior to responder arrival, could include 
setting lane control signals, advisor speed limits or variable message signs to warn 
motorists. Motorists should also be kept fully informed by disseminating incident 
related information. This can be done in various ways: 
• Commercial and public radio broadcasts, 
• Variable Message Signs, 
• Telephone information systems, 
• In vehicle navigation systems 
• Commercial and public television traffic reports, 
• Web sites (for example the Highways Agency- www.trafficengland.com ) 
2.3.4 Incident Clearance 
Once responding equipment and personnel arrive at the incident scene they must 
manage the site and effectively coordinate and manage on scene resources. Incident 
clearance encompasses not only the physical clearance of the incident but also site 
and traffic management. During the clearance phase the safety of response 
personnel, incident victims and other motorists is the primary objective of incident 
site management. Incident site management includes at least the following activities: 
• Accurately assessing incidents, 
• Properly establishing priorities, 
• Notifying and coordinating with the appropriate agencies and organisations, 
• Using effective liaisons with other responders, 
• Maintaining clear communication. 
Management of the traffic is one of the vital parts of incident management. Traffic 
management at an incident site involves many parts: 
• Establishing incident site emergency traffic management, 
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• Managing the road space (opening and closing lanes, blocking only the 
portion of the incident scene that is required for safety, staging and parking to 
minimise traffic flow), 
• Deploying appropriate personnel to assist in traffic management (Incident 
Support Units, Highways Agency Traffic Officers, traffic management 
vehicles, etc.) 
Actively manage traffic control devices (lane control signals, Variable 
Message Signs) 
• Implementing emergency diversion routes. 
Incident clearance is one of the most critical stages in incidents. It can however be 
the longest stage due to the length of time required to remove obstructions and 
restore traffic flow (FHWA, 2000). Minor incidents such as debris can take only a 
matter of minutes to clear, but other incidents, such as incidents involving rolled 
Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGV) or spilled cargo, can take many hours. if incidents 
involve serious injuries the police may have to investigate for evidence prior to re-
opening lanes, adding to the delay. 
The end of incident clearance marks the end of the incident duration but not the end 
of the influence of the incident, which may however carry on for several hours until 
traffic has fully recovered. 
2.3.5 Incident Recovery 
Incident recovery is the final stage of incident management. It covers the period 
between clearance of the incident and the return of traffic to normal flow. This may 
be a lengthy time for major incidents, to allow the traffic queue to dissipate, or a very 
short time for minor incidents. Traffic management and motorist information should 
continue through to the end of the incident. 
Once traffic has fully recovered the incident can be considered to be concluded. Post 
incident multi-agency debriefs should be held to ascertain what worked and what did 
not, as well as what can be improved for next time. Thus ensuring that 
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recovery vehicle was requested at 12:18 and arrived at 12:50. The ambulance left the 
scene at 12:28 clearing lane 3. The closure was left in place to aid recovery of the 
vehicle. Once the recovery vehicle had removed the van from the central reservation 
the ISU crew dealt with all the remaining debris and a minor spillage from the 
vehicle. As the recovery vehicle left the scene at 12:56 the ISU crew then started to 
recover the emergency traffic management, clearing all the travel lanes. As the 
police and ISU left the scene at 13:02 the lane control signals were deactivated 
allowing the traffic to clear. At its peak the queue as a result of this incident was 2.4 





• . •. 
. _ 
T.'rT 
Figure 2.2 CCTV Image of an Example Incident Scene. 
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communication, coordination and cooperation is continued and incident management 
is successful. 
2.3.6 Case Study of Incident Management 
To provide clarification of the incident management process an example incident on 
the M25 will be detailed. A CCTV image is shown in figure 2.2 and a chronological 
time-line of the incident is shown in figure 2.3. 
At 11:50 on 5th December 2003 Surrey police were notified of an accident that 
occurred at marker post 4506B on the anti-clockwise M25 adjacent to the on sup 
road at junction 8. The initial reports were received in Surrey police's Godstone 
motorway control room from the force control room where all 999 calls are 
answered. The incident was verified at 11:52 using CCTV as a small van rolling 
over the central reservation barrier with a car stranded in lane 4 and partially in lane 
3. Multiple police traffic units were dispatched to the incident scene by the radio 
operator. Other control room operators contacted the ambulance service, to request 
their presence and confirm with them the exact incident location and best access 
route, set motorway gantry matrix signals and signs, to give advanced warning of the 
incident and protect the scene, as well as contact the M25 Sphere control room to 
request the support of an Incident Support Unit (ISU). The HA's Traffic Control 
Centre were also informed of the incident and disseminated the information on their 
website, to the media and activated variable message signs to inform motorists of the 
incident. 
The police were the first to respond to the incident scene at 11:57 with the ambulance 
service arriving very shortly thereafter. The police assessed the scene and quickly 
set up emergency traffic management whilst the ambulance service assessed the 
casualties. A second police unit arrived at 12:04 and further reinforced the closure. 
At 12:10 the ISU arrived on scene and promptly set about placing improved traffic 
management to further protect the incident scene as this proved to be in a dangerous 
location on the outside of a bend in the road. The ISU operatives then tackled the 




































































2.3,7 Incident Roles and Responsibilities 
There are many organisations and agencies who are involved in incident 
management on motorways in Britain. A selection is shown and detailed below of 
the major partners involved, which include: 
Police, 
• Fire and Rescue Service, 
• Ambulance Service, 
• Transportation Agencies, 
• Recovery Services. 
There are however several organisations such as the Environment Agency and 
various specialist contractors who become involved in more severe incidents and 
participate on an as-needed basis. 
Police 
Typically the police are the first to receive notification of an incident (as recipient of 
999 calls). They also often detect incidents due to the nature of their role in policing 
the traffic and law enforcement. The police are in overall command at an incident 
scene. They will request additional resources and services and will investigate 
incidents if they involve criminality or result in significant property damage, 
personal injury or fatalities. 
Fire and Rescue Service 
The fire and rescue services attend approximately 3% of all incidents (Highways 
Agency, 2002) but do not have a statutory duty to attend motor vehicle collisions. 
They do however have statutory control powers at a "fire ground" but the police will 
still remain in overall control of an incident scene, supporting the fire services 
activities. The fire service will respond, when requested, to fires, hazardous material 
incidents and rescues. 
Generally, when requested, the fire service sends two appliances, one to each 
carriageway of a motorway. This can greatly reduce response times, especially when 
incident locations have been incorrectly identified. 	However this can also 
significantly increase motorist distraction and thus safety by having several large 
vehicles responding to what could be a very minor incident. 
Ambulance Service 
The ambulance service provides essential medical treatment to those injured in 
incidents. Generally they are only involved at the very early stages of an incident 
and will have left prior to scene clearance. 
Transportation Agencies 
The Highways Agency (HA) is responsible for the trunk road network as the 
executive agency of the Department for Transport. The HA's road network is split 
into areas which are managed and maintained on a contractual basis by agents. 
These agents are responsible for providing incident support units, traffic management 
support, equipment and personnel for incident clearance, debris removal, minor 
hazardous material spills and other incident related activities. 
Originally the HA and its contractors role was purely one of assisting with the 
clearance of an incident. Now it has become more proactive when it comes to 
dealing with incident management, with the provision of ISUs across the majority of 
its network instigated to support the emergency services and the roll-out of 
Highways Agency Traffic Officers (HATO) in certain areas. The new HATOs will 
provide a first response to incidents in conjunction with ISUs to clear incidents and 
reduce congestion on the trunk road network. The HA's National Traffic Control 
Centre (NTCC) provides national strategic traffic management and motorist 
information for incidents, operating variable message signs to advise of delays and 
diversions and disseminating information to pertinent agencies. 
Recovery Services 
The privately operated recovery services are arguably one of the most important 
partners in motorway incident management as many incidents can not be cleared 
until they have finished their job. On motorways these services are generally 
operated under contract to the police but many motorists are also members of 
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automobile clubs such as the RAC, AA and Britannia Rescue who will provide them 
with services. 
2.38 Section Summary 
It can be seen how complex an incident can be with many agencies having varied 
roles and responsibilities. It is occasionally not clear who is responsible for a certain 
link of the chain which can cause friction between parties. It can also be seen how 
varying organisations have different work cultures with some very response 
orientated and operating 24 hours whilst others are not. Also worthy of notification 
is that private companies, such as recovery services, are profit-driven and therefore 
very aware of the amount of time for which they are involved and the resources they 
apply. 
To improve incident management and clarify individuals' roles and responsibilities 
cross agency organisational training and debriefs must be held. This would highlight 
areas for improvement and identify stakeholders to drive the process forward. 
With the wide variety of organisations involved in incident management on 
motorways it shows how important communication, coordination and cooperation 
are. Multiple strategic partnerships must be undertaken to reduce the impact of 
incidents and increase safety for motorists and responders. 
2.4 M25 - London Orbital Motorway 
The M25 motorway, figure 2.4, is the orbital motorway that encircles London and is 
one of the world longest city bypasses. It is not quite a full circle - the only break is 
to the East of London, when it crosses the river Thames on the A282 via the Dartford 
Crossing (consisting of two tunnels and a bridge). The M25 is the strategic hub of 
Britain's motorway network and was designed as a bypass for London and the 
surrounding towns giving substantial traffic relief for communities, particularly from 
heavy goods traffic. 
It is approximately 118 miles in length and is dual three lane carriageway or dual 
four lane carriageway and by Christmas 2005 will be dual five lane between 
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junctions 12 and 14 and dual six lane between junctions 14 and 15. It also has left 
lane hard shoulders over the majority of its length and thirty two junctions. There 
are approximately 500,000 yards of crash barrier, 234 bridges over and under the 
motorway and 452 emergency roadside telephones on the M25. 
( 
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Figure 2.4 Map of the M25 London Orbital Motorway. (Highways Agency, 
2004c). 
Since its completion in 1986 it has become one of the busiest motorways in Europe, 
coming under ever increasing strain with demand often outstripping capacity. More 
than 700,000 daily journeys are made on it and the busiest south western section of 
the M25 regularly carries over 200,000 vehicles per day (Department for Transport, 
1998). The M25 accounts for approximately 6% of the mileage of British motorway 
network, but carries '14% of all motorway traffic (Department of Transport, 1990). 
Today only 30% of road users on the motorway actual use it as a bypass, starting and 
finishing outside the M25, 60% use it as a part of their journey, crossing from outside 
to inside, and the remaining 10% of users start and finish within the M25. Of all the 
traffic that uses the motorway in the morning peak approximately 50% are journey's 
to work and the average car occupancy is very low at 1.15. The average distance 
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driven on the M25 is only two to three junctions. The usage of the M25 is partly due 
to the design, with many junctions installed as an inducement to local communities 
to allow its construction allowing local traffic to use what was intended as a long 
distance route. 
As one of Europe's busiest motorway, congestion is a major problem. Each year, 
traffic congestion leads to millions of hours of vehicle delays and causes significant 
losses in productivity, increases in fuel consumption and environmental pollution 
(Department for Transport, 1998). 
The famous congestion on the M25 has inspired jokes- "The world's biggest car 
park", "the road to nowhere" and "The world's largest roundabout" (Clarke, 1986) - 
songs- Chris Rea's "The road to hell" and the following tongue-in-cheek theory 
(Wikipedia, 2005): 
"Many Phenomena - wars, plagues, sudden audits - have been 
advanced as evidence for the hidden hand of Satan in the affairs of 
man, but whenever students of demonology get together the M25 
London orbital motorway is generally agreed to be among the top 
contenders for exhibit A." 
- Good Omens by Terry Pratchet and Neil Gaiman. 
2..41 M25 History 
In 1854 Joseph Paxton, engineer and architect of the Crystal Palace for the 1851 
Great Exhibition, submitted plans for an 11 mile long ring road around London, 
following roughly the route of today's London Underground Circle Line, later built 
in the 1880s. He proposed a covered arcade 72 feet wide ring road for pedestrians 
and carriages that was bordered by multi-level houses and shops with eight track 
railways above. His proposal was ultimately turned down by Parliament (Evans et 
al, 1986). 
Another idea for a London city bypass was discussed in 1905 when the Royal 
Commission on London Traffic suggested a ring road solution to London's building 
traffic problems, proposing a ring about 12 miles in radius from central London 
(Department of Transport, 1986). 
In 1934 the then Minister of Transport Leslie Hore-Belisha instructed a 
comprehensive and systematic survey of highway developments required in the 
London Traffic Area to be investigated, which produced the first coherent proposal 
for an orbital road around greater London, drawn up by Sir Charles Bressey and Sir 
Edward Lutyens. The route of their south orbital road plans actually follow closely 
the route of the M25 as it is today, starting at the Dartford Tunnel (which opened in 
1963) and carrying on round to between Addlestone and Egham. Their North route 
however was rather different and incorporated a number of existing stretches of road 
which had been built in accordance with a plan by Colonel Hellard in 1910, who was 
the chief engineer of the Board of Trade Traffic Branch in the London area 
(Motorway Archive Trust, 2005). 
In 1944 the Greater London Plan by Sir Patrick Abercrombie was published where 
he proposed a series of five rings around London: 
"A Ring": a sub-arterial route encircling an extended central area, 
"B Ring": an arterial for fast traffic to Earls Court in the West, the Isle of 
Dogs in the East, Islington in the North and Dulwich in the South, 
"C Ring": a sub-arterial formed of the north and south circulars, 
"D Ring": an express arterial just outside the built up area, 
"E Ring": a sub-arterial comprising the North and South orbitals. 
Much work had been undertaken on the issue of relieving London of traffic and 
many proposals put forward but very little progress was made mainly due to the fact 
that there was no central government control until the 1946 Trunk Road Act 
extended the Ministry of Transports jurisdiction. Also, the plans had to wait for the 
1947 Town and Country Planning Act and the Special Roads Act 1949 to provide 
suitable legislation. Despite the passing of the acts, little was done to implement the 
plans (Motorway Archive Trust, 2005). 
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It was not until the 1970s however that increasing traffic demanded government 
action into plans to create a high capacity bypass for London, at one time a 
combination of an inner (A406 North circular upgrade to M15) and outer road (M25) 
as recommended by the Greater London Development Plan. In 1975 the then 
Minister of Transport, John Gilbert, announced the consolidation into a single ring 
London orbital road, to be known as the London Orbital Motorway, the M25, to be 
made from separate relief roads North (M16 outer orbital) and South (M25) of 
London. At its closest (junction 24, near Potters Bar) the proposed M25 was 
approximately 13 miles (21 kin) and at its furthest (junction 5 and 28, Sevenoaks and 
Brentwood) 22 miles (35 km) from Charing Cross. 
The first section of the now combined M25 to be opened in 1975 was a 2.7 mile (4.3 
km) stretch from the Al to the A 111. By January 1984 with the completion of the 
section between junctions 25 (AlO) and 27 (Ml!) meant that there was now a 
continuous 43 miles (70 km) stretch between junction 23 (South Mimms) and 
junction 3 (Swanley). Another milestone was the completion in October 1985 of the 
section between Reigate and Wisley which completed the south-western section, 
providing a direct motorway link between Heathrow and Gatwick airports. Finally in 
October 1986 the concluding 8 mile (13 km) section of the M25 between Micklfield 
Green and South Mimms was completed and the Orbital was finished. The new road 
now provided a direct motorway link between the Ml, Heathrow, M40, M4, M3, 
Dartford tunnel and access to the Channel ports (Department of Transport, 1986). 
The M25 was estimated to have cost £1,000 million to construct in 1986. 
In total there were some 39 separate Public Inquiries into the route, compulsory 
purchase of land and treatment of subsidiary roads, which lasted for more than 700 
sitting days. The inquiries resulted in a delicate balance between the advantages of 
the road to the community against the disadvantages to individuals and groups. A 
number of changes to the design of the road also resulted from the enquiry, including 
a greater use of cuttings and false cuttings to hide the road from view (Department of 
Transport, 1986). 
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There is extensive literature detailing the planning, design and construction of the 
M25 London Orbital Motorway: Jones (1982), Evans (1984), Evans and Lawrence 
(1985), Allinson, et al (1985), Hooper and Rushton (1985), Watts (1986), Langdon 
(1986), Peters and Roe (1986), Richardson, A. F. (1986), Salt and Hart (1987), Peters 
and Welton (1990) and McLeod and Clark (1999) 
2.4.2 M25 Future 
The Highways Agency recently announced a £1.6 billion scheme to upgrade all of 
the remaining dual three lane sections of the M25 to dual four lane. This accounts 
for approximately two thirds of the M25 road network. It is not an option however to 
continually build a way out of congestion on the M25 and a sustainable solution must 
be found for the long term to ensure safer and less congested journeys. 
Figure 2.5 Proposed Outer Orbital Motorway Map (Transport 2000, 2005). 
To relieve the congestion on the M25 an outer M25 was suggested in the 
governments "Roads for Prosperity" programme in 1989. The new route, shown in 
figure 2.5, would go from a new Thames crossing at either Canvey Island or 
Gravesend and orbit the capital to the North of Chelmsford, Stansted Airport and 
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Luton, to the West of High Wycombe and Bracknell, and to the South of Guilford, 
Crawley, Gatwick and Sevenoaks, eventually returning to the new crossing. 
2.4.3 M25 Sphere 
The M25 Sphere (figure 2.6) or Highways Agency area 5, is the HA area that 
contains the M25 motorway. It consists of the M25 motorway as well as additional 
motorways and trunk roads in and out of London including the Ml in the North, M4 
in the West and the M20 and M26 in the South-East. Since September 2001, for the 
first time, a single team consisting of the managing agent, Mouchel Parkman and 
term maintenance contractor Carillion plc has been operating the area on behalf of 
the HA. 
Area 5 facts: 
• 500 Km (3 10 miles) of routes 
• Over 2500 Km total lane length 
• At least 80% of M25 Sphere is Motorways 
• Total length of safety barriers is over 780,000 metres 
• Over 520 foot, road and rail bridges and 5 tunnels 
• Over 1,000 SOS telephone boxes 
• The length of grass verges is at least 1,035,000 metres 
• Approximately 224,000 coloured road studs 
Responding to incidents is only a small part of the tasks carried out by the M25 
Sphere Management team. As part of their contract they must also perform the 
following operations: 
Incident Response Service 
• Highways, Footways & Cycleways General Maintenance 
• Bridge General Maintenance 
• Street Lighting & Road Sign Maintenance 
• Winter Salting & Snow Clearance 
• Verge & Landscape Maintenance 
• Highway Improvements & Safety Measures 
Mi 
• Traffic Management 
• Authorising Skips & Scaffolding 
• Approving Abnormal Load Movements 
• Technical Surveys 
• Liaising with Police, Local Authorities & Statutory Undertakers 
• Liaison with Residents & General Public 
All these tasks are essential so the day to day operation of the M25 sphere runs as 
smoothly as possible 
HaIs + 
A.. 	* 	






Figure 2.6 Map of Roads Within the M25 Sphere (Highways Agency, 2003). 
2.5 Highways Agency 
The Highways Agency (HA), established in 1994, is the Executive Agency of the 
Department for Transport (Dif), who operate, maintain and improve the strategic 
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road network in England on behalf of the Secretary of State for Transport. The 
Secretary of State is responsible for overall Government policy on motorways and 
trunk roads in England and determining the financial resources and the strategic 
framework within which it operates. 
The HA's purpose is to provide safe and reliable long distance journeys by managing 
the traffic using the country's strategic routes. They aim to deliver a high quality 
service to their road users by reducing congestion, improving journey reliability and 
along with road safety, improving management of incidents and road works, 
providing better motorist information and respecting the environment. 
The HA's road network includes various types of roads, ranging from motorways 
carrying up to 200,000 vehicles per day to single carriageway trunk roads carrying 
fewer than 10,000 vehicles per day. These roads comprise some 4,818 miles (7,754 
km) of routes which carry a third of all road traffic in England and two thirds of all 
heavy freight traffic, with over 170 billion vehicle kilometres of journeys undertaken 
each year. 
It has been estimated that incidents account for approximately 25% of all congestion 
on the trunk road network, with road works accounting for 10% and the remaining 
65% due to recurrent congestion. All of this congestion is estimated to cost the 
British economy approximately £3bn ($5.25bn) a year (National Audit Office, 2005). 
2.6 Incident Support Units 
A key objective of the HA is to reduce congestion and increase the reliability of 
journey times. One way to do this is to work with the Police to provide a faster 
response to incidents and quicker clearance of blocked lanes. The Incident Support 
Unit (ISU) was developed to support the effective management of incidents and 
increase co-ordination between the HA's service providers, the Police and other 
Emergency Services. ISUs are operated on the HA's routes by contractors. 
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With sections of the M25 motorway carrying an average of 200,000 vehicles a day 
even a minor incident can bring traffic to a halt very quickly. To help mitigate the 
impact of incidents on the road users of the M25, a new joint initiative by the 
Highways Agency and Carillion plc has been implemented. A fleet of sixteen ISUs 
are on standby 24 hours a day, 365 days a year to solve problems on the M25 and 
adjoining roads (known as the M25 Sphere). These vehicles are dedicated 
maintenance vehicles that do minor maintenance activities on the network, but are 
available whenever an incident occurs or their presence is requested by the 
emergency services. The ISUs are placed at strategic locations around the road 
network and are monitored by GPS, allowing the nearest vehicle to be dispatched. 
They are manned by specialist two man crews, equipped with cones, warning signs, 
environmental protection packs and suitable equipment to deal with most situations 
and carry out emergency maintenance and repairs. ISUs are neither allowed nor 
responsible for removing vehicles from travel lanes, but do provide emergency 
traffic management to protect incident scenes. At incident scenes they free up police 
resources, allowing them to concentrate on their investigation, while the ISU 
expedites the roadway clearance. The aim is to work together as an integrated team 
with the aim of clearing incidents and opening lanes at the earliest opportunity. 
ISUs are now in use on the majority of trunk roads and motorways in England. One 
of the key benefits of the ISUs is that the response time to incidents, contractually 
20minutes, is greatly improved as prior to the service response times were anywhere 
up to 1.5 hours. 
The aim of this service is to provide assistance to the emergency services and reduce 
the impact of an incident on the road network by providing a safe and timely 
response and quicker clearance of blocked lanes. The role of Carillion's ISUs is to: 
• Provide immediate response to incidents on the road network, 
• Provide emergency, short term lane closures, 
• Deal immediately with minor, incident related debris, 
• Undertake minor repairs to highway infrastructure damaged by an incident, 
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• Assess the incident scene and request attendance of additional or specialist 
resources when the task is beyond that of the ISU's capabilities, 
• Provide a communications link between the incident site and the network 
control centre, 
• Patrolling, monitoring and reporting on the network. 
• Undertaking routine maintenance, 
• Making safe defects to the highway infrastructure. 
To date, on the M25 Sphere road network, from the start of Carillion's contract in 
September 2001, ISUs have been involved with more than 38,000 incidents. 
2.6.1 ISU Operative Training 
The ISU operatives must complete specialised training. This training is both 
classroom and practical "hands-on" based, including "ride-a-longs" with experienced 
ISU crews. Training is continuous and ISU operatives must pass refresher courses. 
Examples of some areas covered in training are shown below. 
• Functions of ISUs 
• Road network 
familiarisation 
• Health and Safety 
• Driver training 
Traffic Management 
• Scene management 
• First aid 
• Hazardous chemical awareness 
• Fire awareness 
• HIAB/Loading shovel 
• Communication skills 
2.6.2 ISU Vehicles and Equipment 
The ISUs are equipped with traffic management, environmental protection packs and 
suitable equipment to deal with most situations and carry out emergency 
maintenance and repairs. A detailed list of the minimum contractual required 
equipment is shown in table 2.1 but additional equipment may need to be carried to 
reflect the nature and frequency of incidents within particular areas. 
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Table 2.1 Minimum ISU Equipment 
Installed Equipment 
• Halogen work lights 
• Two-way radio 
• Mobile Data Terminal 
. 
Traffic Management Equipment 
• Reflective traffic cones 
(minimum of 30) 
• Cone Lamps (minimum of 
15) 
• Diverted traffic signs 
• Road narrow signs 
Tools 
• Sandbags 
• Disc cutter + PPE 
• Hand saw and bow saw 
• Manhole lifting keys 
• Sledge hammer 
• Brushes 
• Shovels 
• Safety fence spanners 
• 
Materials 
• Pot hole repair material 
• Oil absorbing granules 
• Oil absorbing boom 
• Carcass disposal bags 
• Lamp batteries 
• Marker paint. 
Personal Equipment 
• Fluorescent reflective 
jacket and trousers 
• Mobile phone 
• Flashlight 
• Gloves 
• Reporting forms  
• Warning Lights 
• Electric light arrow and crash 
cushion (some vehicles) 
• Keep right/left (610) arrows 
• Road closed signs 
• Flooding signs 
• Traffic lights inoperable signs 
• Sandbags 
• Sharps box 
• Electronic data capture device 
• Drain rods and stoppers 
• Pickaxe 
• Washing facility 
• Dog-pole 
• 9kg dry powder extinguisher 
• Cutting discs 
• First aid kit 
• Temporary fencing 
• Gully seals 
• Fence nails and staples 
• Route maps and plans 
• Generic Risk Assessments 
• Method Statements 
• ISU Operations Manual 
• Diversion route plans 
• Contact telephone list 
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There is no national standard for the type of vehicle operated by the HA's contractors 
but they must all be capable of completing all contractual duties safely. Contractors' 
vehicles include panel vans, open flat bed trucks and even full traffic management 
vehicles with crash cushions, which are usually operated on the busiest routes. All 
vehicles must however be livened in the HA's corporate livery with examples shown 
in figure 2.7. The main purpose of the livery is safety, with retro reflective material 
covering as much of the vehicle possible. A national consistent brand vehicle livery 
also helps to build recognition and customer confidence in the HA and its services 
AW 
Figure 2.7 Examples of ISU Vehicles and Livery. 
2.7 Highways Agency Traffic Officers 
Traditionally the HA and its contractors have built and maintained the English road 
network whilst police forces have provided the operational side, primarily addressing 
unplanned incidents. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and 
Highways Agency roles and responsibilities review (Highways Agency, 2005a) 
made recommendations to transfer some of the operational roles over to the HA. The 
Highways Agency Traffic Officer (HATO) concept was developed as an on-road 
support service where civilian HA personnel will perform a number of general traffic 
and road management tasks previously undertaken exclusively by the police. For 
example when an incident now occurs the police still retain responsibility for 
investigation of criminality and, for major accidents, will be in charge at the scene 
and in control offices but the HATOs will concentrate on managing the traffic. 
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The HAlOs will: 
• Stop and direct traffic 	 • Support the Police in their duties 
• Place road signs 	 • Provide mobile/temporary road 
• Undertake high visibility 	 closures 
patrols 	 • Clear debris from carriageways 
• Help and protect drivers in 	• Arrange removal of damaged or 
distress 	 abandoned vehicles. 
The role of the HATOs has been developed in cooperation with the police and will 
enable the police to focus on their core roles of tackling crime, investigating 
collisions and enforcing the law. HATOs are not permitted to offer mechanical 
assistance to motorists but will arrange for assistance/recovery and stay with the 
motorist until it is safe for them to leave. 
The first HATOs started in the West Midlands region of England, around the city of 
Birmingham, in April 2004. This was the start of their staged rollout across the 
whole of the HA's strategic road network, due for completion by the end of 2005. 
Eventually there will be approximately 1,200 Traffic Officers and 300 Regional 
Control Centre staff working to keep traffic moving and improving safety. 
HATOs started operating on part of the M25 motorway around London on the 1st of 
August 2005. Initially they will patrol between junction 2 and junction 14 on the 
M25 as well as some stretches of the M23 and M3 under the control of the South 
East Regional Control Centre (RCC) at Godstone. Six double manned vehicles will 
patrol this section with more staff and vehicles being added when more road sections 
come under the control of the South East RCC with eventually more than 150 
HATO's and supervisors operating 14 patrols over the whole area. 
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As the Traffic Officer position was completely new and some police powers were to 
be transferred, several laws had to be changed and amended to provide them with 
new powers such as: 
Stop traffic and close roads, lanes and carriageways 
Direct and divert traffic 
• Place and operate traffic signs 
• Manage traffic at traffic surveys. 
On 22nd July 2004 the Traffic Management Bill received Royal Assent after 
successfully completing the Parliamentary process, becoming the Traffic 
Management Act 2004. This new legislation provided them with special powers so 
that they are able to perform certain traffic management tasks previously carried out 
by the police. This now means that it is an offence not to comply with the directions 
of a HATO. Further secondary legislation is also being sought to further extend the 
HATOs powers. 
2.7.1 HAlO Training 
All HATOs, supervisors and control room staff receive comprehensive and 
professional training at each level, with a summary of the on road HATOs training 
shown in table 2.2. Supervisors receive an additional 4 days training which includes 
trauma diffusion, media skills and Performance and Development Plans (PDP). The 
training is delivered through both classroom instruction and hands-on exercises. 








Induction 	 2 Supervisors: 
Familiarization 	3 Trauma Diffusion 	½ 
People Skills 2 Media Skills 	½ 
Health & Safety 	3 PDPIILM 3 
Highway Patrol II 
Driving 	 7 
First Aid 
HABIT 
Total Days =30 or 34 
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The training is provided both internally and by external partners and contractors. 
Some external courses include: first aid training provided by the Red Cross, driving 
by Police driving schools and health and safety by Fire service colleges. Once all 
initial training is completed the traffic officers receive an accredited qualification, the 
"Certificate in Traffic Management", which is externally verified by City and Guilds. 
The HATOs will also be continually assessed to ensure competency of staff. 
2.7.2 HATO Vehicles and Equipment 
INK 
Figure 2.8 Examples of HATO Vehicles and Livery. 
The HATO vehicles are all large and powerful four-wheel drive and are fully 
livened, with examples shown in figure 2.8. These vehicles were chosen as they 
were thought to be the most flexible for the role: good safety for occupants, power 
for towing/dragging vehicles from the carriageway and all weather capabilities. 
They are marked very similar to motorway traffic police vehicles which use blue and 
yellow "battenburg" rather than the black and yellow used by HATOs. These 
contrasting colours, on the vehicle sides increase conspicuousness and were chosen 
to increase safety. The material used is retro reflective (florescent and reflective) 
which gives good results both day and night. The HATOs similar colours to the 
police also assist with their duties as motorists consider their driving habits more 
when they believe they are in the presence of the police. The fully marked vehicles 






Figure 2.9 Examples of HATO Equipment and Storage. 
Table 2.3 HATO Standard Equipment, Tools, and Supplies. 
Installed Equipment 
• Rear tow ball 
	
• Electronic Message Sign 
• Halogen work lights 	 • Warning Lights 
• Two-way radio w/repeater 
Portable Equipment and Tools 
• Tow straps 
• Reflective traffic cones 
(minimum of 20) 
• Cone Lamps 
• Dog-pole 
• Portable traffic control 
signs 
Supplies 
• Water (16 litres) 
• Tape 
• Safety area tape 
• Fire extinguishers 
• Fire blanket 
• Area maps 
• Wipes 
Personal Equipment 
• Fluorescent reflective 
jacket and trousers 
• Mobile phone 
• Flashlight 
• Searchlight  
• Push brooms, shovels and scoops 
• Camera 
• Pry bar 
• First aid kit 
• Emergency escape hammers 
• Hazardous spill kit 
• Emergency thermal blankets 
(minimum of 10) 
• Emergency ponchos (minimum of 
10) 
• Refuse bags 
• Face masks 
• Spare batteries 
• Portable two-way radio 
• Gloves 
• Binoculars 
• Manuals and guidebooks 
• Reporting forms 
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The HATO vehicles carry the majority of equipment that would allow them to 
quickly deal with minor incidents or reduce the impact of larger incidents. An 
example of the equipment carried is shown in figure 2.9 and an example list is shown 
in table 2.3. 
2.8 International Incident Management Programme 
Comparison 
2.8.1 Introduction 
To assist with the evaluation and optimisation of the incident support service on the 
M25 several international incident management programmes were contacted and a 
review is presented below. 
2.8.2 Background 
To mitigate non-recurrent congestion, rapid response and clearance is essential. In 
the US, many incident management programmes have been developed in recent 
years with freeway service patrols (FSP) playing a major role (Roper, 1990). FSPs 
are usually roving vehicles that are intended to detect, respond to and clear incidents, 
in partnership with other emergency responders, facilitating the quick removal of 
incidents (Skabardonis et al, 1998). They typically offer a broad range of services 
including motorist assistance, debris removal, vehicle clearance, first aid and traffic 
control (ITS, 2000). All services rendered by FSPs are generally free and often 
include: minor mechanical repairs, water, air and fuel. They were initially used at 
spot locations such as bridges or tunnels where incidents would have a great impact 
on traffic flow. An extensive introduction to FSPs is given by McDade (1990). 
Roving patrols were introduced at first only on a temporary basis during holiday 
periods or in heavy tourist areas in peak seasons. The first regular roving patrol was 
the Chicago Emergency Traffic Patrol (ETP) which commenced operating in 1960 
(Fenno and Ogden, 1998). Today there are in excess of 70 FSP programmes in 
operation in the United States. 
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In the United Kingdom, FSPs are not operated. In England, in 2000 the Highways 
Agency deployed fleets of Incident Support Units (ISUs) on some of the most 
congested roads. Also, in the spring of 2004 Highways Agency Traffic Officers 
(HATO) commenced operating on motorways and trunk roads in the West Midlands. 
ISUs and HATOs have been discussed in Section 2.6 and 2.7 
A selection of four FSP programmes in the United States are detailed below. 
2.8.3 Florida Department of Transportation Road Rangers 
Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) operates an incident management 
programme over the busier roads in the state. The service patrol concept is a service 
of FDOT and its partners and was initially used for the management of vehicle 
incidents in construction zones, during the 1980's. The units were known as 
"Highway Helpers". This programme has since been renamed to "Road Rangers", 
and expanded, to respond to all types of incidents. It has become one of the most 
effective elements of the Department's incident management programme. The 
Department began funding the state-wide service patrol in December 1999. Funding 
for the programme comes from State maintenance funds for Intelligent 
Transportation Systems (ITS) projects. 
The goals of the programme are to: 
. Reduce secondary collisions (In Florida, 33% of all accidents were 
secondary); 
• Improve responder safety; 
• Improve response and clearance times; 
• Reduce incident congestion and delay; 
• Decrease economic impact of incidents. 
The Road Rangers are roving vehicles that patrol congested areas and high incident 
locations of the urban freeway and are fully equipped to deal with most situations. 
Their main role is to assist the general public, keep roads open and increase safety 
for road users. The vehicle operators are mechanics, fully qualified first-aiders, and 
are trained in incident management practices. 
The benefits of the programme have been as follows: 
• The reduction of accidents; 
• The reduction of incident duration by assisting the Florida Highway Patrol 
(FHP); 
• Assistance to stranded or disabled motorists; 
• Keep traffic moving, reducing delay; 
• The removal of road debris; 
• Reduced response times to incidents, (41 minutes for FHP, Road Rangers on 
20 minute loop); 
Increased safety for road users. 
All of the Road Ranger vehicles carry the minimum of the follow equipment: 
• 	Towing Straps, • Brooms, 
• Rubber push-bumper, • Shovels, 
• 	Spot lights, • Flares, 
• Power 	outlets 	and 	jumper • Cones (15 each), 
cables, • 2 ton jack, 
• 	Arrowboard, • Compressor, 
• Fully equipped tool box, • Torches, 
• 	Fuel 	(diesel 	and 	unleaded) • Trash can, 
(minimum 10 gallons of each), • Absorbent material, 
• 	Motor oil, • Drinking water, 
• First aid kit, • Disposable camera, 
• 	Fire extinguishers, • Mobile phones, 
• Radiator water, • Tire repair kit, 
• 	Car belts, • Public address system. 
• Wood blocks, 
In central Florida there are two main Road Ranger programmes operating. Firstly 
the FDOT, district 5, programme which operates on Interstate 4 from County Road 
532 in Osceola County to Saxon Boulevard in Volusia County. The second service 
is a partnership between FDOT and the Orlando-Orange County Expressway 
Authority (OOCEA) who provide a service on toll roads around the central Florida 
area. 
FDOT Interstate 4 Programme. 
Interstate 4 (1-4) is one of the busiest roads in Florida. It runs from Tampa in the 
West to Daytona Beach in the East. The district 5 Road Ranger programme runs 
from the Osceola/Polk county line to the Seminole/Volusia county line on 
approximately 53.6 miles of 1-4. The service is operated under contract by LYNX. 
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Figure 2.10 Road Map of Central Florida. 
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Six service patrol vehicles patrol 5 zones on a twenty minute loop. Each assists in 
incident management, including incident detection, traffic control and the removal of 
disabled vehicles from travel lanes. The vehicles are manned by one operator and 
have all the tools and equipment necessary for making minor vehicle repairs, pushing 
vehicles involved in non-injury incidents out of travel lanes, securing incident scenes 
and removing debris from the roadway. The operators also have the necessary 
training to complete the above tasks. They provide fuel and radiator fluid, change 
flat tires, replace/repair belts and hoses and offer other simple repair services that can 
typically be completed in less than 15 minutes, all at no cost to the motorist, if 
repairs are not possible, the use of a mobile phone is offered to allow the motorist to 
contact a tow company or a relative. Operators remain with motorists pending the 
arrival of towing company. On average the 1-4 Road Rangers have 30 assists per 
day. 
Figure 2.11 Line-up of LYNX 1-4 Road Ranger Vehicles. 
All vehicles are all full size, heavy duty, 1/2 ton long bed pickup trucks with crew 
cabs, capable of easily carrying all necessary equipment. Each vehicle is fitted with 
a full lighting package which also includes a Radar Safety Warning System, to warn 
approaching motorists, with radar detectors, of road hazards ahead. The system is 
activated whenever the vehicles lightbar is turned on. 
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Figure 2.12 LYNX Road Ranger Vehicle. 
The service operates 8 hours a day: between 6am-10am, 3:30pm-7:30pm weekdays. 
Additional hours at weekends and for special events are also scheduled. Whenever 
an operator stops to provide assistance, the motorist is given a postage paid comment 
card and requested to return at their convenience. Up to the end of March 2002, 
1443 responses had been received. From this feedback there has only been one 
negative answer- free petrol was refused to one motorist who had been given petrol 
three previous times. 
It is proposed to expand the central Florida Road Rangers to a 24 hour service on 
weekdays and 9:30am-6:30pm at weekends. The number of patrol vehicles would be 
expanded to nine from the current six and ten more operators would be hired. 
OOCEA / FDOT partnership programme. 
The motorist assistance services, provided by the Orlando and Orange County 
Expressway Authority (OOCEA), are operated under contract by Martin Petroleum 
Corporation of Florida. The contract is for a three year period, with a one year 
option, and is worth $1,511,100 (f1,036,846). These vehicles are mainly funded 







Figure 2.13 OOCEA / FDOT Road Ranger Vehicle. 
The Road Rangers' patrol 96 miles of the expressway system including State Road 
408 (East-West Expressway), State Road 417 (Central Florida Greeneway), and 
portions of State Road 528 (Bee Line Expressway). These roads are separated into 
five patrol sectors. Each sector is patrolled by one road ranger vehicle during peak 
periods (6am-lOam, 3.30pm-7.30pm) 365 days a year. 
The expressway authority vehicles are all full size, heavy duty, 1/2 ton long bed 
pickup trucks with extended cabs and all vehicles are equipped with Nextel cellular 
mobile telephones and Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) radios. Every vehicle is fitted 
with either a Dynamic Message Sign (DMS) or lightarrow board for traffic control. 
Each vehicle is manned by one fully trained operator who makes on average 7-8 
assists a day. At every assist a postage paid response card is issued- to date over 
1000 returned of which all were very positive. 
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Service provided by operators include: 
• Attempt minor repairs, not exceeding 15 minutes; 
• If not corrected, motorist are allowed three, 3 minute phone calls to make 
arrangements for further service; 
• Move disabled vehicles; 
• Provide minimum amount of fuel to reach closest fuel station; 
• Follow directions of law enforcement personnel; 
• Protect accident scene; 
• Clear debris; 
• Change flat tires; 
• Give jump starts. 
Every operator must complete an incident log after every assist. The log should 
include: 
• The date of log entry; 
• The following times; 
- Time when advised of incident; 
- Time of arrival at scene; 
- Time of departure from scene; 
• The nature of each incident; 
• Whether incident was detected by normal patrol or dispatch; 
• Incident location - Mile marker and lane(s) located and direction of travel; 
• Vehicle make, model, body type, license plate number; 
• Nature of problem; 
• Disabled vehicle driver's name; 
• Type of assistance provided; 
• Any damage evident before moving of vehicle; 
• Was additional assistance required; 
• Service patrol vehicle operator's name and vehicle license number; 
• Service patrol vehicle odometer reading at beginning and end of each shift; 
• Weather conditions. 
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Figure 2.14 Examples of OOCEA / FDOT Road Ranger Vehicle with DMS 
Activated. 
Other FDOT Road Ranger Programmes 
FDOT's Road Ranger programme is not limited to District 5, all other districts run 




Figure 2.15 Examples of FDOT District 4 Road Ranger Tow Truck Vehicle. 
FDOT District 4, which covers Ft. Lauderdale and Palm Beach, has a fleet consisting 
completely of small tow trucks. These vehicles are used primarily to move disabled 
motorists from the roadway to a safe area or next available exit ramp. Once in a 
safer location, repairs will be attempted. When the current contracts are renewed, it 
is planned to expand the vehicle fleet to include pickups equipped with Dynamic 
Message Signs (DMS). The plan is to have the Road Rangers work in teams of four 
with three wreckers and 1 pickup per team operating on one beat. 
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Road Ranger Programme Summary 
FDOT now operate their freeway service patrol, the Road Rangers, in all of their 
districts across the state of Florida. To date they have assisted thousands of motorists 
and supported the emergency services at many incidents, improving traffic 
conditions and safety across the whole state. 
The Road Ranger programme has been expanded very rapidly, almost doubling in 
size. They are becoming first responders, often arriving at incidents prior to the 
emergency services. In the future, to support their activities, all vehicles will be 
fitted with automatic vehicle locators (AVL), 25% units to be equipped with DMS 
and 25% units to be tow trucks to allow faster quick clearance and motorists' 
information, without the need to wait for assistance from another party. Operative 
training will be improved and more advanced training will also be given. The Road 
Rangers will centrally dispatch to provide a more integrated programme with the 
emergency services. 
FDOT's "Open Roads Policy" 
In an effort to provide the travelling public of the State of Florida a cost effective, 
high quality, transportation infrastructure, the Florida Department of Transportation 
has implemented their "Open Roads Policy" for quick clearance, safety and mobility, 
to make travel in Florida safer and more efficient (FDOT, 2005). 
The "Open Roads Policy" is an agreement between the Florida Highway Patrol 
(FHP) and the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) and establishes a policy 
for FHP and FDOT personnel to expedite the removal of vehicles, cargo and debris 
to restore, in an "urgent manner" the safe and orderly flow of traffic following a 
motor vehicle crash or incident on Florida's roadways (FDOT, 2005). Roadways 
will be cleared as soon as it is safe to do so and it is understood that damage to 
vehicles or cargo may occur as a result of using this quick clearance policy. While 
reasonable attempts to avoid damage will be taken, the major concern is to restore 
the roadway to normal conditions as the cost of incident induced congestion is 
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considerably greater than the salvage value of an already damaged vehicle and its 
cargo. 
As part of the policy when requested by FHP or other emergency agency, FDOT 
have agreed to respond and deploy resources at traffic incidents 24 hours a day, 7 
days per week. Each individual FDOT District will also develop and implement 
response procedures to meet the goal of providing initial traffic management on 
scene within 30 minutes of notification during normal working hours and 60 minutes 
after hours and on weekends. 
Ultimately MOT and FHP's aim is to have roadways cleared as soon as possible, 
with the goal that all incidents should be cleared from the roadway within 90 
minutes. 
To support the strategy detailed in the "Open Roads Policy" legislation has been 
introduced which limits liability during quick clearance. This eliminates liability for 
FDOT, fire fighters, police officers, etc. to remove a vehicle and its cargo off the 
roadway when it presents a safety hazard. 
RISC Incentive Towing Contracts 
Consistent with the Open Roads Policy, Florida's Turnpike Enterprise, who maintain 
Florida's toll roads, has adopted an innovative clearance strategy by implementing 
the Roadway Incident Scene Clearance (RISC) Programme in order to significantly 
reduce the time it takes to clear major accidents and incidents. The programme 
involves an enhanced contract with recovery operators that include incentives for 
quick clearance and disincentives for delayed clearance. Previously recovery 
operators were paid by the hour for their service with some unscrupulous operators 
"dragging their heals" to get paid more, which was not conducive to quick clearance. 
As part of the new contracts the recovery operator should respond to requests for 
vehicle recovery and clearance services within fifteen minutes, 24 hours a day, 7 
days a week. Once the recovery agent confirms the request they must arrive at the 
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incident scene with all contractual equipment, personnel and vehicles within one 
hour. All RISC contractors are specially qualified with very heavy duty recovery 
equipment and highly trained operators who know how to safely and quickly clear 
roadways. The RISC programme is in addition to the normal rotational tow list 
currently used by FHP for typical incidents on the Turnpike system. 
A full summary of the RISC incentive towing contract is given in appendix A. 
2.8.4 Tennessee Department of Transportation HELP Freeway 
Service Patrol 
Stage implementation of Tennessee Department of Transportation's (TDOT) new 
freeway service patrol, known as HELP, began in June 1999 in the cities of 
Knoxville and Nashville. One year later, the service was expanded to cover the cities 
of Chattanooga and Memphis. The HELP patrols operate on some of the highest 
volume roads of these four cities, with traffic volumes on their patrol routes ranging 
from 80,000 to 120,000 annual average daily traffic (AADT). The HELP mission 
statement gives a good introduction to the programme: 
"The mission of HELP is to minimize traffic congestion, promote the 
safe movement of people and products, and improve the travel 
environment. We work in partnership with emergency response 
agencies and other TDOT units as part of a highway incident 
management team. We are committed to performing our duties in a 
professional manner." 
The lime yellow, specially equipped HELP trucks operate on designated patrol 
routes. Normally, the patrols cover approximately 198 miles in the four cities 
combined, with some patrols overlapping where traffic volumes are the highest. The 
patrolling supervisors can authorise responses to off-mute locations when requested 
by law enforcement agencies. 
The uniformed HELP operators are very aggressive in dealing with incidents and 
restoring traffic to normal conditions as soon as possible. The HELP trucks operate 
as emergency vehicles, and the four-wheel drive vehicles are equipped to quickly 
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push, pull or drag disabled vehicles from the travel lanes. HELP operators and 
supervisors receive nine weeks of initial training and "quick clearance" is an 
important part of the training. Each operator has two-way radio communication with 
a HELP dispatcher and the other operating personnel and each shift supervisor has a 
police radio to facilitate coordinated response to incidents. The operators and 
patrolling supervisors are all certified as emergency medical First Responders. 
The HELP programme operates with three shifts and has 66 specially equipped 
trucks, 52 operators, 16 supervisors and 17 dispatchers. All HELP personnel are 
TDOT employees. During a regular week, at least four and as many as seven HELP 
trucks are on patrol during each shift in each city for weekdays. At weekends, there 
are normally fewer trucks on patrol. Most of the capital and operating expenses for 
the first three years of the HELP programme were paid with federal dollars, matched 
by the state, under either the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality (CMAQ) 
programme or the Surface Transportation Programme (STP). HELP began with the 
expectation that state funds would be used to continue the services beyond the first 
three years and 100% state funding for the Knoxville and Nashville services will 
begin during the 2002-2003 fiscal year. The HELP programme costs annually 
approximately $5.1 million resulting in an estimated benefit-cost ratio of more than 
6:1 (TDOT, 2005). 
TDOT HELP Training 
All HELP operatives receive comprehensive training, with initial training on a wide 
range of topics lasting nine weeks. The training is completed through classroom 
instruction and hands-on exercises. Trainees also "ride along" with experienced 
operators at different stages of the training. 
An outline of the topics covered in the HELP training course in shown in table 2.4, 
along with the approximate number of hours allocated to each topic. TDOT 
managers participate in many of the training activities, and TDOT managers and 
training staff members deliver some of the instruction. 
49 
To a large extent TDOT has put together courses and material from already existing 
sources, in some cases adapting or customising the original course or material to be 
more meaningful for the HELP programme. Most of the human resource courses are 
provided through the state Department of Personnel. The Tennessee Highway Patrol 
teaches the self defence and verbal judo course, and the Tennessee Emergency 
Management Agency teaches hazardous material awareness. The State Fire 
Marshal's office provided the initial instruction on vehicle fires and use of fire 
extinguishers, but that training is now provided by a HELP supervisor who is a 
retired fire chief. 
Table 2.4 Initial Training Modules and Approximate Number of Training 







Organization and Procedures Human Resource Skills 
HELP Orientation 	 4 Sexual Harassment Prevention 	 3 
TDOT Orientation 4 Diversity 	 6 
Organizational Policies and Practices 	12 Self-Defense/Verbal Judo 	 3 
ITS Awareness 	 2 Working In Teams 	 3 
HELP Administrative Procedures 	4 Speechcraft 	 4 
Drug Testing Awareness 	 3 Public Relations - Working with the 
Legal, Liability, and Safety Issues 	4 Media 	 6 
Operational Skills Operations 
CPR 	 8 HELP Mission 	 3 
First Responder (Medical) 	 60 HELP Operating Procedures 	 4 
Mechanical Trouble Shooting 8 Traffic Incident Management (NHI) 	12 
Radio Communications 	 4 Proper Operation and Use of Vehicle 3 
Hazardous Material Awareness 	4 Traffic Management at Incident Scenes 	8 
Vehicle Fires and Fire Extinguishers 	3 Supporting Other Incident Responders 2 
Emergency Vehicle Operations 	8 Individual Check Rides 
Orientation to HELP Trucks and Scheduled "Ride Alongs" - Partnered 
Equipment 	 8 Training 	 80 
Traffic Control 8 
Total Hours* = 282 
All of the trainees also participate in a National Highway Institute (NHI) Incident 
Management Workshop, and TDOT has arranged for the NHI instructors to present 
additional material specifically for the HELP operators. Usually, one of the NFII 
instructors accompanies each new operator on a "check ride" for personal coaching. 
The HELP first-line supervisors receive the same training as the operators, plus 
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supervisory training. All of the HELP dispatchers receive at least 40 hours of training 
through the Association of Public Safety Communications Officials (APCO), and 
many of the dispatchers have participated in parts of the operator training. Several of 
the Region HELP managers have participated in the training. Three of the current 
managers are certified as medical First Responders. 
Finally, training is a continuing process for all HELP personnel. The most structured 
part of recurrent training is to help operators maintain their First Responder 
certification, but TDOT frequently arranges special courses and guest lectures. 
Difficulties in communicating with Spanish-speaking customers prompted TDOT to 
also arrange special language classes for the HELP personnel. 
TDOT HELP Vehicles and Equipment 
The first-rate vehicles and equipment comprise a major part of programme. The 
HELP vehicles and equipment have met or exceeded all expectations and have 
allowed the operators to accomplish their work quickly and safely. Some of the most 
frequent comments from law enforcement officers and other emergency responders 
relate to the excellent quality of the vehicles and equipment. 
The HELP operators' trucks are heavy duty, four-wheel drive vehicles, with dual rear 
wheels and an ambulance-type enclosed box (canopy) mounted on the chassis. The 
mounted box has outside compartments for storage of gear and supplies as well as 
inside shelves and room for tools, equipment, and supplies. The trucks are powered 
by turbo diesel engines and equipped with heavy duty cooling systems and 
suspensions. HELP supervisors drive heavy duty, four-wheel drive pickup trucks, 
also painted lime yellow with much of the same equipment as the operators. The 
pickups have extended cabs for transporting passengers. 
Table 2.5 lists the standard equipment, tools, and supplies found on the HELP trucks. 
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Table 2.5 HELP Standard Equipment, Tools, and Supplies. 
Installed Equipment 
• Oversized 	front 	push • Retractable arrow or message board 
bumper (roof mounted) 
• Rear trailer ball • Exterior 	quick 	connect 	jumper 
• Air compressor receptacles 
• 20-foot self-retracting air • Two-way radio w/repeater 
hose • CB radio 
• 3500 watt generator • Police radio (supervisors) 
• Halogen work lights on • Front-facing video camera (some 
telescoping poles vehicles) 
• Portable flood light, cab- • Emergency vehicle package (lights, 
mounted spotlight siren, PA system etc.) 
Portable Equipment and Tools 
• Tow straps and chains • Ball pen hammer, sledge hammer, 
• Reflective 	traffic 	cones pry bar, hack saw and chisel 
(minimum of 20) • Air 	impact 	wrench, 	lug-lock 
• Portable 	traffic 	control removal tool 
signs • Portable air hose 
• Roadway flares • Jacks, wheel chocks 
• Fluorescent traffic control • Tire patch kit 
flags • 25-foot jumper cables 
• Stop/slow 	traffic 	control • Battery booster pack 
paddles Camera • Push brooms, shovels and scoops 
• Standard and metric tools, • Five-gallon bucket 
including 	sockets, • 300-foot measuring tape 
wrenches, 	screw 	drivers • Leaf blower (some vehicles) 
and vice grips • Radiological monitoring device 
Supplies 
• Gasoline and diesel fuel • Assorted fuses, hose clamps, nuts, 
• Water bolts, clips 
• Fire extinguishers • Absorbent material 
• Marking paint • Paper towels and hand cleaner 
• Electrical tape, duct tape, • Area maps and phone directories 
mechanical wire 
Medical 
• First aid/trauma kit • Blankets, flat cloth sheets 
• Oxygen kit • Automated external defibrillator 
• Eye wash kit 
Personal Equipment 
• Reflective vest and Jacket • Quick entry tool 
• Binoculars • Gloves (leather and rubber) 
• Cell phone • Manuals and guidebooks 
• Portable two-way radio • Reporting forms 




Figure 2.16 TDOT HELP Operator, Truck, and Equipment. 
2.8.5 Washington State Department of Transportation 
Incident Response Team 
In the State of Washington, as in the UK, roads are operating at or above capacity. 
The majority of all congestion is caused by accidents, broken down vehicles, spills 
and other events that obstruct the normal flow of traffic. With the average 
Washington motorist spending approximately two weeks of every year stuck in 
traffic, it is easy to see how important the Incident Response Teams (IRT) are in 
keeping Washington state moving. 
Since 1963, Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) tow trucks 
have been clearing blockages on the Interstate 90 Mercer Island floating bridge. In 
1989, IRT was highlighted as a pilot programme during the Goodwill Games in 
Seattle. This pilot programme coupled with the tow trucks on the floating bridges 










Figure 2.17 WSDOT Incident Response Team Vehicles. 
JIRT personnel provide "roving" coverage during "peak traffic periods", also 
responding 24 hours a day, seven days a week to provide traffic control, traffic 
diverting, mobile communications for "real time" traffic reporting, and assist in 
incident clearance and clean up. Helping motorists with a flat tyre, jump starts, a 
gallon of fuel and many other types of motorist assistance are also included in the 
service, all completely free. 
Figure 2.18 WSDOT Incident Response Team Vehicles. 
IRT staff are specially trained WSDOT maintenance employees. They have to 
undertake intensive training before being allowed onto the roads: 2 days classroom 
training; ride-alongs with experienced IRT drivers; 1 day ride-along with a 
Washington State trooper; 1 day visit to WSDOT's Traffic Management Centre 
(TMC) and Washington Highway Patrol's Communication Centre. 
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2.8.6 Oregon Department of Transportation COMET Incident 
Response Programme. 
In 1995, the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) initiated one of the first 
documented incident management programmes in the rural United States. With the 
cooperation of Oregon State Police and several local agencies, ODOT administers 
the incident response programme on highways and interstates all over the State of 
Oregon. The incident response programme known as COMET (COrridor 
ManagEment Team) is ODOT's response to directly addresses traffic congestion and 
delays caused by traffic incidents. 
[ I. 
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Figure 2.19 ODOT COMET Incident Response Vehicle. 
ODOT's COMET helps to keep traffic moving smoothly and safely. This is 
accomplished by pre-planned and coordinated responses that quickly and safely clear 
incidents while minimising disruption to traffic flow. The three main goals of the 
COMET programme are: Incident Prevention, Motorist Assistance, and Incident 
Management. COMET vehicles respond to an average of 1,200 incidents each 
month, including disabled vehicles, road debris, and accident/traffic control. They 
are normally first on the scene and can start incident cleanup operations. They can 
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initiate tow truck requests, call off responding emergency services when not needed, 
and set up safe traffic control. 
ODOT uses different types of COMET vehicles throughout the state but the majority 
are 3/4 ton specially equipped trucks. They are equipped with nearly everything 
needed to get the job done quickly and efficiently, specifically hazmat kits, jumper 
cables, jack, shovel, gasoline, traffic cones, pry bar, water jugs, air compressor, tow 
strap, chain saw, roller magnet, rubber push bumper and numerous other tools. They 
also carry both standard flares and speciaf electric detonating cap flares, which can 
be deposited on the move via a special launcher installed next to the cab. The trucks 
are fitted with a diesel transfer pump and holding tank, which allows leaking fuel 
tanks of Large Goods Vehicles (LGV) involved in incidents to be emptied prior to 
removal. Additionally, all COMET vehicles are fitted with LED portable variable 
message signs, rated to 90 mph. They can display any text message and many 
graphics such as arrows. The vehicle cabs are fitted with many radios including 
police and fire services. Responding emergency services contact the COMET 
personnel at incident scenes to ask incident information, best response access, 
coordinate response and best position for parking vehicles. 
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Figure 2.20 ODOT COMET Vehicle at an Accident Scene. 
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The smaller 3/4 ton trucks allow COMET vehicles to work and move well in the 
heavy congested urban areas. They are classed as emergency response vehicles 
which allow them to run with emergency lights and sirens enabling them to respond 
to incidents very rapidly. The emergency lights and sirens also help them respond 
through areas where there is little or no hard shoulder. The COMET vehicles may be 
small but they are very powerful and are capable of towing broken down heavy 
goods vehicles clear of travel lanes, with the current record being 54.5 tons. 
COMET operatives are authorised under the law to forcibly remove wreckage and 
debris (private or commercial product or items that are now debris on the road) on 
the freeway. They can push trucks and loads into the ditch or side of the road 
regardless of what the company wants. Management can under the law ignore the 
owner's wishes and simply remove what's there even if more damage and destruction 
occurs to their truck and load. 
ar 
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Figure 2.21 Demonstration of ODOT COMET Vehicle's VMS. 
The governor of the state supports the efforts of ODOT and has directed the police 
officials, fire departments officials, investigators, DOT, etc. that all incidents on the 
freeway system throughout the state be cleared in under 90 minutes. With the 
protection of the law behind them, first responders on scene can now take extreme 
measures to open the road. 
The authorities are even looking at creating a unit of accident investigators that 
would be flown by helicopter to the incident scene to quickly conduct their 
investigation and have the road opened with the 90 minutes time window. When the 
governor says all incidents which closes a road will be reopened within 90 minutes, 
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and the law will protect your agency and individuals against lawsuits, departments 
and units quickly create new means of accomplishing that goal. 
2.8.7 Programme Comparison 
There are many differences between the US FSP programmes and UK HATOs and 
ISUs. A selection is shown in table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 Comparison of US FSP Programmes to UK. 
FDOT TDOT WSDOT ODOT 
Programme M25 ISU M25 HATO COMET Road Rangers HELP IRT 
Hours of 7 Days, 24 7 Days, 24 
7 Days, 7 Days, 
7 Days, 24 7 Days, 24 
Daytime Daytime 
Operation Hour Hour Hour Hour 
Hours Hours  
Crew 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Motorist 
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Assist  
Scene 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Protection  
Traffic 
Control No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Powers  
Towing / 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pushing  
Debris 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Removal  
Quick 
Clearance No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Legislation  
Maintenance Yes No No No No No 
Authorised 
Emergency No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Vehicle 
The biggest difference observed between the programmes examined was that two 
different programmes, the HATOs and the ISUs, operate in the UK whereas in most 
states only have a single service encompassing both British roles. 
W. 
The hours of operation, though different, may not have a great impact on the 
effectiveness of their respective programmes as it is very dependant on the type of 
roads and the traffic flow that uses the road. The presence of out-of-hours response 
can often replace full time patrol. It should be noted that incidents can and do occur 
at any time of the day or night and impact operations long after they have been 
cleared. Also, motorists generally have a greater level of distress if they breakdown 
during the night, particularly vulnerable motorists, which is when they would be 
most grateful for assistance. 
One of the main differences noted between the US and UK are that the all FSPs and 
similar programmes are single crewed whereas the ISUs and HATOs operate with 
two crew members. This may be partially due to historical operations where in the 
UK the motorway police have almost always operated in pairs. There are many 
implications of single operator working, especially safety, particularly when working 
in rural areas. 
When the HATO programme was being developed, there was fierce opposition to 
any form of motorist assistance being offered, mainly from automobile clubs, such as 
the Automobile Association (AA) and the Royal Automobile Club (RAC) as well as 
tow operators, who were concerned about losing their business. Motorist assistance, 
such as assisting to change a tyre or providing mechanical aid, was also not seen as a 
major issue by the HA as large numbers of motorists in the UK are members of 
automobile clubs who have an approximate response time of 30 minutes to their 
members on the motorways. 
All examined programmes were capable of implementing emergency traffic 
management to protect incident scenes if required. All US programmes and HATOs 
are also authorised to direct traffic for traffic control purposes at incident scenes. In 
the UK only the police, police traffic wardens and now HATOs, following 
completion of the Traffic Management Act, are legally allowed to stop and direct 
traffic. ISU operatives are not allowed to direct traffic but can however close slip 
roads and carriageways under the direction of a police officer or HATO. 
59 
With exception of the ISUs all programmes used vehicles that are equipped to either 
push or tow incident involved vehicles from the carriageway. All examined US 
vehicles were fitted with push bumpers to allow quick and easy relocation of 
vehicles. The FDOT Road Ranger vehicles specifically used their bumpers to 
remove vehicles that had broken down at toll plazas. The push bumpers are most 
likely popular in the US as it allows one person to safely move the vehicle. HATOs 
are not equipped with push bars due to insurance issues over damage liability and the 
vehicles being leased, consequently push bumpers would invalidate their warranties. 
The ISUs are not permitted to remove vehicles from the carriageway and must wait 
for the attendance of the police or a HATO to remove a vehicle. The ISU will 
however protect the vehicle until their arrival. 
All programmes were responsible for removing debris from the roadway. In the UK 
debris removal is typically done using an ISU and either a police vehicle or HATO 
providing a rolling road block to allow the ISU operatives time to safely move the 
obstruction. 
Quick clearance legislation was in place for all of the US programmes which limits 
the liability of the programme operatives and encourages quick clearance. The 
roadways can be cleared rapidly without the risk of liability of further vehicle 
damage through quick clearance. It had been identified that any further damage to 
vehicles or cargo that were rapidly removed from the roadway was insignificant in 
comparison to the cost of delay many motorists experienced while care was taken. 
Many states also had laws prohibiting stopping in carriageways following incidents, 
such as "Steer it - Clear it" which reduced the initial impact of incidents as motorists 
legally should move their vehicles to the shoulder. There is no such legislation in the 
UK with care having to be taken when removing incident effected vehicles and cargo 
from the carriageway. 
The ISU service was the only programme that also carried out maintenance as well 
as incident duties. 
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The vehicles in several US programmes are authorised emergency vehicles which are 
allowed to proceed to incident scenes with lights and sirens whereas in the UK, non 
emergency services, responders are only allowed to responded with the traffic, 
following all road traffic laws. This can greatly increase the response time of 
responders, especially when there is no hard shoulder available to aid travel to 
incident scenes. 
A further difference between US and UK programmes is the amount and type of 
vehicle markings. Even though most vehicles are painted bright colours, such as 
white or lime yellow and have reflective logos they are a great deal less conspicuous 
than either the ISUs or HATOs, whose vehicles are fully liveried with retro reflective 
material. 
2.8.8 Section Summary 
There are both many similarities and differences between programmes operated in 
the US compared to the UK. Additionally experience from British programmes may 
prove useful and insightful for international practitioners and should be shared. 
Points that can be drawn from the international comparisons include: 
• Two programmes are used in the UK compared to a single in the US, 
• All UK programmes operate with two crew members compared to single in 
US, 
• No free motorist assist is offered in the UK, 
• Hours of operation vary between programmes, 
• UK incident vehicles are not authorised emergency vehicles, 
• Most US states have quick clearance legislation in place to promote rapid 
clearance, 
• Vehicle markings are much more conspicuous in the UK. 
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Current US practices that could prove beneficial to British incident management 
programmes include: 
• Emergency authorised vehicles- Enabling ISUs and HATOs to respond faster 
to incidents by using emergency lights and siren, especially in areas with no, 
or discontinuous hard shoulders, would help reduce incident duration and 
improve safety. Traffic clearing equipment would also increase the safety of 
responders and other motorists as it would make the vehicles more 
conspicuous, in particular when passing stationary traffic. 
• Motorist assistance- By providing free motorist assistance, similar to that 
offered by freeway service patrols, the duration of motorists' stoppages on 
the hard shoulder will be reduced, thus reducing the possibility of a more 
serious incident occurring and improving safety. Public relations could also 
be improved. 
• Quick clearance legislation- Providing legal protection for incident 
responders from litigation with respect to additional damage caused to 
incident involved vehicles or cargo, will encourage faster clearance of travel 
lanes. This in turn will reduce delay experienced by motorists, reduce the 
exposure of incident responders to harm and lessen the possibility of 
secondary incidents. 
2.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented an examination of the motorway incident management 
process and a background into its operation on the M25 London Orbital Motorway. 
The following was presented: 
• The five stages of incident management- detection, verification, response, 
clearance and recovery- were detailed, with programme stakeholders 
identified and their roles and responsibilities at motorway incidents 
examined. This gives an understanding of an incident lifecycle in order to 
give context to incident analysis in subsequent chapters. 
• An introduction to the M25 London orbital motorway was presented, 
including the history, future and current maintenance and management 
arrangements. 
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Incident Management practices on the M25 motorway were examined in 
detail including the Highways Agency's role and their response capabilities 
through Incident Support Units and Traffic Officers. This has introduced the 
British approach to incident management. 
• An international incident management programme comparison was also 
presented which highlighted the differences between the programmes on UK 
motorways and those of four US states. Several points were drawn and 
identified as areas of potential future benefit. 
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3 A Qualitative and Quantitative Review of the Incident 
Support Unit Programme on the M25 Sphere 
3.1 Introduction 
The Incident Support Unit (ISU) service, like any new programme, must be regularly 
evaluated to allow for continual improvement and facilitate an improved 
understanding of the programme benefits and effectiveness. As part of the 
evaluation both quantitative and qualitative analysis must be performed. Measuring 
the benefits of such incident management programs is however complex. 
This chapter will present a review of the ISU service on the M25 motorway, operated 
by the HA's service provider, Carillion plc, including quantitative (analysis of 
incident data) and qualitative examinations (via questionnaire survey), and a benefit-
cost estimation. An analysis of ISU attended incidents, an estimation of ISU benefits 
and qualitative police and ISU operative survey results will be presented. 
This chapter is structured as follows: 
• Section Two. A background is firstly presented including estimated 
benefits of the Incident Support Service on the M25 Sphere. A literature 
review on previous benefit estimations is also shown. 
• Section Three. An examination of historical ISU records is undertaken 
to reveal an insight into the activities of ISUs on the M25 Sphere road 
network. 
• Section Four. The results of a qualitative questionnaire survey of ISU 
operatives and police officers regarding the benefits of the ISUs are 
presented. 
• Section Five. The cost effectiveness of the ISU service is investigated 
using an incident impact computer programme, IMPACT. A benefit-cost 
value for the service on the M25 is derived and presented. 
• Section Six. Chapter summary and conclusions. 
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3.2 Background 
The longer an incident is on a motorway, the more of a problem it becomes. 
According to traffic engineering theory incident delay increases as the duration 
squared. Therefore incidents must be cleared from the roadway as quickly as 
possible, reducing incident duration (Petty, 1997). 
A key objective of the HA is to reduce congestion and increase the reliability of 
journey times. One way to do this is to work with the Police to provide a faster 
response to incidents and quicker clearance of blocked lanes. The ISU was developed 
to support the effective management of incidents and increase co-ordination between 
the HA's service providers, the Police and other Emergency Services. 
3.2.1 Estimated Benefits of ISUs 
Unfortunately due to the lack of pre ISU operational data, on the M25 Sphere, an 
accurate quantitative analysis can not be achieved. However, a qualitative estimate 
of the impact of the ISUs and their expected benefits can be examined. 
Through consultation with the Police, Highways Agency and Carillion plc (service 
provider) the following is an example of who benefits from the service and the 
expected benefits of the ISUs. 
Who benefits form the ISU service: 
• General Public, 	 Carillion plc (Service 
• Highways Agency, 	 provider), 
• Emergency Services, 
Estimated benefits of the ISU service: 
• Faster detection of incidents, 
• Faster response to incidents, 
• Faster incident clearance times, 
• Restoring traffic lanes faster, 
• Risk of secondary incidents 
reduced, 
• Better traffic flow, 
• Increased safety: 
M. 
• Debris removal, 
• Barrier damage, 
• Potholes, 
• Boundary fencing securing, 
• Improved level of service, 
• Freeing up of emergency 
services, 
• Timely reporting of motorway 
conditions, 
• Increased motorist safety and 
security, 
• Extra equipment arriving 
quicker, 
• Homeland security, 
• Reduction in vehicle operating 
hours, 
• Reduced fuel consumption, 
• Reduced emissions, 
• Improved air quality, 
• Reduced motorist delay, 
• Vitalising local economy, 
• Small maintenance jobs done 
quicker and at night, 
• Fewer Police tyre punctures, 
• Environmental improvement 
due to spill control, 
• Reduced motorist stress, 
anxiety and discomfort, 
• Increasing network mobility, 
• Assistance to drivers - 
accident victims and stranded 
motorists, 
• Reporting of damages to crown 
property. 
Benefit Estimation 
There have been no evaluations previously carried out on the Incident Support 
Service. There have however been many evaluations of US Freeway Service Patrols 
(FSPs). 
A study by Fambro et al (1976) was the first published evaluation of a Freeway 
Service Patrol programme. The programme studied had been operating in Houston, 
Texas since 1973 and utilised three tow trucks that operated on 64 miles of freeway. 
The benefit-cost ratio for the service was computed as 2:1. 
In 1990 Cambridge Systematics (1990) reviewed various incident management 
programs in five major metropolitan areas in the US. They also conducted a full 
evaluation of Chicago's FSP, the Minuteman programme, returning a benefit-cost of 
17:1. 
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The Massachusetts Motorist Assistance Programme (MAP) was evaluated by 
Stamatiadis et al (1998) in 1995. They found that for every dollar spent on the 
programme it returns an average saving of $19. This saving was estimated using a 
simulation package and representative incidents and accounts for the reduction in 
delay, fuel consumption ad vehicle emissions. They also identified a 13.8% to 2.3% 
reduction in secondary incidents which was not included in the financial calculation. 
One of the most comprehensive studies conducted to date was done by Skabardonis 
et al (1995) in 1993. They evaluated the FSP operation in the San Francisco Bay 
area and uniquely attempted to measure all of their data in the field. Data was 
collected both before and after the deployment of the FSP programme from probe 
vehicles (instrumented vehicles that provide information on traffic speeds and travel 
times) with average headways (vehicle spacing) of less than 7 minutes and from loop 
detectors. They then used this information to directly measure the incident induced 
delay. The evaluation compared the average delay before and after the FSP 
implementation and achieved a final benefit-cost of 3.4:1. 
Another study by Skabardonis et al (1998) evaluated the FSP on a 7.8 mile stretch of 
Interstate 10 in Los Angeles. They again examined comprehensively data from the 
field using probe vehicles and loop data to estimate incident delays. Their study was 
conducted for six hours per day over 32 weekdays. Overall they estimated a benefit-
cost ratio of 5:1 based on delay and fuel savings. 
The Maryland State Highway Administration's (MSHA) Coordinated Highways 
Action Response Team (CHART) Emergency Traffic Patrols (ETP) and Emergency 
Response Units (ERU) were evaluated by COMSIS in 1996 (COMSIS, 1996). This 
incident response evaluation examined the delay and fuel savings due to their FSP's, 
reporting an annual public saving of $30.5 million. This saving equates to a benefit-
cost ratio of 7.5:1. 
In 1997 Presley and Wyrosdick (1998) examined the benefits for Navigator, 
Georgia's Intelligent Transportation System. For the entire Navigator transportation 
management system including their HERO FSP service they returned an estimated 
benefit of $44.6 million giving a benefit-cost ratio of 2.3:1. 
Latoski et al (1999) evaluated the Indiana Department of Transportation's (INDOT) 
the Hoosier Helper FSP programme under two different operating regimes- daytime 
patrol and 24 hour. They estimated a benefit-cost ratio of 4.71:1 for the daytime 
operation and 13.28:1 for a 24 hour operation. This increase in estimated benefits 
motivated the change of the service to fully 24 hour. 
Donnell et al (1999) evaluated the Penn-Lincoln Parkway FSP in Pennsylvania, 
USA. By comparing the effectiveness of the new service to prior implementation 
data obtained from the State Police they estimated a projected benefit of $6.5 million 
per year giving a benefit-cost of 30:1. 
An evaluation of Michigan Department of Transportation's FSP in Southeast 
Michigan in 2002 estimated a benefit-cost saving of 9.2:1 (SEMCOG, 2003). This 
figure only accounted for travel-time savings for motorists and was thought to be 
very conservative. Previous evaluations in 1998 and 1996 of the same programme 
returned benefit-cost figures between 14.1:1 and 17.1:1. These figures are higher 
than the 2002 analysis which they attributed to increased operating costs such as 
higher fuel costs, increased operative wages as well as acquiring different and more 
advanced types of FSP vehicles. 
Morris and Lee (1994) produced a summary article reviewing statistics of 32 
different service patrol programs. They also summarised calculated benefit-cost 
rations for six studies. 
Another summary article by Fenno and Ogden (1998) evaluated the state of the 
practice of FSP programs in the United States. They surveyed managers of fifty- 
three programs in twenty-two states to derive organisational, operational and 
institutional programme information in 1996. It was found that FSPs had proven to 
be one of the most successful aspects of an incident management programme for 
reducing detection time and duration producing benefit-cost ratios ranging from 2:1 
to 36.2:1. They recommended that an extensive public awareness campaign was 
essential to ensure the success of any FSP programme. Similarly Denholm et a! 
(2000) provided a summary of nineteen US agencies FSP programs. Each 
programme was critically analysed and evaluation guidelines developed. 
Table 3.1 Examples of Freeway Service Patrols in the United States 
Patrol Location Patrol name Date of Evaulation Benefit - Cost 
Houston, TX Metro Freeway Service Patrol 1976 2:1 
Chicago, IL Emergency Traffic Patrol 1990 17:1 
Oakland, CA Freeway Service Patrol 1991 3.5:1 
Charlotte, NC Incident Management Assistance Patrol 1993 3:1 to 7:1 
Los Angeles, CA Highway Helper 1993 11:1 
Charlotte, NC Motorist Assistance Patrol 1993 7.6:1 
San Francisco, CA Freeway Service Patrol 1993 3.4:1 
Houston, TX Metro Freeway Service Patrol 1994 6.6:1 to 23.3:1 
Dallas. TX Courtesy Patrol 1995 3.3:1 to 36.2:1 
Detroit, Ml Freeway Courtesy Patrol 1995 14:1 
Fresno, CA Motorist Assistance Program 1995 12.5:1 
Minneapolis, MN Highway Emergency Local Patrol 1995 5:1 
New York and Westchester Co., NY Safety Service Patrol 1995 23.5:1 
Norfolk, VA Freeway Service Patrol 1995 2:1 to 2.5:1 
Orange Co. CA Freeway Service Patrol 1995 3:1 
Riverside Co.. CA Freeway Service Patrol 1995 3:1 
Sacramento, CA Freeway Service Patrol 1995 5.5:1 
Boston, MA Motorist Assistance Patrol 1995 19:1 
Denver, CO Mile High Courtesy Patrol 1996 20:1 to 23:1 
Detroit, Ml Courtesy Patrol 1996 15:1 
New Jersey. NJ Emergency Service Patrol 1996 11:1 
New York, NY Highway Emergency Local Patrol 1996 26:1 
Baltimore, MD Emergency Traffic Patrol 1996 7.5:1 
Atlanta, GA HERO 1997 2.3:1 
Gary, IN Hoosier Helper 1998 4.7:1 to 13.3:1 
Los Angeles, CA Freeway Service Patrol 1998 5:1 
Penn-Lincoln Parkway, PA Freeway Service Patrol 1999 30:1 
Detroit, Ml Courtesy Patrol 2002 9.2:1 
Bay Area, CA Freeway Service Patrol 2002 11:1 
Fresno, CA Freeway Service Patrol 2002 2:1 
Los Angeles, CA Freeway Service Patrol 2002 15:1 
Monterey, CA Freeway Service Patrol 2002 5:1 
Orange, CA Freeway Service Patrol 2002 6:1 
Riverside, CA Freeway Service Patrol 2002 5:1 
Sacramento, CA Freeway Service Patrol 2002 15:1 
San Diego, CA Freeway Service Patrol 2002 7:1 
San Joaquin, CA Freeway Service Patrol 2002 13:1 
Santa Cruz, CA Freeway Service Patrol 2002 9:1 
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A summary of FSP examinations and estimated benefit-cost ratios is shown in table 
3.1. 
It can be seen from previous US studies that Freeway Service Patrols are very 
beneficial to the motorists that they serve. Reported benefit-cost ratios ranged from 
the modest 2:1 to an astonishing 36.2:1. The majority of studies just examined the 
reduction in delay experienced by motorists due to the quick clearance of incidents 
by FSPs but some also included the pollution reduction and fuel savings from the 
reduced delay. One study even included the benefit to the individual motorist 
involved in the incident, which most studies neglected as it is such a small value 
compared to the overall delay saving. 
3.3 ISU Historical Records 
3.3.1 Introduction 
To understand the activities of Incident Support Units on the M25 Sphere road 
network a quantitative examination of historical ISU data was conducted. This 
would reveal what the ISUs actual do on the M25 Sphere daily. 
This section will present the results of an examination into the actions of ISUs on the 
M25 Sphere road network. 
3.3.2 Background 
The computer aided dispatch (CAD) data for Carillion's ISUs on the M25 Sphere 
road network included 17,450 incidents for the first two years of their contract 
between September 2001 and August 2003. On the M25 motorway alone there were 
11,857 incident requests. The CAD data is recorded at the M25 Sphere Hatfield 
Network Control Centre (NCC) where ISUs are centrally dispatched. Operators at 
the NCC receive telephone requests for an ISU from the emergency services or 
Mouchel Parkman route steward and then using the Global Positioning System 
(GPS) installed in each vehicle dispatch the nearest ISU to the incident location. The 
vehicles are dispatched electronically using mobile data terminals but the ISU crew 
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are also usually informed of additional information with a short wave radio or mobile 
telephone call. 
Incident Data Summary 
When an incident support request is notified to the M25 Sphere NCC, the following 
information is recorded on incident characteristics: 
Incident Number, 
• Location (Road, junction no.), 
• Type (Type of location- SOS box, MJP, gateway, etc.) 
• M/P (Marker Post +1- metres), 
• Track (A/B), 
• Reported by, 
• Symptom of Incident, 
• Cause of Incident, 
• Type of Work (Immediate / Non-Immediate), 
• Priority (Day / Night), 
• W/RS (Weather / road surface conditions (Weather condition 
Fine/Rain/Fog/Snow, Road Surface Dry/Wet/Ice/Snow)), 
• Area (North / South), 
• Engineer (Which ISU was dispatched), 
• Start Date/Time, 
• Arrive Date/Time, 
• Close Date/Time, 
• Comments (including- damage to crown property, actions carried out by 
ISU crews, materials used, etc.) 
3.3.3 Results 
An examination of incident frequency, location and timings is shown below. 
For the period between September 2001 and August 2003 there were 17,450 
recorded incidents. This equates to an average of 24 incident requests per day for the 
study period on the M25 Sphere road network. The number of incident requests per 
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day was however very variable with the maximum number in one day being 76 on 
29th April 2003. 
Figure 3.1 Breakdown of Incident Request Types. 
Figure 3.1 shows a breakdown of recorded ISU requests by symptom of the initial 
call. The request symptom describes the initial reason for requesting an ISU's 
presence at an incident. This may differ from the type of incident attended, which 
would be completed at the close of the call in the incident cause field if different. 
For the first two years of ISU operations on the M25 Sphere the majority of calls 
requesting the support of an ISU were to deal with debris both in the carriageway and 
on the hard shoulder. There were 4,217 debris ISU requests which accounted for 
24% of all incident requests and on average 5.8 support requests per day. Debris was 
followed by barrier damage with 3,115 requests (4.3 per day), potholes with 2,621 
(3.6 per day) and road traffic accidents with 1,563 (2.1 per day). The remaining 34% 
of incident requests included broken down vehicles, dead animals, boundary fence 
damage and fires. 
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Figure 3.2 Incident Request Locations Organised by Junctions. 
The location of each incident was recorded in the CAD data as either a marker post, 
SOS box (emergency roadside telephone) or feature on the side of the carriageway. 
Marker posts are spaced at 100 meter intervals along the full length of the M25 and 
all on-road features are referenced using GPS. The spatial distribution of incidents, 
organised by junctions for the M25 motorway only, is shown in figure 3.2 both by 
frequency and normalised by distance. Normalising by distance allows request rates 
by link to be established giving a clearer view of high incident frequency locations. 
It can be seen that the highest ISU requests occurred between junctions 9 and 10 and 
the highest rate was between junctions 30 and 31. The highest request rate between 
junctions 30 and 31 is mainly due to the short length of the link. It should be noted 
that the M25 is controlled by six different police forces who all use the ISUs 
differently. For example Surrey police, who control between junctions 6 and 14 on 
the M25, are very proactive in the deployment of an ISU whereas Hertfordshire 
police, who control junctions 17 to 24, are the complete opposite. This discrepancy 
in ISU deployment may explain the fewer incident requests in certain areas 
compared to others. 
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Figure 3.3 Incidents by Day of Week. 
Figure 3.3 shows the variability of recorded incidents by days of the week. The plot 
of data shows, for weekdays, that the larger numbers of incidents occurs on Mondays 
with 2,803 incident requests or 16% of all incidents in the study period. The 
weekday distribution is fairly constant with only a 155 request difference between 
the highest (Monday) and the lowest (Friday). As expected there are fewer incident 
requests at the weekend as there are lower traffic volumes on the road network. 
The distribution of incident requests by month, shown in figure 3.4, is not as straight 
forward as it first appears. From the recorded data July experiences the most 
incident requests, with nearly 36 support requests per day. The ISU service first 
started in the month of September so understandably initially the service was not 
fully employed by the emergency services and artificially skews the results. It can be 
seen that the demand for ISUs has increased over the study period. Future 
examination of a larger data set or a data set excluding the first year would be needed 
to properly evaluate any patterns of ISU requests by month. 
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Figure 3.4 Incidents by Month of Year. 
The frequency of incident requests varies throughout the day and generally 
corresponds to the number of vehicles on the road, with the majority of all requests 
when the road network is near or exceeding capacity, shown graphically in figure 
3.5. It can be seen that the greatest number of ISU requests are between 11:00 and 
12:00. It can also be seen that the majority of incident requests occur between 7am 
and 7pm. This information will allow the optimisation of ISU operative shift 
patterns to provide the greatest coverage of incidents and improving the response to 
incidents. 
Figure 3.6 shows the average response times for each of the sixteen M25 Sphere 
ISUs. It can be seen that the average response times vary greatly between vehicles 
by as much as 7 minutes. The average for all vehicles was 12.5 minutes which is 
well within the contractual 20 minutes response time. GPS tracking data and CAD 
dispatch logs must be examined more closely to fully understand the reasons for the 
differences in ISU response times. 
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Figure 3.5 Incident Requests by Time of Day. 
It was not possible to analyse incident durations from the M25 Sphere CAD data as 
the closing time of incidents was when the job was finally closed at the NCC once all 
work had been completed. The durations could also be influenced by the fact that 
the CAD data is only concerned with the activities of the ISUs and therefore the 
incident may continue for some time following the ISU departure from the scene. 
ISUs do not attend every incident that occurs on the M25 Sphere road network as 
their presence is not always required by the emergency services. A previous study 
by University of Edinburgh (Rodgers et al, 2005) showed that ISUs were requested 
to attend 21.33% of all incidents during the study period. They attended 44% of all 
accidents, 5% of breakdowns and 63.41% of debris incidents. After being requested, 
the ISUs had an average response time of 12 minutes over 96 incidents. 
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Figure 3.6 Average ISU Response Time by Vehicle. 
3.3.4 Section Summary 
An overview of the characteristics of incidents attended by Incident Support Units, 
on the M25 Sphere road network for the period between September 2001 and August 
2003 has been shown. Incident frequency, timings and locations were examined. 
It was found that: 
• A total of 17,450 incidents were observed resulting in an average 
frequency of 24 incidents per day for the M25 Sphere. 
• Most ISU requests, 24%, were for debris clearance. 
• The highest ISU requests occurred between junctions 9 and 10 and the 
highest frequency was between junctions 30 and 31. 
• Most incidents, 16%, occurred on a Monday albeit there was little 
variance on weekdays and there were fewer at the weekend 
July experiences the most incident requests however ISU requests have 
grown steadily since they were introduced. 
• The greatest number of ISU requests is between 11:00 and 12:00. 
• The average response time for all ISUs was 12.5 minutes. 
• It was not possible to examine incident durations with the available data. 
3.4 Police and ISU Operative Surveys 
3.4.1 Introduction 
As well as quantitative analysis of the Incident Support service a qualitative analysis 
can also provide valuable information regarding the benefits of the service. 
A survey of police officer's within the M25 Integrated Policing Group, police control 
room staff and Carillion's ISU operatives, who have actually worked with or 
observed ISUs at an incident scene was conducted in late 2003 and early 2004. 
The purpose of the survey was to: 
• Determine the opinions of the service while it was still relatively new, 
• Establish a baseline of opinions of the service for future year comparison, 
Compensate for the lack of hard data on certain benefits of the service, 
Request comments and suggestions to help enhance and improve the ISU 
JtA[II'J 
The survey was constructed in five different formats: 
• Statements, 
• Rating questions, 
• Fill in the blank question, 
• Open ended questions, 
• Comments and suggestions. 
The statement questions were designed to allow the respondents to indicate their 
level of agreement or disagreement with the question: l=Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 
3=Neither Agree or Disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly Disagree. The ratings 
questions allowed respondents to rate various aspects of Carillion's ISU service 
using the following scale: l=Excellent, 2=Good, 3=Adequate, 4=Fair, 5=Poor. The 
survey had 26 statements, 9 rating questions, 1 fill in the blank question, and 2 open 
ended questions, giving a total of 36 questions. 
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This section will present the results of the questionnaire survey of ISU operatives and 
police officers regarding the benefits of the ISUs. 
3.4.2 Survey Design 
A survey is a method of collecting information from people about their ideas, 
feelings, plans, beliefs and social, educational, and financial background (Fink and 
Kosecoff, 1985). They usually take the form of questionnaires or interviews and are 
used to help assessors, planners, researchers and policy makers. There are many 
reasons for conducting surveys- planning of a programme, setting of policy, and 
programme evaluations are just three examples. 
Questionnaire and Interview Design 
Interviews and questionnaires are the most frequently used type of surveys. 
Questionnaires and interviews share many of the same features, with both relying on 
getting information by asking people questions. Questionnaires let people work at 
their own speed and when and where they want to. Interviews require more 
structure. Interviews can produce more reliable information than questionnaires due 
to the set order and time for completion. Interviews can contain a built in bias 
because people react to the interviewer and not just the questions (Aireck and Settle, 
1995) 
Survey Design 
The design of a survey is critical. It must be designed in such a way that it will result 
in the data that is required. There are several key points to designing surveys: 
• Type of Survey, 
• Length, 
• Content, 
The type of survey must be chosen to enable the best result data to be collected. 
Telephone interviews, face-to-face interviews and questionnaires are three examples 
of surveys. Each different survey method will be suitable to an individual survey's 
requirements but may be completely wrong for another (Oppenheim, 1992). 
The length of a survey depends upon what you need to know and how many 
questions are necessary to collect the required data. The length is also dependant on 
how much time the respondents have available for completing the survey (Fink, 
1995). 
The content should be directly related to the aims and purpose of the survey, 
especially the first question (Fink and Kosecoff, 1985). All questions should be 
independent and unbiased and should have just one thought. Questions should be 
well defined and not be open to respondents personal definitions (Hague, 1993). 
Types of Questions 
Survey questions typically take the form of either closed or open ended (Fink and 
Kosecoff, 1985). 
Closed ended questions (also known as "forced choice") are those where respondents 
answer multiple choice questions, where the answers are predetermined. For 
example a person could be asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement 
on a list of pre-selected alternatives. Closed ended questions can be more reliable 
and efficient as they are easy to use and mark. As all respondents have the same 
options to choose from, the resulting data is uniform. 
Open ended questions are questions that respondents answer in their own words. 
Answers are inevitably hard to interpret as each responder has a different view. 
These questions can however allow respondents to express their own opinions, 
providing greater insight into respondents' thoughts. 
Pilot Testing 
Reliability and validity of a survey are established by pilot testing. The survey 
should be trialled extensively by choosing respondents similar to the ones who will 
eventually complete the survey (Gillham, 2000). As many people as possible should 
be enlisted. 
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Pilot testing enables the survey to be modified if the testers do not understand the 
survey instructions and directions. To help reliability there should be focus on the 
clarity of questions and general format of the survey. 
Testing also aids design issues such as providing enough space for responses and 
identifies any failures to answer questions. Poorly worded questions, responders 
providing several answers or writing comments in margin are also discovered thanks 
to pilot testing. 
Sample 
When a survey is conducted it must be decided whether to include everyone or just a 
sample of the population. There are several issues that must be addressed when 
looking at the size of samples (Aireck and Settle, 1995): 
How quickly is the data needed - If you survey everybody in the 
population then the data will take a long time to collect and analyse. 
. What type of survey is planned - A telephone survey or self-administered 
questionnaire would be quicker than personally interviewing everybody 
in the population. 
• How credible will your results be - Enough people must participate in the 
survey to ensure that it is representative. 
There are two basic methods of sampling used for surveys: probability and non-
probability sampling. 
Probability Sampling Method 
A probability sample is one in which each person in the population has an equal 
chance of being selected and is said to be representative. It should be a miniature 
version of the population to which the findings are going to be applied. The sample 
should be representative of the general population as the people selected are thought 
to be the same as the people who are not. Three commonly used methods of 
probability sampling are: 
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Simple random sampling, 
. Stratified random sampling, 
• Simple random cluster sampling. 
Simple Random Sampling 
A simple random sample is one in which each person has an equal chance of being 
chosen for involvement in the survey. This method is the simplest and easiest to 
conduct. Examples of simple random sampling would be by selecting people names 
from a hat or by using a table of random numbers against names. This method can 
however produce greater errors than others and can not be used if it is required to 
split respondents into subgroups. 
Stratified Random Sampling 
Stratified random sampling is slightly different from simple random sampling as you 
first split the population into subgroups or strata and then select a certain number of 
respondents from each division to get a sample. For example the entire group could 
be divided into subgroups of males and females and then randomly choosing your 
sample from each subgroup, to give you an equal representation of males and 
females. Stratified random sampling is more precise than simple random sampling 
and it allows the surveyor to select a representative sample, of a variety of groups 
and patterns of characteristics in the required proportions. The method however 
requires more effort than the simple method and it requires larger sample sizes. It 
should be noted that the increase in the accuracy of the results found with 
stratification can usually be produced by increasing the sample size of a simple 
random sample. 
Simple Random Cluster Sampling 
Simple random cluster sampling is useful for when random selection cannot be used 
and is employed mainly for administrative ease, not to improve accuracy. Instead of 
randomly selecting individuals, groups or clusters of respondents are used. The 
method assumes that the population is arranged into natural or predefined clusters or 
groups. The method is unfortunately not mathematically efficient but is 
administratively simple, as individuals are not required to be identified, and can be 
used when it is inconvenient or unethical to randomly select persons. 
Non-Probability Sampling Method 
Non-probability samples are those acquired by accident, such as the first one hundred 
people to return the survey. They are usually easier to draw than other probability 
samples, but increases in effectiveness frequently correspond to losses of accuracy. 
Three commonly used methods of non-probability sampling are (Fink and Kosecoff, 
1985): 
Systematic sampling, 
. Accidental sampling, 
Purposive sampling. 
Systematic Sampling 
Systematic sampling is done by selecting a number and then picking names off a list 
corresponding to that number. For example if three was picked, every third person 
on the list would be selected. The sample size is relative to total size of the list as 
you have to select a collection from it. Another example would be if you had a list of 
1000 names and wanted to select 200 from it. A random number between one and 
ten could be selected, and then you would start at that random number and count 
every five until you had your 200 sample. If two had been chosen, the resulting 
selection would be the second name seventh, twelfth, seventeenth until 200 names 
were collected. Unfortunately lists of people are occasionally arranged so that 
certain patterns can be uncovered. If a patterned list is used then there will be a bias 
introduced into the sample. Any lists of names used for this method of sampling 
should be carefully examined and if any bias is suspected another method should be 
used. 
Accidental Sampling 
Accidental sampling is conducted by selecting people who are accessible. For 
example you survey the first 25 people that enter a shop or get off a bus. The 
convenience of an accidental sample is the main benefit but it can be very susceptible 
to bias. If you only conducted the survey at a certain time of the day you would only 
get a certain type of people. People willing to do the survey may be concerned about 
the issues in the survey, may have a complaint or may be very satisfied thus not 
giving a complete general sample. 
Purposive Sampling 
In purposive sampling the sample is selected by the surveyor. The judgement of the 
surveyor is a major problem as they may be in error. If the choices, of the surveyor, 
can be justified there can be great value in purposive sampling. 
Confidence Levels 
The confidence level describes the probability that the chosen sample is 
representative of the population. The 95 percent confidence level is frequently used, 
but other levels such as 99 or 90 percent levels may also be employed. 
Margin of Error 
Unless a survey is conducted of an entire population there will be some errors. A 
sample is almost always different from the population by some margin of error, 
whatever sample method you use. For the sample to be accurate the error has to be 
minimised. 
The accuracy of a sampling method can be measured by computing standard error of 
the mean (Fink and Kosecoff, 1985). 
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Where, SE is standard error, N is the total population size, n is the sample size and 
or 
  is the variance. 
The standard error is a good indication of how well the sample's response will reflect 
the total population. It can be seen that if you increase the sample size the sampling 
error is improved. 
Sample Size 
Once the sampling method has been chosen the sample size must then be established. 
The survey sample size should be large enough to satisfy the problem and enable the 
results to be properly analysed. To get credible findings, enough people whose 
views count must reply, so that the results will be representative of the population. 
When using statistical method to choose the sample size, three issues must be 
considered, as discussed earlier: 
• Sampling error, 
• Stratification, 
• Confidence levels. 
The formula used for statistically calculating the sample size is shown below (Fink 
and Kosecoff, 1985). 
N = (-Z )(PXl - p) 	[Eq. 3.21 
Where, N is sample size, z is the standard score corresponding to confidence level, 
e is proportion of sampling error and pis the estimated proportion of incidences of 
cases. 
For a 90% confidence level z =1.65, for 95% z =1.96 and for 99% z =2.58. A 
satisfactory level of error is approximately plus or minus 10%, 0.10. 
It is not always necessary to use statistical methods to obtain a sample size. As long 
is the sample size is sufficient in size as to yield useful data it is acceptable to just 
selected the size. 
Response Rate 
The response rate should be as high as is feasibly possible. The response rate being 
number of people who respond to a survey divided by the number who should have 
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responded. For example if 50 surveys were sent out and 40 were returned, then the 
response rate would be 80 percent. Error will be introduced, into the survey, if a 
number less than the chosen sample is returned, resulting in the survey not being as 
credible. 
To try and improve response rates a high response technique such as face-to-face 
interviews should be used (Fink and Kosecoff, 1985). Over—sampling by selecting 
more people than initially required will allow non-respondents to be replaced easily. 
3.4.3 Incident Support Unit Assessment Survey 
Another way to estimate the benefits of the ISUs is to ask the people who use the 
service daily their opinions. This methodology was first used by Baird and Jacobs 
(2003) who assessed the Tennessee Department of Transportation's HELP freeway 
service patrols. 
The participants were asked to either manually post return the survey or 
electronically complete the questions. It was thought that this format would be the 
most flexible and most convenient for the police officers. 
Question Choice 
Questions were chosen in discussion with police officers and ISU operatives to 
ensure relevance and to ensure that each question was meaningful to respondents. 
The questions were arranged in several different styles: open ended, ratings, 
statement and fill in the blanks. Open ended and fill in the blanks questions were 
chosen to enable the person being surveyed to answer the questions in their own 
words. It was hoped that the varied question styles and types would aid in the 
collection of an accurate set of results. 
Following the choice of questions the questionnaire was trialled by serving police 
traffic officers, from several police forces, to ensure the reliability and validity of the 
results. These trials highlighted several issues with the survey that were addressed 
and another pilot performed. 
Sample 
It was decided not to use a sampling method, as the population was relatively low, 
therefore as many police traffic officers and ISU operatives as possible were asked to 
participate. 
3.4.4 Survey Results 
The results of the survey are shown in tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, showing the average 
(mean) and most frequent (mode) of the responses to each question. The results are 
also split into three categories: all survey results, ISU operative results and Police 
survey results. 71 police surveys were returned and 66 ISU operative surveys were 
returned giving 137 in total. 
Response Rate 
The survey response rate is very difficult to establish as the number of operational 
police officers changed on a daily basis depending on their duties. The staffing 
numbers provided by police forces also included officers that were on leave, sick 
leave, court duties, training courses and secondments which also hindered the 
calculation of response rates. 
Using supplied officer numbers and numbers of responses a conservative response 
rate can be estimated at 30% for police officers. For ISU operatives the response rate 
was considerably higher with an approximate response rate of 85%. Again due to 
sick leave, holidays and training a more accurate figure can not be established. 
Another reason for a lower number of responses was that several officers from each 
police force were used for pilot testing the survey, thus reducing the sample size, and 
were not included in the analysis. 









Mean Mode Mean Mode Mean Mode 
I ISU8 are an asset to police officers. 1.64 1 1.56 1 1.70 2 
2 The ISU service has improved safety at incident scenes for emergency responders. 1.81 2 1.67 1 1.94 2 
3 Roads patrolled by the ISU5 are safer and less congested. 2.90 3 2.39 3 3.37 3 
4 ISUs are an unnecessary duplication of services already provided. 4.16 4 4.39 5 3.94 4 
The ISU service has resulted in a reduction of secondary incidents (either in queues 
from previous incidents or rubbernecking). 
289 3 2 3 324 3 
6 The ISU service has reduced traffic congestion caused by crashes and other incidents. 2.74 3 2.27 2 3.17 3 
The police receive more accurate and timely information about incidents as a result of 
ISUs. 
2.69 3 2.20 2 3.15 3 
8 The ISU service is well coordinated with local agencies. 2.53 2 2.35 2 2.70 2 
9 The ISU operatives work effectively with other responders at incident scenes. 1.85 2 1,65 2 2.04 2 
10 An ISU should be requested immediately when an incident occurs. 1.96 1 1.56 1 2.32 2 
11 
The ISU service has enabled the police to better utilise its resources on the motorways 
for enforcement and emergency response. 
2.21 2 1.70 1 2.70 2 
12 The police now give lower priority to the motorways than before the ISU service started. 3.55 3 3.21 3 3.87 5 
Ii The ISU5 arnve in a timely manner at incident scenes. 2.04 2 1.71 2 2.34 2 
14 There would be extra benefit if the ISUs arrived at an incident faster. 2.44 3 2.35 2 2.52 3 
It ISUs carry all necessary equipment to deal with incidents swiftly. 2.36 2 2.24 2 2.46 2 
16 There should be more integrated training between ISUs and the emergency services. 2.09 2 1.74 1 2.42 2 
17 
It is safer at an incident when a large, crash cushion equipped, ISU is at an incident 
scene. 
1.72 1 1.61 1 1.82  2 
18 ISU operatives can get in the way at incident scenes. 3.68 4 3.97 5 3.41 4 
19 There is less debris on the hard shoulder since the lSUs started. 1.95 1 1.21 1 2.63 2 
20 Direct radio communication with ISUs would be of benefit. 1.89 1 1.62 1 2.14 2 
21 
When an ISU is present at an incident scene, police officers can cut the time for normal 
investigations for collisions and minor injuries on the motorways. 
2.68 2 2.11 2 3.21 4 
22 
The environmental impacts of incidents, from spills, are lessened due to the rapid initial 
response by ISU operatives. 
2.15 2 1.59 2 2.66 2 
23 ISU5 are better equipped to help protect incident scenes. 1.94 2 1.89 2 1.99 2 
24 The carriageway is cleared much quicker when an ISU is present. 1.91 2 1.39 1 2.39 2 
25 All ISU5 should be equipped with electric light arrows. 1.91 2 N/A N/A 1.91 2 
26 ISU mounted, portable variable message signs would be of benefit. 1.85 1 N/A N/A 1.85 1 









Mean Mode Mean Mode Mean Mode 
I How do you rate the general skills and expertise of the ISU operatives at 2.12 2 1.91 2 2.32 2 
2 
How do you rate the attitudes and professionalism displayed by the ISU 
operatives towards the emergency services? 
1.83 2 1.50 1 2.14 2 
How do you rate the attitudes and professionalism displayed by the ISU 
operatives towards the public? 
2.07 2 1.67 2 2.45 2 
4 How do you rate the ISU vehicle livery? 2.82 2 3.36 3 2.32 2 
5 How do you rate the ISU vehicle lighting? 2.96 2 3.82 5 2.15 2 
6 How do you rate the ISU equipment? 2.72 2 3.201 4 2.27 2 
7 How do you rate the ISU operatives concern for safety? 226 2 1.77 2 2.72 2 
8 Do lSUs attend the majority of incidents in an acceptable time from 2.09 2 1.82 2 2.34 2 
9 l How do you rate the overall ISU service? 	 1 12.00, 2 1.76 2 2.23 2 










Mean I Mode Mean I Mode Mean Mode 
1 
Ideally, an ISU should arrive at an Incident scene 	thin 
minutes. 
17.55 20 18.03 20 17.12 15 
Police Survey Responses 
The first question "ISUs are an asset to police officers" received an average response 
of 1.7 (1=strongly agree, 5=strongly disagree, section 3.4.1), the most positive of all 
the responses to all of the survey statements and questions. More than 87% of 
officers agreed with this statement, with the other 13% neither agreeing or 
disagreeing. The majority of police officers (82%) also thought that the ISU service 
was not a duplication of services already provided, giving it an average of 3.9. More 
than 73% of responders also rated the overall ISU service as good or excellent. 
The ISU operatives received a positive response from the police officers with good 
response to all questions related to them. They also received several positive 
remarks in the comments section. The statement "ISU operatives work effectively 
with other responders at incident scenes" received very positive feedback with 84.5% 
agreeing with it. Conversely when the police officers were asked "ISU operatives 
can get in the way at incident scenes" only 53.5% disagreed with the statement and 
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22.5% agreed with it. The most frequent chosen answer was 4 but respondents may 
not have fully understood or read the question properly. Two ratings questions on 
the professionalism of ISU operatives both received positive feedback. Their 
attitudes towards the emergency services and attitudes towards the public, received 
2.1 and 2.45 with 77.5% and 59% of police officers rated them as good or excellent 
respectively. The general skills and expertise of the ISU operatives at incidents were 
also given a good rating of 2.3 with 69% of respondents rating them as good or 
excellent. 
A number of questions were posed regarding the benefits of the ISUs in the eyes of 
the people who use the service daily. More than 53% of police officers agreed that 
there was less debris on the hard shoulder since the ISUs started giving it an average 
response of 2.6. The officers agreed with the statement "the environmental impacts 
of incidents, from spills, are lessened due to the rapid initial response by ISU 
operatives" with an average response of 2.6. The statement "the police receive more 
accurate and timely information about incidents as a result of ISUs" received varied 
responses with 42% neither agreeing nor disagreeing. It is thought the many officers 
on active patrol duties would never directly receive information from ISUs which 
may account for this response. 
For the question about the police now giving lower priority to motorways than before 
the ISU service started, the most frequent response was 5, strongly disagree, but the 
average was 3.8. More than 61% of the officers selected strongly disagree but a 
small number, 12%, of respondents did believe that there had been a shift in 
priorities. On the other hand the previous statement question, "the ISU service has 
enabled the police to better utilise its resources on the motorways for enforcement 
and emergency response" was given 2.7 and 49% officers agreed. 
The response time of the ISU vehicles is very important and feedback is valuable. 
More than 70% of police officers rated good or excellent that ISUs attend the 
majority of incidents within an acceptable time. They also thought that the "ISUs 
arrive in a timely manner at incident scenes", giving an average response of 2.3 and 
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73% agreeing with the statement. The response to "there would be extra benefit if 
the ISUs arrived at an incident faster" was positive with an average response of 2.5 
but only 46.5% agreed and 45% neither agree nor disagree. Some police forces only 
requested an ISU once an officer has started to clear an incident scene and realises 
that he needs more specialised assistance which is far from the ideal situation. As 
ISUs are not emergency vehicles it can take a long time to respond to an incident as 
they now have to contend with large tailbacks due to the initial incident. One way 
round this problem would be to request an ISUs presence immediately an incident 
occurs. More than 60.5% of officers agreed with an average response of 2.3. 
All of the ratings questions relating to the details of the ISU vehicles and equipment 
they carry all received very positive responses. The most positive was the ISU 
vehicle lighting rating with an average of 2.1 and 75% of officers selecting good or 
excellent. The ISU equipment was also rated highly at 2.27 and 69%. Finally the 
ISU vehicle livery was rated as 2.3 and 67%. One statement question regarding ISU 
equipment - "ISUs carry all necessary equipment to deal with incidents swiftly"-
received a slightly positive response of 2.5 and 59% of officers agreeing with the 
statement. Unfortunately none of the officers included suggestions for additional 
equipment so more information will be sought from officers to enhance the ISU 
service. 
Improved Safety 
The police officers provided very positive responses to statements and questions 
about safety at incident scenes. The statement question "The ISU service has 
improved safety at incident scenes for emergency responders" received an average 
response of 1.94 with nearly 79% agreeing with the statement but 10% also 
disagreed. They were not as positive about the statement question "Roads patrolled 
by the ISUs are safer and less congested" giving it an average of 3.37. A couple of 
officers noted in the comments section of the questionnaire that they would not know 
how to judge this. Officers also had a similar reaction to the question "The ISU 
service has resulted in a reduction of secondary incidents (either in queues from 
previous incidents or rubbernecking)" again stating that they would not know how to 
judge this. The average answer was 3.2 with 52% of responders neither agreeing nor 
disagreeing. The police officers responded very strongly to the statement "it is safer 
at an incident when a large, crash cushion equipped, ISU is at an incident scene" 
giving it an average answer of 1.8 and nearly 82% of officers agreed with the 
statement. Another strong response of 84.5% of officers agreeing with the statement 
"ISUs are better equipped to help protect incident scenes" certainly shows one of the 
benefits of the ISUs. The officers were also asked to rate the ISU operative concern 
for safety at incident scenes giving an average response of 2.7. More than 50% of 
responses rated them as good or above but 21 % did respond that they thought that 
they were poor. This has been fed back to the service provider and more regular 
training will now be given to all operatives to remind them of the dangers of working 
on live motorways. 
Reduced Incident Duration 
Three questions looked at the impact of the ISUs on the durations of incidents. In 
response to the statement "the carriageway is cleared much quicker when an ISU is 
present" more than 65% of officers selected agree or above with an average of 2.4. 
The responses to "the ISU service has reduced traffic congestion caused by crashes 
and other incidents" were not as positive with an average of 3.17. More than 40% of 
officers selected neither agree or disagree and some stated that again that they would 
not know how to judge this. Another question that received a varied response was 
"when an ISU is present at an incident scene, police officers can cut the time for 
normal investigations for collisions and minor injuries on the motorways". This 
question was given an average of 3.2 with 44% of officers disagreeing with the 
statement and 28% agreeing. 
Future work 
Several questions were included in the survey regarding future enhancements to the 
ISU service. 
When the survey was conducted, ISUs did not have any direct radio communications 
with police officers or police control rooms. The ISUs are in contact with their 
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Network Control Centre (NCC) who then contact the appropriate police control room 
who in turn control the officers on the ground. When direct communication was 
needed, for example with debris removal from a live lane with a police rolling road 
block, the control rooms would often pass direct mobile phone numbers for the 
police and ISU crews for safety reasons. When asked if "direct radio communication 
with ISUs would be of benefit" 72% of police officers agreed and the average 
response was 2.14. The HA are currently implementing airwave, a tetra based radio 
system, for their new traffic officers which is compatible with the police radio 
network and it is hoped will be used by the ISUs as well to improve on scene 
communications. 
The use of vehicle mounted light arrows and variable message signs was examined. 
76.5% of police officers agreed that "all ISUs should be equipped with electric light 
arrows" with the average response of 1.91. This is very positive as 4 of the large ISU 
vehicles are already equipped with light arrows but the benefits were not certain or 
supported. This result can be used as a justification for equipping the rest of the ISU 
fleet. An even more positive response was recorded for the statement "ISU mounted, 
portable variable message signs would be of benefit" with an average response of 
1.85 and again 76.5% of responders agreeing. This response is also very 
constructive as a proposal can be prepared to justify equipping the ISUs with 
electronic variable message signs. 
Training of emergency responders is arguably one of the most critical pieces of any 
traffic incident management programme. Currently there is minimal integrated 
training between the ISUs and the other emergency services. More than 59% of 
police officers agreed that "there should be more integrated training between ISUs 
and the emergency services" with an average of 2.4. There were many remarks in 
the comments and suggestions section, of the survey, regarding ISU operative 




Officers were asked a fill in the blank question about what ideally the response time 
of the ISUs should be. The most frequent answer was 15 minutes and the average 
was 17.12 minutes. This is quite close to their current contractual maximum of 20 
minutes but is in fact higher than what the ISUs on the M25 currently achieve. 
More than 40% of responders made comments or offered suggestions. A selection is 
shown below: 
• "Improvement in integrated training would be of benefit to both ISU 
operatives and the police. Improved communications (direct radio) would 
improve the existing arrangement of passing messages via separate 
control rooms" 
• "Very good - freeing of police time and equipment to concentrate on the 
job at hand" 
• "ISU operatives should be better trained by operational traffic motorway 
officers. This would also assist in a good working environment. I would 
happily assist in training" 
• "It would be extremely helpful for them to have police radios to assist 
communications" 
• "More personal safety awareness training should also be given to ISUs 
whilst on the motorway. At times seem oblivious to the hazards" 
• "ISUs are a great help at incidents" 
• "Overall the service they provide is beneficial and I am generally 
impressed with what I have seen them do" 
• "The ISU's on the M25 are very good, but their colleagues on the M3 
leave a lot to be desired" 
• "The service provided by the ISU's is extremely valuable and assist in the 
role that I perform. if the ISU's were not working on the motorway 
network I feel that my job would be made far more difficult and even 
minor incidents would take longer to complete" 
• "I would like to state that I think they work bloody hard and don't get a lot 
of praise for what they do" 
95 
• "I can say I have thanked God they have been protecting RTC scenes 
when I have had to deal with them" 
. "The crews that I have come in to contact with have been more than 
helpful to assist and have even taken the initiative in dealing with 
incidents" 
• "They are a valuable resource" 
• "I feel that it would benefit them if they did training with us so they can 
see what we are trying to achieve. This also puts names to faces and 
makes us one big team" 
• "I think they do a damn good job" 
• "ISU staff currently do their best to assist but lack the necessary 
equipment" 
• "The ability of ISU vehicles to tow/drag disabled/crash-damaged cars & 
light vans from live running lanes onto the hard shoulder under the 
direction and supervision of police would be of great help since garage 
attendance times are generally much greater than ISU's" 
. "This needs to be adapted and extended over all areas" 
• "I am personally always thankful when they arrive at a scene especially 
one in the running lanes as their cones and lights provide the required 
level of safety to allow us to concentrate on the job in hand" 
Two negative comments are shown below: 
• "FORGET TRYING TO PATROL THE MOTORWAYS CHEAPLY - 
EMPLOY MORE POLICE OFFICERS AND THE PROBLEM IS 
SOLVED!" 
• "During my patrol time on the M25 I have rarely seen the ISUs attend 
incidents. I was under the impression the ISUs were a temporary trial due 
to their lack of presence" 
The first comment shows how emotional some of the police officers feel about their 
jobs on the motorways. It should be noted that the ISUs are in no way intended to 
take over any roles currently performed by the police but are intended to support the 
operational roles of the emergency services. The second comment is very 
unexpected as there is identical ISU coverage all over the road network and the 
majority of respondents were positive about the response times and presence of the 
vehicles. These responses may be due to a lack of education about the ISU 
programme or training. 
Police Force Comparison 
On average, the responses from all four police forces that participated in the survey 
were reasonably constant. Of all the police forces, Essex police force were on 
average the most positive about the ISU service and Hertfordshire police force were 
the least positive. On average Hertfordshire police officer responses were 
approximately 0.6 units less positive than their Essex counterparts. It is unknown 
why there is such a discrepancy and further work would have to be conducted to 
establish a reason and strategies to mitigate it. 
ISU Operative Response Comparison 
Comparing responses from police officers to those of the ISU operatives shows 
understandably that the ISU operatives gave more positive responses. On average 
their responses were 0.47 more positive. Observations from first hand experience 
would suggest that the ISU operatives' pride in their work may have contributed to 
these more positive responses. This may also because they are more aware of the 
system and what its aims are compared to police officers'. 
There were however three negative responses from ISU operative: ratings question 4, 
5 and 6. Ratings questions 4, 5 and 6 all pertained to the ISU vehicles livery, 
lighting and their equipment. On average the ISU operatives were 1.1 points less 
positive than police officers for these three questions. 
3.4.5 Section Summary 
A total of 137 police officers and ISU operatives were surveyed using questionnaires 
to establish qualitative information regarding the benefits of the Incident Support 
service. The opinions of police officers on the M25 have been captured at a time 
when the majority are still familiar with the operations prior to ISUs. Also, a 
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baseline of the officers' opinions has been established for future assessments. A 
better understanding of what police officers see as the programme's strengths, areas 
where officers are less convinced and specific suggestions for improvement are now 
known. 
The following is a summary of the study findings: 
• A qualitative questionnaire survey of police officers has elicited a 
valuable and positive response towards the ISU service on the M25. 
• Overall feedback regarding the ISUs was positive and it can be concluded 
that the ISU service provided on the M25 is of benefit. In particular: 
- more than 87% of surveyed police officers agreed that "ISUs are 
an asset to police officers". 
- more than 73% of officers also rated the overall ISU service as 
good or excellent. 
- more than 79% of officers believed that safety had been improved 
at incident scenes for emergency responders. 
- more than 65% of officers agreed that "the carriageway is cleared 
much quicker when an ISU is present". 
• Areas of improvement identified by police officers included: 
- 42% neither agreed nor disagreed that they receive more accurate 
and timely information about incidents as a result of ISUs. This is 
an opportunity to improve communication between ISUs and 
police officers and hence effectiveness. 
- 21% rated ISU operatives concern for safety at incident scenes as 
poor. This is now being addressed with further training being 
offered to ISU operatives. 
• Significant feedback has shown that future developments should focus on 
(1) Improved direct communications; (2) Improved use of mobile variable 
message signs and electric light arrows; and (3) improved integrated 
training between the various emergency and response services. 
• ISU operatives gave more positive responses in comparison to police 
officers. 
3.5 IMPACT Benefit Prediction Model 
3.5.1 Introduction 
As the Highways Agency is a government agency it must justify its actions and the 
effectiveness of its programmes. The cost effectiveness of the ISU service must be 
established to ensure continued financially and politically support. 
This section will utilise a piece of software, IMPACT, to estimate the delay saving 
benefits brought about by the Incident Support Unit service on the M25 Sphere. The 
estimated delay savings will be converted into a financial value and a benefit-cost 
ratio established. 
3.5.2 Background 
Due to the lack of pre Incident Support Unit operational data on the M25 it was not 
possible to estimate their influence on the delay experienced by motorists. Another 
method is to use an incident impact estimation model to approximate their 
effectiveness. Such a model was sourced from the United States called IMPACT 
which was developed under a research project from the US Federal Highways 
Administration (FHWA). 
A thorough analysis of the IMPACT model was conducted to establish if it could 
accurately estimate the impact of incidents for the UK motorway system, in 
particular the M25 London Orbital Motorway. 
The model was then be calibrated for British motorways using incident statistics 
relative to Incident Support Units. Once calibrated for local conditions the delay 
savings as a result of the ISUs was be converted into a monetary value to enable a 
benefit cost figure to be established. 
The IMPACT model has previously successfully been used by Maas (1998), Maas et 
al (1998) and Miller and Abkowitz (2000). Maas (1998) and Maas et al (1998) 
utilised IMPACT to evaluate the benefits of implementing Intelligent Transportation 
Systems (ITS) in Northern Virginia, in particularly CCTV, cellular phones in 
response vehicles, computer aided dispatch screens in response vehicles and global 
positioning system location for response vehicles. Using IMPACT they estimated 
that an additional 21 to 46 percent delay reduction is possible with full deployment 
of selected applications of ITS technology. Miller and Abkowitz (2000) used 
IMPACT as part of a decision support protocol for a highway incident management 
system. 
IMPACT Model 
IMPACT is an empirical computer model of incident occurrence, location and 
severity, intended for use to estimate the incident impacts expected for freeways, and 
to quantify the expected changes in incident impact corresponding to proposed 
alternative traffic and incident management procedures. From estimated delay, other 
traffic and economic impacts of incidents can be determined, such as increased air 
pollution and increased fuel consumption (Sullivan (1997), Sullivan and Champion 
(1995), Sullivan, Taff and Daly (1995)). 
The IMPACT software was developed under contract between the Federal Highways 
Administration (FHWA), US DOT, and Ball Systems Engineering, later 
subcontracted to California Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo. 
Designed for cost-benefit analysis and planning applications, IMPACT is a stand-
alone Windows computer programme. The programme utilises standard Microsoft 
Windows file management and help screen facilities and is completely menu driven 
through the stages of input data specification, solution calculation and output of 
results. The developers generated the model by collecting and analysing the best 
available incident, highway geometry and traffic volume data from eight major US 
cities. A detailed statistical analysis of the incident data was conducted, with the 
analysis revealing considerable similarities in the patterns in incident frequencies and 
characteristics that were quantified for these cities. Variations among locations 
could be explained by variations in traffic conditions, incident response capabilities 
and other known factors. The empirical relationships captured in the model are 
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transferable to other locations. Even though IMPACT is fully calibrated, it is 
possible to substitute the current model calibration with locally suitable or the latest 
available relationships through the user interface. 
The IMPACT model contains four sets of calculations: 
• Road capacity, 
• Incident rates, 
• Incident location and severity, 
• Incident duration and delays due to incidents. 
The four sub-models join together to approximate the impact of each of seven classes 
of freeway incidents: 
• Accidents and vehicle fires, 
• Major mechanical and electrical breakdowns, 
• Dropped loads and other debris, 
• Vehicle stalls, 
• Flat tires, 
• Abandoned vehicles, 
• Other. 
The incident impacts can be viewed under any one of the five Incident Management 
scenarios: 
• No Incident Management, 
• Traffic management centre, 
• Major incident response team, 
• Freeway service patrol, 
• User defined. 
Calculations are conducted on a road section by section basis, with no spill over 
effects from one section to the next. Firstly, the incident rate sub-model estimates 
the number of incidents of each type and then the number is multiplied by the output 
from the location and severity sub-model. Subsequently each lateral locations and 
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incident, together with their reduction of capacity, is combined with four percentile 
values that represent the duration distribution of incidents of a given type, under the 
chosen incident management scenario. The collection of incident duration and 
capacity reduction is assessed in the delay sub-model and the annual number of hours 
of delay estimated for each type of incident. 
IMPACT Model Inputs 
The freeway section data is entered through the IMPACT user interface (figure 3.7), 
which provides a screen template, or by directly manually inputting files into the 
appropriate ".DAT" text file. The following section characteristics variables are 
required by the IMPACT model: 
Length: The length of the section along the centre line from junction to 
junction. 
. Lanes: Number of lanes (each direction). 
. AADT: 2 way Annual Average Daily Traffic flow. 
. Peak Period: The total peak period each day, the time for both morning 
and evening rush hour combined. 
. Percent Trucks: The ratio of the daily traffic flow, which is made up by 
Large Goods Vehicles as a percent. 
. K: This is the percentage of the daily traffic which occurs in the peak 
hour of the day. 
• D: This is the directional factor, i.e. the percent of the peak hour traffic in 
the peak flow direction will default, if not specified, to zero. 
• AAWT/AADT: the AAWT is the Annual Average Weekday Traffic, this 
ratio will account for the fact that the AADT includes data obtained from 
the weekend. 
• Shoulder: This indicates the type of hard shoulder in operation at the 
facility. IMPACT has four different options: no shoulder, left shoulder, 
right shoulder and shoulder on both sides of the carriageway. As the 
model was designed for the US, when choosing the correct shoulder for a 
UK motorway a right shoulder would be selected. 
102 
• Management: In order to carry out a cost benefit of a highway 
management system the model offers a number of different management 
types for the road network; these are: 
- None 
- Traffic Management Centre Surveillance 
- Incident Response Teams 
- User-Defined (which defaults to the same values as none, unless 
otherwise inputted) 
In addition to the section characteristics a climate model must be calibrated which 
details the number of dry weather days, wet weather and snow as a percentage. 
The basic road section characteristics were obtained from the Highways Agencies 
Annual report for Area 5 2000 (Highways Agency, 2000) and the HA were consulted 
regarding other required inputs. Any additional factors that are not available default 
to values contained as assumptions in the IMPACT model. 
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Figure 3.7 IMPACT User Interface 
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IMPACT Model Calculations 
The IMPACT model uses four sets of relationships, which link together in series to 
estimate the delay impacts of incidents. 
The four step modelling framework 
Incident rate models- Freeway Capacity of a section is calculated 
which determines which incident rates are used to estimate the 
number of incidents by type in a time period (peak/off-peak) and 
weather condition. 
Incident severity model- The incident severity model is used to 
estimate how severe an incident will be. It estimates the likelihood 
that incidents of a given type will block one or more lanes or occur on 
the shoulders and what the associated effects will be on freeway 
capacity. 
Incident duration model- This is used to estimate how long it takes to 
resolve an incident of a given type and severity. 
Incident impact model- The Incident impact model is used to estimate 
the delay due to incidents of a given type, severity and duration. 
IMPACT Model Outputs 
Each sub-model produces summary statistics that can be viewed independently to 
ensure consistency. 
• The basic calculated capacity for each section. 
• The severity model produces a number of incidents for the seven classes 
listed below: 
I. Abandoned vehicles 
Accidents and fires 
Debris on the highway 
Mechanical, electrical, fuel and cooling system failures - likely to be 
the most severe disablement's for which vehicles must be towed away 
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Stalled vehicles - largely including out of fuel and similar problems, 
which may be serious but where brief roadside attention can often get 
the vehicles going again 
Tire problems 
Other, this captures a variety of causes, such as pedestrians and 
providing information, as well as a host of other rare incident types. 
The frequencies of these incidents occurring in each section for the desired time 
period is determined as well as a total for all the sections, which is summarised at the 
end of the output. 
The severity report details a breakdown of each incident type, the resulting 
proportion of lanes blocked and the effect this will have on the remaining capacity 
for each section. 
The final output is the delay report, for each section the vehicle/hour delay due to 
each incident type is detailed, totalling the delay in a summary. 
3.5.3 IMPACT Model Calibration 
Data Description 
The IMPACT model was thoroughly run and compared with US data. The model 
has been shown to work well for the US highway system (Sullivan et al, 1995), 
however a comparison must be made to actual results from the M25 motorway. For 
the comparison the following data was used: 
• Carillion ISU CAD data - This data is summarised in section 3.3 above. 
It details the section of road, incident symptom and date and time of 
received call. Although the information contains many incident 
symptoms, only the fields pertaining to accidents, fires, debris and 
breakdowns were utilised. There is no data on abandoned vehicles or flat 
tires from Carillion so these are neglected. 
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• STATS 19 - Road accident data for incidents that caused injury to any 
person and is completed by the police. It was obtained from the UK data 
archive at Essex University. 
• Weather data - Obtained from the UK Meteorological office on the 
Heathrow weather station. This detailed rainfall on each day and 
temperature, fog etc. This allowed a climate model to be set up for 
IMPACT. 
• MIDAS traffic flow data - Traffic flow data from the M25 between 
junctions 6 to 16 and a small section of the M4 and M40. The MIDAS 
data was obtained through Mott MacDonald, on behalf of the Highways 
Agency. 
• Highways Agency Annual Report for Area 5 - This contains detailed 
traffic counts, including details of AADT, AAWT and percentage of 
LGVs on each section of road. 
• DETR data - This is a series of equations that derive accident levels from 
the total vehicle miles of a particular section of roadway. 
• Breakdown data - obtained from the RAC breakdown Service. 
• Damage only accident data - obtained from Essex police. 
Model Sections 
The M25 Sphere road network was divided into individual road sections defined by a 
number. Each section was classed as each stretch of road between junctions. This 
was done for all sections of the M25 and the additional M25 Sphere sections. 
3.5.4 Initial Run Results 
Table 3.5 shows a summary of the IMPACT incident model results and comparison 
data following the initial model run. 
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Table 3.5 Initial Model Run Results and Comparison Data. 
Incident Type IMPACT results Canllion results DETR results STATS 19/RAC 
Off-Peak Peak Oft-Peak Peak Oft-Peak Peak 
Vehicle-Miles 1.92E+08 9.87E+08  
Accidents and Vehicle Fires 651.59 2265.1 168 97 588.8 487.38 679 
Mechanical and Electrical 
Breakdowns 
1557.6 5670.7 77 26 454.548 376.25 487 
Flat Tires 1085.7 3787.4 0 0 
Vehicle Stalls 992.28 3820.2  0 0 
Dropped Loads and Debris 222.76 521.73 544 182 1045.27 865.22  
Abandoned Vehicles 2751.3 2622.7 0 0 
Other 608.75 3171.5 224 57 0 0 
Totals 7870 1 	21859 1 	1013 1 	362 1 	2088 1728 1166 
Daily Total 29729 1 1375 1 3817 1166 
The IMPACT model generates far higher incident frequency than any of the 
comparison data which indicates that the standard incident generation model is not 
suitable and must be calibrated. This would suggest that the incident frequency is 
higher on US roads than in the UK roads. 
Incident Frequency Calculation 
IMPACT uses rates per million vehicle miles to develop the incident statistics. These 
ratings will differ according to the three following factors: 
• Time of day: peak/off-peak. 
• Road conditions: wet, dry and snowy. 
• AADT/C factor: This falls into three areas <7, 7-10 and >10. 
• C is capacity and is obtained using equation 3.3. 
C=MSFxNxfxf 11 xf 	[Eq.3.3] 
Where: 
• MSF: Maximum Service flow, which is the ideal flow rate per lane under 
ideal conditions, which defaults to 2000 in the IMPACT model. 
• N : Two way number of lanes. 
• f,,: Lane width adjustment factor, which in all sections will be for a right 
shoulder in the US, a left shoulder in the UK, this defaults to 0.98. 
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f: Population adjustment factor, which represents the reduction of 
capacity due to driver behaviour and defaults to 1. 
f,,: heavy vehicle adjustment factor, determined from equation 3.4 
f,=lI(l+P,xE,) 	[Eq.3.4] 
Where: 
• I: Ratio of heavy goods vehicles to other vehicles operating on the 
section as a percentage. 
• E,: Truck equivalence factor representing the difference in capacity with 
a truck in comparison to a car. 
Before a calculation involving the rates is carried out the model needs the volume of 
traffic for the peak and off-peak times on the section. These are determined using 
equations 3.5 and 3.6. 
Peak volume of traffic: 
V,, =AADTxKxN h XWDPY 	[Eq.3.5] 
Where 
• AADT: Annual average daily traffic now in the section. 
• K: Percentage of AADT, which occurs in the peak period. 
• N h : Peak period hours in a day, the am and PM rush hour times 
combined. 
• WDPY: Number of weekdays in a year which are non holiday basically 
the number of recognised workdays a year. Defaults to 250 if ignored in 
the section characteristics. 
Off-peak Traffic volume: 
V0 =AADTx (AA WT/AADT—KxN h )XWDPY 	[Eq3.6] 
Where: 
• AAWT/AADT: Average annual weekday flow divided by AADT. 
i ii:i 
The step by step process continues with the final two calculations, which complete 
the calculation of incident volumes per section. Again there are different equations 
for rush hour and non-rush hour conditions. 
Peak time incident levels: 
I,,j =V, xLx(R,, 1 x C + Rp,,  xR+R 31 xS) 	[Eq. 3.71 
Where: 
. V,,: Result of equation 3.5, the peak volume distribution. 
L: Length of the section inputted in the section characteristics. 
• C, R, S: ratios of days in the year which experience dry, wet and snowy 
road conditions respectively. The climate sub model contains this 
information and can easily be modified. 
• R, 1 , R pri 	peak period incident rates for the weather conditions of 
dry, rainy and snowy respectively. 
Off-Peak incident levels: 
= V<, x Lx (R i x  + Ron  x R + R (?$  x S) 	[Eq. 3.8] 
WhereRpci l R pnj  and R j, çj are off-peak period incident rates for the weather 
conditions of dry, rainy and snowy respectively. 
Revised Incident Frequency 
The Carillion data was collated into IMPACT symptoms which were then classed 
into the three factors (time, weather, AADT/C) which determined ratings. Following 
the determination of incident frequencies for each incident type and each factor, the 
following equation (Sullivan, 1995) was used to determine: 
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• R: Incident rate measured in incidents per million vehicle miles. 
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• I : Number of incidents of a given type that were listed in a group of road 
sections during peak or off-peak and some specified number of days. 
• D: Number of days covered by the incident data. 
• s: Number of road sections covered by the incident data. 
. ADT5 : The AADT of each road section. 
• a: the fraction of the AADT that occurs during the time period of 
chosen rating. 
• L: the centre line length of the section. 
3.5.5 Revised Model Run 
The second model run was completed using revised incident rates based on Carillion 
CAD data. A summary of the revised run is shown in table 3.6. 
Table 3.6 Comparison of IMPACT Initial Run and Revised Run. 
IMPACT results IMPACT results Carillion results 
Incident Type Initial Run Revised Run 
Off-Peak Peak Off-Peak Peak Off-Peak Peak 
Vehicle-Miles 1.92E+08 9.87E+08 1.92E+08 9.87E+08  
Accidents + Fire 651.59 2265.1 140.47 115.33 168 97 
Mechanical and Electrical 
Breakdowns 
1557.6 5670.7 61.071 34.248 77 26 
Dropped Loads & Debris 222.76 521.73 436.63 194.15 544 182 
Other 608.75 3171.5 181.29 66.483 224 57 
Totals 7870 21859 819.461 410.211 1013 362 
Daily Total 29729 1229.672 1375 
The values provide significant improvement on the initial run but the section 
characteristics can still be modified to improve accuracy. 
Section Characteristics Update 
Using MIDAS traffic flow data enabled accurate K value and D value to be 
determined as well as a value for the AAWT. In addition rush-hour times were also 
verified (peak/off-peak times). 
The D values obtained from MIDAS traffic flow data were obtained taking the 
average of 10 incident free weekdays of data for each section. Where a D value was 
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not available (i.e. section not with the MIDAS area), the average D value was used, 
for the M25 it was calculated as 53.8 1%. For all other sections of motorway the 
average D value was higher at 56.15%. 
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Figure 3.8 Graph of Traffic Flow Throughout The Day 
The K values were taken as the average from 10 sets of incident free days. Where a 
K value for a section is not obtainable the average K value is used, for the M25, 6.6 
and 7.5 for other routes. 
The average AAWT/AADT value was calculated to be 1.04. This value was kept 
uniform throughout all sections and was obtained by analysing 4 weeks and 4 
weekends of data. 
Figure 3.8 shows the average flow for weekdays during the month of September 
obtained from MIDAS traffic flow data. This confirms the selected peak period. 
Revised K, D and AAWT Values 
The updated model run was performed with actual K, D and AAWT values 
determined from MIDAS traffic flow data and demonstrated a marked increase in 
comparison to the initial model run results. The revised run results are shown in 
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table 3.7 and demonstrate the improved match but also that considerable differences 
still remain. 
Table 3.7 Comparison of IMPACT Model Runs 
IMPACT results IMPACT results Carillion results 
Incident Type Initial Run Updated Run 
Off-Peak Peak Off-Peak Peak Off-Peak Peak 
Vehicle-Miles 1.92E+08 9.87E+08 1,30E+09 8.00E+08  
Accidents + Fire 140.47 115.33 153.07 93.533 168 97 
Mechanical and Electrical 
Breakdowns 
61.071 34.248 66.548 27.774 77 26 
Dropped Loads & Debris 436.63 194.15 475.79 157.45 544 182 
Other 181.29 66.483 197.55 53.915 224 57 
Totals 819.461 410.211 892.958 332.672 1013 362 
,
Daily Total 1229.672 1225.63 1375 
3.5.6 Incident Severity 
The incident severity model determines how severe an incident is, with the severity 
defined as the number of lanes that are blocked by a certain incident. 
This stage involves lookup tables, which comprises two parameters ALPHA, and 
ALPHA 2 These are used to redistribute incidents when there is no median or (US) 
right hand shoulder. 
The three look-up tables are: 
• Distribution of lateral locations of incidents 
• Calibrated percentages of lanes blocked 
Percentage capacity remaining for different severity 
Revised Severity Rates 
As all road sections of the M25 Sphere analysed included a hard shoulder and did not 
have any median shoulders, the median shoulder value distribution was set to zero 
and both ALPHA values were set to 1. 
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Distribution of Incident Lateral Locations 
The average percentage distributions of lateral locations of incidents refer to whether 
the incident took place in either the hard shoulder or in-lane. From the Carillion CAD 
data it was possible to revise the original values and these are displayed in table 3.8. 
Table 3.8 Lateral Lane Locations of Incidents. 
Incident Type Carillion Data Original IMPACT Values 
Frequency Percentage (%) Percentage (%) 
Shoulder In-Lane Shoulder In-Lane Shoulder In-Lane 
Accidents 138 663 17.23 82.77 60.6 39.4 
Debris 1091 1006 52.03 47.97 26.4 73.5 
Breakdown 122 97 55.71 44.29 90 1 	10 
Other N/A I 	N/A N/A I 	N/A 	1 95 1 4.9 
The "Other" incident category of the IMPACT model was not used, as there was no 
possible comparison data. 
Percentages of Lanes Blocked 
Table 3.9 shows the original values for the impact model regarding lanes blocked 
during incidents. 
Table 3.9 Blocked Lanes During Incidents (Sullivan, 1995) 
# Incidents 1 lane 2 lane 3 lane 4 lane 
Accidents 350 80.9% 15.8% 2.7% 0.7% 
Debris 82 96.7% 3.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
Mechanical 348 97.8% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Other 53 i 	94.3% 5.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
As data regarding lane blockages was not available the original IMPACT data was 
assumed to be correct. 
Percentage Capacity Remaining 
It was chosen to modify the percentage capacity remaining figures to those reported 
by Huddart and Thompson (2001) as these were determined by analysing accidents 
on the M25. These figures are used by the delay model to estimate the volume of 
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traffic delayed dependent on the severity (number of lanes blocked) by an incident. 
The updated figures are shown in table 3.10. 
Table 3.10 Capacity Reduction by Number of Blocked Lanes (Huddart and 
Thompson, 2001) 
% Reduction Number of blocked lanes 
1 2 3 4 5 
2x2 75 95 
3x3 60 85 95 
4x4 50 75 90 95 
5x5 40 65 75 85 95 
Table 3.11 Indicates the revised capacity figures that were used with the severity 
sub-model of the IMPACT model. The rates for other incident types were not 
modified, except for the full lane blockage which was changed to 5%. 
Table 3.11 Revised Capacity Remaining Values 
Original width of Roadway 
Lateral Location 4 I 3 F 	2 1 
Accident & Debris 
IMPACT Revised IMPACT Revised IMPACT Revised IMPACT Revised 
Right Shoulder 85 80 83 80 81 80 79 79 
1 lane blocked 62 50 53 40 39 25 0 5 
2 lanes blocked 26.7 25 18.4 15 0 5 
3 lanes blocked 13.9 10 0 5 
4 lanes blocked 0 5 
All other Incident Types  
IMPACT Revised IMPACT Revised IMPACT Revised IMPACT Revised 
Right Shoulder 96 96 90 90 84 84 78 78 
1 lane blocked 66.7 66.7 57 57 42 42 0 5 
2 lanes blocked 28.7 28.7 19.8 19.8 0 5 
3 lanes blocked 14.9 14.9 0 5 
4 lanes blocked 0 5 
3.5.7 Incident Durations 
When defining a road network without any kind of incident support service the 
IMPACT model used a combined detection and response time of 20 minutes for 
accidents and in-lane incidents while the remaining incident types have an average 
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25-minute detection and response time. Table XXX from Sullivan (1995) details the 
detection and response times for all traffic management scenarios. 
Using values for total incident duration for different incident types enabled the 
generation of the mean and standard deviation values for the total incident duration. 
Total incident duration was defined as the sum of detection, response and clearance 
times. A selection of these values is shown in table 3.12. 
Table 3.12 Mean and Standard Deviations for Detection and Response Times, 







Mean STD Mean STD 
Accidents None 39.72 33.35 47.09 40.17 
TMC 31.72 26.63 39.09 33.35 
IRT 31.72 26.63 39.09 28.35 
Mech./Elec. None 41.63 30.59 38.65 30.54 
TMC 31.36 23.2 30.65 24.22 
IRT 31.36 23.2 30.65 24.22 
Other None 38.19 36.14 34.69 26.56 
TMC 28.19 26.67 26.69 20.43 
IRT 28.19 26.67 26.69 20.43 
Debris None 31.29 39.46 29.64 33.98 
TMC 21.29 26.85 21.64 24.81 
IRT 21.29 26.85 21.64 21.09 
It should be noted that the difference of in-lane standard deviation between Traffic 
Management Centre (TMC) and Incident Response Teams (IRT) for accidents and 
debris is due to a 15% factor introduced due to the result of improved traffic 
management, being introduced to ease traffic flow around major incidents (Sullivan, 
1995). 
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To represent the differences in incident duration between various incident seventies, 
four percentiles are calculated to model the incident duration, these are the 20th, 55th 
and 95th . These values represent the lowest 40%, the following 30%, 20% and 
finally the highest 10% of incident durations. Guiliano (1988) states that the 
characteristics of incident duration take the form of the lognormal distribution and 
this is the approach has also been adopted in the IMPACT model. 
Incident Detection and Response Time 
The average response time for the M25 was estimated by Essex police who stated 
that it took them 20 minutes to detect and respond to a motorway incident (Essex 
Police, 2003). Other than this data, the UK incident timing statistics are very limited 
in contrast to the United States. 
A US Department of Transport report on incident Management (USDoT, 1998) 
stated that introducing incident response units on to a motorway system reduced 
detection and response times by, on average 20%. This value is supported by a report 
on incident response units implemented in San Antonio which also suggested a 20% 
reduction (TransGuide, 2001). A more conservative value for the implementation of 
active incident response units suggests a reduction in accident detection time of 2 
minutes (Sreedev & Picado, 2001). 
Incident Duration 
Data on incident duration times is more easily obtainable. A summary of 
information from report cited by the Transportation Research Laboratory, TRL 
Report PRTLT/141/95 (Huddart and Thompson, 2001), is detailed in table 3.13. 
Unfortunately the standard deviation could not be obtained from this report as it only 
detailed mean and median. 
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Table 3.13 TRL Report on Incident Duration 
Incident Type Duration 
Mean Median 
Accidents 38 minutes 15 minutes 
Breakdown 20 minutes 11 minutes 
Debris 12 minutes 10 minutes 
Fire 101 minutes 43 minutes 
Load shedding and spillages 70 minutes 40 minutes 
The US also have large volumes of data on incident duration reduction due to 
freeway service patrols, a study in Atlanta showed a 38% reduction in incident 
clearance due to the implementation of Highway Emergency Response Operators 
(HEROs) (Presley and Wyrosdick, 1998). 








Mean STD Mean STD 
Accidents None 39.72 33.35 47.09 40.17 
ISU 37.72 31.67 45.09 32.69 
Mech./Elec. None 41.63 30.59 38.65 30.54 
ISU 36.36 26.72 36.65 28.96 
Other None 38.19 36.14 34.69 26.56 
ISU 33.19 31.41 32.69 25.03 
Debris None 31.29 39.46 29.64 33.98 
ISU 26.29 33.15 27.64 26.93 
The percentiles were then re-calculated using the new incident duration values listed 
in table 3.14 and these are shown in table 3.15. 
Maas (1998) stated a list of mean reductions in incident duration due to a range of 
technologies on board freeway service patrols and at the traffic management centres, 
in this case the Network Control Centre at Hatfield. With the technology on board 
the ISUs, the report stated a reduction of up to 9 minutes in mean incident duration. 
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After analysing all the information presented above, table 3.12 was revised to include 
updated incident duration mean and standard deviations and is shown in table 3.14. 
The base values of IMPACT for incident type "none" are used as a base reducing 
incident detection and response by 2 minutes for accidents and 5 minutes for other 
incident types. The mean was not altered with the TRL values above, as the duration 
times were not broken down into shoulder and in-lane. 
Table 3.15 Revised Incident Durations Percentiles by Incident Type and Lane 
Blockage 
Incident Type Lanes Blocked 
Accident and Fire Shoulder In-Lane 
20 0.230674 0.380656 
55 0.502315 0.677446 
80 0.89484 1.039014 
95 1.711335 1.679565 
Mechanical and Electrical Shoulder In-Lane 
20 0.297224 0.254517 
55 0.540441 0.513494 
80 0.842192 0.864373 
95 1.385969 1.551185 
Debris Shoulder In-Lane 
20 0.076285 0.126577 
55 0.245176 0.323889 
80 0.583019 0.650356 
95 1.542144 1.422709 
Other Shoulder In-Lane 
20 0.160523 0.24324 
55 0.398892 0.470034 
80 0.783735 0.766307 
95 1.673141 1.326679 
3.5.8 Incident Delays 
The final part of the model uses the outputs of the three sub-models and estimates the 
total delay on the road network from a particular incident type for the desired time 
period. It uses the distribution shown below in figure 3.9 to model the queuing of 
traffic at a specific incident and hence obtain a delay time. This is obtained by first 
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generating the graph of traffic volume distribution, which is then converted to a 
cumulative volume/capacity (V/C) distribution. A nine-degree polynomial equation 
was developed to best describe the cumulative V/C distribution (the build up of 
traffic). The polynomial parameters are changeable and located in the assumptions 
sub-menu. 
Equation 3.10 shows the 9 degree polynomial equation. 
V(t)=a0 +a1 1+a2 t 2 +a3t 3 +a4 t 4 +...+a9 t 9 	[Eq. 3.10] 
where: 
. V(t): cumulative value of traffic arriving at a time of the day t. 
• a0 : values that represent the polynomial parameters. 	Different 
parameters exist for different combinations of AADT/C and K*D  values. 
• t: evaluation time for which the above distribution is calculated. Each 
K*D value and off-peak/peak situation has different evaluation times. 
For the original IMPACT data, in general it was found that the 9th  degree 
polynomials achieved good approximations to the original cumulative distributions 
(Sullivan, 1995). 
The evaluation times are the last of the assumption sub-menu's and these are selected 
to provide a representative sample of times of the day and the proportion of incidents 
that occur at these times, hence giving different delay impact consequences. Table 
3.16 illustrates the original values for the K*D  value <0.425. 
Table 3.16 IMPACT Values for Evaluation Times and Proportion Ratings. 
Off-Peak Peak 
Evaluation Time (m) Proportion of incidents Evaluation Time (m) Proportion of incidents 
4 0.019 17 0.183 
10 0.192 15.5 0.174 
12 0.173 18.5 0.153 
14 0.211 14.75 0.138 
19.5 0.269 16.25 0.18 
22.5 0.137 17.75 0.171 
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Figure 3.9 IMPACT Graph of Traffic Volume Distribution (Sullivan, 1995). 
Using MIDAS traffic flow data it was possible to create traffic volume distributions, 
for comparison with the original IMPACT versions. Figure 3.9 shows the original 
IMPACT graph for K*D!5;0.425  and figure 3.10 shows the graph from the M25 
Sphere for the same K*D  value. 
The two-graph peaks are at approximately the same points but the IMPACT graph 
does not maintain the same volume of flow between the two peak periods. Hence the 
polynomial parameters were refined, as this is one of the key characteristics on the 
M25 and will mean delay in this time period is subsequently underestimated using 
IMPACT values. 
Due to the high flows in the M25 area of the MIDAS zone all sections fall within the 
range K*D!~0.425  and AADT/C> 11, apart from section 9 were AADTIC is in the 
range of 7-11. The additional sections of network not on the M25 ring, have K*D 
values which fall into the IMPACT defined ranges of K*D!!~0.425  and 
0.425<K*D—<0.475. These sections have AADT/C values in all four ranges; in total 
seven new graphs to adjust the polynomial parameters were required. The 
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cumulative Volume/Capacity values could then be obtained from the new traffic 
volume distributions. Unfortunately these graphs were generated in Microsoft Excel 
where only a 6 degree polynomial equation could be produced. These values did still 
however generate acceptable results. 
Traffic Volume Di stribution 
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Figure 3.10 Example of M25 Traffic Volume Distribution. 
The evaluation times were the final part that required modification. Table 3.17 
details the new evaluation times derived for the K*D  values of, !!~0.425 and 0.425-
0.475. 
Table 3.17 Revised Evaluation Times and Proportions Ratings. 
K*D, !~O.425 K*D ,  0.425 - 0.475 
Off-Peak Peak Off-Peak Peak 
05:00 0.049 06:30 0.086 05:00 0.025 06:30 0.034 
10:00 0.293 07:30 0.118 10:00 0.350 07:30 0.172 
12:00 0.267 08:30 0.244 12:00 0.188 08:30 0.345 
15:00 0.223 17:00 0.217 15:00 0.225 17:00 0.276 
20:00 0.100 18:00 0.231 20:00 0.125 18:00 0.103 
23:00 0.067 1 	19:00 0.104 1 	23:00 0.088 1 	19:00 0.069 
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3.5.9 Model Error Identification 
While analysing the initial runs of the IMPACT model an error was discovered. It 
was observed that sections with lower AADT and incident frequency were 
generating higher delay figures, which should not occur. 
Following an extensive investigation into this it was discovered that the delay model 
was selecting the incorrect polynomial parameters from the lookup assumption 
menu. To remedy this, the lookup procedure was derived and polynomial parameters 
inputted into where the model would actually look for them rather than where it was 
supposed to look. This meant an analysis could still be implemented to create an 
accurate delay value. Table 3.18 details where the model actually looks for certain 
values. 
Table 3.18 Actual Polynomial Parameter Lookup Table Locations 
Actual Polynomial Parameters Location 
K x D AADT/C K x D AADT/C 
<0.0425 >11 0.0475-0.0625 <5 
<0.0425 7-11 0.0425-0.0475 <5 
<0.0425 5-7 <0.0425 5-7 
<0.0425 <5 <0.0425 <5 
0.0425-0.0475 >11 0.0475-0.0625 5-7 
0.0425-0.0475 1 	7-11 0.0425-0.0475 5-7 
0.0425-0.0475 1 	5-7 <0.0425 7-11 
3.5.10 	Final Model Run and Incident Delay Estimation 
The final model runs were performed in two stages for the two management types-
"none" and "user defined" values. The summary of expected motorist delay is shown 
in table 3.19. 
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Table 3.19 Comparison of Incident Delay. 
Incident Type No Incident Management With Incident Support Units 
Off-Peak Peak Off-Peak Peak 
Accidents and Vehicle Fires 6.90E+05 2.71 E+05 6.1OE+05 2.48E+05 
Mechanical and Electrical Breakdowns 7.95E+04 1.78E+04 7.31 E+04 1.65E+04 
Dropped Loads and Debris 5.61 E+05 1.06E+05 4.87E+05 9.59E+04 
Other 9.03E+04 8.51E+03 8.13E+04 7.75E+03 
Totals 1.42E+06 4.03E+05 1.25E+06 3.68E+05 
Daily Total 1.82E+06 1.62E+06 
The total delay with no incident management was estimated as 1.82x 106  veh.Ihours. 
The total delay with Incident Support Units was estimated as 1.62x 106  veh/hours. 
Therefore a saving of 200,000 vehicle/hours per year is obtained, which is equivalent 
to an 11 % reduction in delay due to incidents on the M25 Sphere. 
3.5.11 	Benefit-Cost Estimation 
Now that a motorist delay saving due to Incident Support Units has been estimated 
using the IMPACT model a monetary value for this can be established. The average 
cost of delaying a vehicle is taken as £7.84 (Huddart and Thompson, 2001), based on 
1994 prices. This figure has been sourced from Department for Transport survey 
figures for the whole of Britain, detailing the costs of travel. To convert this value 
into 2005 prices the Retail Price Index (RPI) was used as an efficient rate to base an 
updated value on. Therefore: 
. Retail Price Index (RPI) in 1994 was 144.1, 
• Average RPI value so far for 2005 is 191.06 (Wolfbane, 2005) 
Therefore the cost saving from Incident Support Units on the M25 Sphere can be 
calculated as: 
• The approximate cost for delaying a vehicle for an hour in 2005 will 
therefore be: (191.06/144.1) x 7.84 = £10.40 
. Hence, the total saving as a result of Incident Management on the M25 
Sphere for 2005: 
= 10.40 x 200,000 
= £2.08 Million per year. 
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The contractual cost to the Highways Agency of providing the Incident Support 
Service on the M25 Sphere is £1.6 million. Using this value, the Benefit-Cost ratio 
of providing the Incident Support Service is 1.3. 
This value represents a 30% return on the investment in the ISU service on the M25 
Sphere. The figure is however considerably lower than those established for US 
incident management programs. 
Further investigation would be required to understand exactly why this difference 
exists but possible reasons include: 
• Differing capital costs- vehicle costs are less in the US and additionally 
smaller and cheaper vehicles are generally used in the US. 
• Running costs including fuel price and operative costs differences, 
• Differences in the relative delay values, 
• Different service objectives- for example the benefits gained by assisting 
broken down motorists in US, 
• Limitations of IMPACT model, 
• Over-estimation of benefits in US assessment methodologies, 
• Underestimation of ISU services- for example benefit of additional road 
maintenance undertaken while on patrol. 
3.5.12 	Discussion 
Incident Frequency Model 
The model has been used to predict incident frequency on sections of highway 
through out the Unites States, however in application to the UK road network there 
appears to be limitations: 
• When IMPACT is run with no modifications to its parameters, the results 
show the model greatly over-estimates the number of incidents. This 
would be expected when compared to the Carillion CAD data, as this is 
not the actual number of incidents that occurred on the network, but 
merely those incidents that their ISUs attended. The case is the same with 
the STATS 19 data and RAC breakdown data, as only accidents involving 
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injured persons are logged in STATS 19 and the RAC attend 
approximately 34% of breakdowns on the M25 Sphere. The DETR data 
is the one accurate source for the UK road system, the comparisons here 
are poor, with only the off-peak accident volumes similar. Interestingly 
the DETR values for debris are larger than IMPACT, but agrees with the 
Carillion CAD data rates. 
. The results of the initial run would imply that the level of incidents on 
American roads is considerably higher than in the UK and certainly 
additional literature would support this view. 
The revision of the model was carried out in two stages: first the ratings that generate 
the volume of incidents were modified; and secondly the section characteristics were 
updated as accurately as possible, using the MIDAS traffic flow data. The ratings 
were altered using the Carillion CAD data and hence any comparison of output 
results would be against this data. As was expected, this revision of ratings produced 
far more suitable incident volumes, which related closely to the original Carillion 
values in terms of the total M25 Sphere. The updating of the section characteristics 
had the effect of generating better results for each individual section, but the total 
number of incidents on all sections stayed constant. 
Incident Severity Model 
Two types of changes were made to the severity model: capacity remaining values 
were updated to values from more recent and suitable studies and the values were 
adapted to fit the types of incidents that ISUs attended. 
One of the biggest alterations made to the severity model was in the incident 
locations (hard shoulder or in-lane). The primary reason being ISUs are far more 
likely to be notified for an incident which is in-lane and causing a much greater 
delay. 
Although the model deals with reduction in capacity in the carriageway that is 
affected by the incident, it does not account for the reduction in capacity, through 
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rubbernecking, to the opposite carriageway during an incident. This will be a result 
of curious drivers slowing down for a closer look and this figure has been quoted as 
high as 30% for major incidents (Huddart & Thompson, 2001). A recommendation 
in the IMPACT user guide (Sullivan, 1995) suggests that capacity remaining is 
revisited and hence the determination to update these values with a more recent 
report in this case Huddart and Thompson (2001). 
Incident Duration Model 
The incident duration sub-model is the section where the effects of different types of 
incidents are modelled. Their duration will decrease with quicker and more efficient 
incident management. 
Incident Delay Model 
The most significant issue with the delay model is with regards to the model 
incorrectly looking up the polynomial parameters. This is unfortunate, as it 
undermines what is essential a good procedure for determining traffic delay. The 
problem was corrected and the model was run using the correct polynomial 
parameters. 
The M25 only really has one peak period and that is from 6 am to 7pm. The traffic 
flow only drops slightly after morning rush hour, but effectively there is a 13-hour 
peak period on the M25. This means the cumulative traffic distribution will rise 
more steeply and requires updating. Again, the fact that the polynomial parameters 
are arranged in the class of AADT/C means that the majority of M25 sections will fit 
easily into the top bracket. This gives further reason to suggest that the IMPACT 
model results reduce in accuracy when dealing with highway sections that have a 
very high traffic flow. 
If the model was to be used to analyse separate sections and the operator had access 
to MIDAS traffic flow data or the equivalent, it would be possible to model 
individual sections with individual polynomial parameters. This would increase the 
delay result accuracy. While analysing the individual sections it was found that 
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several sections have very different cumulative traffic distribution, but both would 
fall under the same category in the IMPACT model. 
There is no way to compare the delay figures for ISU attended incidents, for two 
main reasons. Delay is particularly hard to record, and any values that are available 
will be for all incidents - so it is difficult to put a figure on the proportion of incidents 
ISUs attended. 
It must be emphasised that the delay value reductions are thought to be very 
conservative and the resultant delay reduction is therefore probably considerably 
lower than actual results. The reduction in incident duration as a result of 
implementation Incident Support Units is thought to be particularly conservative. 
IMPACT Model Limitations 
The first issue which has to be addressed is the problem with the incorrect lookup of 
the polynomial parameters. This initially caused considerable problems and a new 
user without knowledge of the model may not identify the problem. 
It was felt that the original incident rates are not suitable for any area of UK roads, 
even if every actual incident that occurs is to be modelled. 
Impact only works for 250 days when Incident response units in this country are 
available all the time, 365 days a year. 
Incident Support Units will not attend every incident and it is safe to assume that this 
is also experienced in the US yet no facility in the model is available to enter a 
percentage of total incidents attended. This would also enable the evaluation of for 
example a reduced service on the weekends. 
IMPACT takes no account of traffic build up it effectively models each section as 
one road and delay build up in adjoining motorway sections is not taken into 
consideration. 
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3.5.13 	Section Summary 
Using statistical trends between freeway incidents in the United States a model for 
estimating incident induced delay, IMPACT, was developed. This US model was 
modified and updated for use on the British motorway network and an analysis 
completed, detailing the impact of Incident Support Units on the M25 Sphere. 
The following conclusions were drawn: 
IMPACT can be successfully adapted for use on the UK motorway 
network. 
. It was estimated that ISUs reduced delay due to attended incident on the 
M25 by approximately 200,000 vehicle hours, or 11%. 
• This estimated delay saving equates to £2.08 million savings per year and 
an approximate benefit/cost ratio of 1.3:1. This shows that the ISU 
service is beneficial and that deployment and support of this service 
should be continued. 
3.6 Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter has presented a review of the ISU service on the M25 Sphere, operated 
by the HA's service provider, Carillion plc, including quantitative (analysis of 
incident data) and qualitative examinations (via questionnaire survey) and a benefit-
cost estimation. Conclusions for each section are detailed below. 
Section Three 
An examination of historical ISU records was undertaken to reveal an insight into the 
activities of ISUs on the M25 Sphere road network. The following are the key points 
that can be concluded from the analysis undertaken: 
• An overview of the characteristics of incidents attended by ISUs on the 
M25 Sphere road network for the period between September 2001 and 
August 2003 has been shown. Incident frequency, timings and locations 
were examined. 
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• ISUs attended on average 24 incidents per day. However a maximum of 
76 support requests were received on one day, showing the variability of 
demand. 
• Most ISU requests, 24%, were for debris clearance. 
• The average response time for all ISUs was 12.5 minutes. This is 
considerably shorter than the contractually required 20 minute response 
time. 
• The frequency of support requests from the emergency services has 
steadily increased since the introduction of ISUs in September 2001. This 
shows the increasing recognition given to the ISUs by the emergency 
services. 
Section Four. 
The results of a qualitative questionnaire survey of ISU operatives and police officers 
regarding the benefits of the ISUs were presented. The opinions of police officers on 
the M25 have been captured at a time when the majority are still familiar with the 
operations prior to ISUs, allowing a baseline of the officers' opinions to be 
established for future assessments. A better understanding of what police officers 
see as the programme's strengths, areas where officers are less convinced and 
specific suggestions for improvement are now known. In particular, the following 
can be drawn: 
• A positive response towards the ISU service on the M25was received 
from the surveyed police officers. 
• Overall feedback regarding the ISUs was positive and it can be concluded 
that the ISU service provided on the M25 is of benefit. 
• Improvements could be made between ISU operatives and police officers, 
thereby improving efficiency and effectiveness. Additionally further 
training will now be offered to ISU operatives to improve safety. 
• Significant feedback has shown that future developments should focus on 
(1) Improved direct communications; (2) Improved use of mobile variable 
message signs and electric light arrows; and (3) improved integrated 
training between the various emergency and response services. 
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• It is suggested that future work should include a repeat of the presented 
survey to continually assess performance. 
Section Five 
The cost effectiveness of the ISU service was investigated using an incident impact 
computer programme, IMPACT, which utilised statistical trends between freeway 
incidents in the US to estimate incident induced delay. The model was modified and 
updated for use on the British motorway network and an analysis completed, 
detailing the impact of ISUs on the M25 Sphere. The following can be drawn from 
the analysis: 
• IMPACT can be successfully adapted for use on the UK motorway 
network. 
• It was estimated that ISUs reduced delay due to attended incident on the 
M25 by approximately 200,000 vehicle hours, or 11%. 
• This estimated delay saving equates to £2.08 million savings per year and 
an approximate benefit/cost ratio of 1.3:1. This shows that the ISU 
service is beneficial and that deployment and support of this service 
should be continued. 
The ISU service has been reviewed and evaluated to facilitate an improved 
understanding of the programme benefits and effectiveness allowing for continual 
improvement, and in summary, it has been found that there is both a qualitative and 
quantitative material benefit to the ISU service. 
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4 Analysis of Incidents on Motorways 
4.1 Introduction 
The activities of Incident Support Units on the M25 Sphere were examined in 
chapter 3, but what is not known is their involvement in relation to all incidents that 
they are not required to attend. To fully understand the influence and role of ISUs on 
the M25 Sphere a detailed study of all incidents which occur on the road network 
was undertaken. To enable this, motorway incident data was collected by the author 
through observing motorway operations at a police control room. 
This chapter will involve the collection and examination of motorway incident data. 
This chapter is structured as follows: 
Section Two. A background and literature review is presented on incident 
analysis on motorways and freeways. 
. Section Three. The collection and analysis of motorway incident data from 
Surrey Police's Godstone motorway control room is examined to establish an 
accurate representation of incidents on motorways. 
. Section Four. To provide a larger data set for the analysis of incidents, 
historic matrix signal activations were examined and an analysis presented. 
. Section Five. Chapter summary and conclusions. 
4.2 Background 
There is limited literature on incident analysis on motorways in Britain, with the 
exception of Roberts et al (1994). Their study, in 1992 and 1993, provides a review 
of incidents on British motorways. They assessed incidents at 10 motorway control 
rooms, to establish incident rates and durations on motorway links for the then U.K. 
Department of Transport. Multi-channel time-lapse video from CCTV cameras and 
historical police records were used. 
There is more information available on US freeway incident characteristics (Pal et al 
(1998), Skabardonis et al (1997), Giuliano (1989), Jones et al (1991), Golob et al 
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(1987), Skabardonis et a! (1999) and Bertini et a! (2004)). Other studies for major 
cities in the US have been useful sources of information as reported traffic conditions 
are similar to that of the M25. However, many were carried out in the 1960's and 
1970's (Skabardoms et al, 1997) when drivers and vehicles were very different. 
More recent studies into the characteristics of incidents were undertaken in Seattle 
(Jones et al., 1991), Portland (Bertini et al., 2004) and Los Angeles (Skabardonis et 
al (1997), Giuliano (1989), Golob et al (1987), Skabardonis et a! (1999)). These 
studies used archived incident records as data whereas Skabardonis et a! (1997 and 
1999) collecting comprehensive field data, using probe vehicles, to determine 
incident and accident patterns. This data will be referred to in more detail within the 
analysis and comparison. 
4.3 M25 Motorway Incident Analysis 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Due to the lack of any recent motorway incident analysis in Britain a significant data 
set was collected and a comprehensive investigation undertaken. The following 
incident data was recorded by the author at a police motorway control room and the 
analysis presented below. 
4.3.2 Godstone Motorway Incident Data 
The data, for this study, were collected through observations, using closed-circuit 
television (CCTV), at Surrey Police's Godstone Motorway Control Room. A total of 
four weeks (28 days) of incident data was collected from between November 5th to 
December 11th. Every day, incident information was collected for a 12 hour period 
between 7am and 7pm. This time period was chosen as it covered the majority of the 
morning and evening travel peaks. 
Godstone Motorway Control Room manages Surrey Police's strategic roads which 
include the M25, M23, M3 and other major trunk roads. This study is however only 
concerned with incidents that occurred on their section of the M25, between Clacket 
Lane Motorway Services (marker post 4335) and junction 14 (marker post 4919) and 
is approximately 58.4 kilometres (36.3 miles) long. The road section under 
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examination can be seen in figure 6.17. The annual average daily traffic (AADT) 
over the study area ranged from 140,000 to 200,000 vehicles per day. 
The complete survey area is covered by an extensive network of CCTV cameras, 
emergency roadside telephones (ERT), gantry matrix signals for speed and lane 
controls and variable message signs (VMS). The matrix signals are used by the 
Motorway Incident Detection and Automatic Signalling (MIDAS) system. The 
MIDAS system covers the area between junction 6 and junction 16 and uses 
information on flows, speed and occupancy from a large number of inductive loop 
detectors, spaced at approximately 300 and 500 metres, to trigger and impose speed 
limits on that section through the overhead gantry matrix signals and VMS. This is 
known as the variable speed limit zone and attempts to "smooth-out" the traffic flow, 
thereby reducing the stop-start and wave effect brought on by heavy traffic flow. In 
theory, this should create a more efficient network, keep congestion at a minimum 
and improve safety. The data recorded from loop detectors used by the MIDAS 
system have also been collected. Prior to data collection an extensive survey of 
previous incident management evaluation studies was conducted to evaluate the data 
requirements. Certain data fields that were sought were unfortunately prohibited by 
Surrey police due to data protection and security issues. 
When an incident was notified to the control room or found by them, the following 
information was recorded on incident characteristics: 
• Time of notification, 
• Type of incident (Breakdown, Accident, Debris, Vehicle Fire, Animal, etc.), 
• Time travel lanes were cleared, 
• Time incident was cleared, 
• Day of week, 
• Method of notification, 
• Location (Marker post, direction, junctions, lane), 
• Number of lanes blocked, 
• Weather conditions, 
• Light conditions, 
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• Road conditions, 
• Length of queue (if available), 
• Occurrence of secondary accidents, 
• Whether an ISU was required, 
• Time of ISU request and arrival, 
• Type and number of vehicles involved, 
• Any other relevant details (times of matrix signal activations and settings, 
VMS messages and timings, Type, number and timings of emergency and 
recovery vehicles at incident scene, etc.). 
For the duration of data collection period a total of 732 incidents were notified to the 
control room and recorded. As this study is only interested with incidents that 
occurred within Surrey police's section of the M25, only these incidents will be 
examined, giving a total of 450 incidents for the study area throughout the study 
period. 
4.3.3 Incident Data Analysis 
The data collected and described above can be investigated and analysed to provide 
greater insight into the occurrence of incidents on the M25. This data can be 
investigated in four separate areas: 
Incident Frequency, 
Incident Durations, 
• Incident Locations, 
• Incident Support Unit Involvement. 
Each of these four areas will be discussed below providing conclusions where 
applicable. 
Incident Frequency 
The incident records were analysed to derive the incident type proportions and 
summary statistics are shown in table 4.1 and figure 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Overall Incident Type Frequency and Locations 
Type of Incident - HIS In-Lane Slip Road Unknown ••• Total 
Breakdowns 247 84.9% 39 13.4% 5 1.7% 0 0.0% 291 64.7% 
Accidents 49 518% 41 45.1% 1 11% 0 0.0% 91 202% 
Debris 3 7.3% 35 85.4% 1 2.4% 2 49% 41 9.1% 
Pot Holes - 0 0.0% " 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 9 2.0% 
Animals 1 20.0% 3 60.0% 0 0.0% 1 20.0% 5 1.1% 
Vehicle Fire - 2 40.0% 1 	3 60.01,16 1 	0 0.0% 1 	0 0.0% 5 1.1% 
Medical - 3 100. 0% 1 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0 0.0% - 0.7% 
Pedestnan - - 2 1000% 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0% - 0.4% 
Abandoned Vehicles - 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0 0.0% - 1 0.2°!. 
Obstruction 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0 0.01/6 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 
Suicide 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.211. 
Total = 307 68.2% 132 29.3% 8 1.8% 3 0.7% 450 100.0% 
Figure 4.1 shows the breakdown of incident types. For the study period there were 
291 breakdowns that accounted for approximately 64.7% of all incidents and were 
followed by accidents at 20.2% and debris with 9.1% of the total 450 incidents. The 
estimated incident rate for the study area was 2.32 incidents per million vehicle km 
(3.74 incidents per million vehicle miles). In comparison, in the US, Bertini et al 
(2004) found that breakdowns accounted for 50% and accidents accounted for 15% 
of all incidents and Skabardonis et al (1999) found 86.6% of incidents were 
breakdowns and 6.5% were accidents. As Skabardonis et a! (1999) used probe 
vehicles, patrolling the highway looking for incidents, instead of CCTV, for data 
capture, they would have witnessed more breakdowns than this study. On the M25 
only breakdowns notified to the control room were logged, hence the smaller number 
of breakdowns. This highlights a difference in the recording of the incident data. 
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Figure 4.1 Breakdown of Incident Types. 
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Table 4.1 illustrates the type and the lateral locations of incidents on the carriageway. 
The locations are classified as to where the incident was first observed. Incidents 
may have occurred in the live lanes but by the time it was detected and verified the 
incident may have cleared to the shoulder. It can be seen that the predominant 
incident type recorded was breakdowns on the hard shoulder, approximately 55% of 
all incidents. In-lane accidents accounted for 45.1% of all accidents and 9.1% of all 
incidents. Approximately 29.3% of all recorded incidents occurred in-lane and had 
the potential to cause delay to motorists. The majority of accidents, 61.6%, involved 
only two or less vehicles and 80.2% of accidents involved three or less vehicles. A 
total of 50.5% of accidents involved a Large Goods Vehicle (LGV) and 34% of all 
accidents included a foreign LGV, which is very concerning as they comprise less 
than 10% of the LGV traffic. Foreign LGV's however only accounted for 1.37% of 
all breakdowns with LGV's accounting for 5.84%. 
Lanes Blocked 
3 or More Lanes 




Figure 4.2 Lanes Blocked by Percentage. 
In contrast, in the US, Skabardonis et al (1999) observed that the proportion of in-
lane incidents was approximately 10.7% on 1-10, Skabardonis et at (1997) on 1-880 
showed 4.6% occurred in-lane and FHWA (Lindley (1986)) also presented values of 
approximately 4%. Bertini et al (2004) however observed 29.3% in-lane incidents 
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using historical data from the Portland area. Roberts et a! (1994) estimated that 6% 
of incidents occurring on the motorway network had the potential to interfere with 
free-flowing traffic in the running lanes. Skabardonis et a! (1997) do admit that if 
CCTV had been used to observe incidents, rather than probe vehicles, the number of 
in-lane incidents would have been higher. 
The percentage breakdowns of lanes blocked by noted incidents are shown in figure 
4.2. As shown, 69% of incidents blocked only the hard shoulder and only 7.6% of 
lane blocking incidents blocked two or more lanes. Less than 1% of incidents 
blocked 3 or more lanes which is much lower than Bertini et al (2004) who reported 
that 3% of incidents blocked all lanes. 
An average of 16.1 incidents/day were observed during the study period, within the 
study area, with an average of 10.39 breakdowns and 3.25 accidents per day. For 
each collection day there were on average 2.32 incidents per million vehicle-km 
(3.73 incidents per million vehicle-miles). The number of incidents was 
approximately the same for each direction of the study area with only 3.5% 
difference between clockwise and anti-clockwise carriageways. 
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Figure 4.3 Incidents by day of Week. 
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Figure 4.3 shows the variability of recorded accidents by days of the week. The plot 
of data shows, for weekdays, that the larger numbers of incidents occur on Fridays 
with 74 incidents or 16.4% of all incidents in the study period. This is expected as 
more vehicles use the M25 on a Friday than on any other day and gives an incident 
rate of 2.41 incidents per million vehicle-km (3.88 incidents per million vehicle-
miles). It can also be seen from figure 4.3 however that, unexpectedly, there are 
more incidents on a Tuesday. This requires further investigation with a larger data 
set to fully understand the influence of days of the week on the frequency of 
incidents. 
Also unexpectedly there are more incidents on Saturdays than any other day of the 
week giving an incident rate of 3.36 incidents per million vehicle-km (5.42 incidents 
per million vehicle-miles). With Sunday also very high compared to weekdays, this 
may be due to the fact that motorists using the M25 at the weekend may be less 
prepared or experienced for driving on an extremely busy motorway, in comparison 
to weekday commuters. It should also be noted that the majority of incidents on 
weekends were breakdowns, 72% of all incidents compared to an average of 61.5% 
on weekdays. Even though there were more incidents at weekends, fewer occurred 
in-lane: on average 21.8% of incidents in-lane compared to 35.4% on weekdays. 
Vehicle fires also occurred more often at weekends than on weekdays, possibly 
confirming that less well maintained vehicles were being used at the weekend. 
The rate of incident occurrence changes throughout the day and generally 
corresponds to the number of vehicles on the road, with the majority of all incidents 
when the road network is near or exceeding capacity, shown graphically in figure 
4.4. There are however two exceptions to this between 11:00 - 12:00 and 14:00 - 
15:00 where the incident rates are higher than expected. Further work has to be 
undertaken on the timings of incident occurrence, as the discrepancies occur in 
uncongested low flow periods. The temporal variation in the occurrence of incidents 
can be used to enhance the ISU program by optimising staffing shift patterns. 
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Incidents by Time of Day 
Figure 4.4 Incidents by Time of Day. 
Figure 4.5 illustrates the different ways that incidents were notified to the motorway 
control room. As can be seen, emergency roadside telephones (ERT) are the most 
frequent method of notification with 236 uses or 52.4%. This is then followed by 
999 (British emergency number) emergency calls with 25.1% and then police patrols 
with 5.8%. The remainder of incidents were either observed by CCTV from the 
control room or reported by the Highways Agency, including ISUs, other emergency 
services or various breakdown agencies. 
For the entire study period there were only 4 secondary accidents and all were very 
minor damage only accidents. Other incident types however had even fewer 
secondary effects with only two debris incidents struck before clearance. This may 
be a result of the MIDAS system quickly reducing speed limits following incidents, 
and stopping other vehicles meeting stationary queues at high speed. 
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Figure 4.5 Method of Notification. 
Incident Durations 
For the 450 incidents observed, the total incident duration was calculated as the 
difference in the time from when the incident was first observed until all lanes, 
including the hard shoulder were cleared. The average duration of all incidents was 
1 hour, 9 minutes. This duration is approximately three times that of Skabardonis et 
a! (1999) incident duration of 20.7 minutes and double the duration of Bertini et al 
(2004) study in Portland at 33 minutes. The British study by Roberts et al (1994) 
found the average incident duration of 46 minutes for several UK motorways. This 
longer duration may be due to many locations on the M25 being rural and having 
longer distances between junctions compared to other study areas - as emergency and 
recovery vehicles have to travel further to an incident scene. The average duration of 
a travel lane being blocked was 32 minutes. The longest incident duration, and travel 
lane blockage duration, observed was 6 hours 40 minutes and involved extensive 
infrastructure damage that had to be repaired immediately for safety reasons. 
Accidents had the longest durations of all incidents, at 81 minutes, approximately 6 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































approximate detection times to be established. For the incidents that were discovered 
there was on average 5 minutes between the incidents occurring and the control room 
being notified. 
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Figure 4.7 Graph of Average Incident Duration and Lane Closure Duration 
Throughout the Day. 
Incident Locations 
The location of each incident was recorded to the nearest marker post. These are 
spaced at 100 metre intervals along the full length of the study area. The spatial 
distribution of incidents, organised by junctions, is shown in figure 4.8. 
It can be seen that for a straight count of incidents, that the section between junctions 
8 and 9 has the highest occurrences of incidents. However, when incident rates are 
considered, the section between junctions 9 and 10 has the highest rate of incidents at 
2.87 incidents per million vehicle km (4.63 incidents per million vehicle-miles). 
This information can be used to enhance the ISU program as the standby locations 
can be altered in relation to the spatial locations of incidents. 
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Incident Locations by Junction 
Figure 4.8 Incident Locations Organised by Junctions. 
Incident Support Unit Involvement 
Incident support units were requested to attend 21.3% of all incidents during the 
study period. They attended 44% of all accidents, 5% of breakdowns and 63.4% of 
debris incidents. After being requested, the ISUs had an average response time of 12 
minutes over 96 incidents. Further research will have to be conducted to fully 
understand the influence of ISUs on the M25 road network. 
Comparison between UK and US Incident data 
Table 4.2 shows a comparison between this study's findings regarding incident 
characteristics and three other studies: Roberts et a! (1994), Skabardonis et al (1999) 
and Bertini et al (2004). It can be seen that there are few similarities between 
studies. 
Average incident duration varies by as much 28 minutes between the M25 and 
Interstate 10. Durations in the UK are between double and triple those of the US. 
Does this imply that US incident management practices are better than UK practices? 
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Table 4.2 Comparison of Study Results 
British Los Angeles I 
 Portland 




Year of Study - 2003 1992/1993 1996 2001 
Average Incident 
69 46 20.7 33 
Duration (Minutes 
Incident Rate 
(Incidents per million 2.32 11.49 92.8 N/A 
vehicke kilometres)  
Percentage In-Lane 
Incidents (%) 
31.1 6 10.7 29.3 
Percentage Accidents 
20.2 4.7 6.5 15 
(%) 
Percentage 
64.7 78.6 86.6 50 Breakdowns (%) 
Incident rates between Britain and the US are vastly different with an average 
incident rate of 6.91 incidents per million vehicle kilometres from Britain compared 
to 92.8 in the US. This may be due to different driving styles, vehicles, vehicle 
regulations, driving distances, weather and many other factors such as incident 
recording. The difference between percentages of in-lane incidents appears to 
increase with more recent studies. Very minor incidents may not have been captured 
in this study thus increasing the in-lane percentage. The percentage in this study and 
the Portland study (Bertini et al., 2004) are however both greater than the two older 
studies in the comparison. The differences could also be due to different traffic 
densities. The percentage of accidents could also be due to the age of the study - 
again with the two more recent studies having greater percentages of accidents 
occurring. The lower accident percentages may also be due to the total number of 
incidents as the studies with the higher incident rates have lower percentages. Again 
the age of studies may be the cause of the differences between studies as more 
modern vehicles are less prone to breaking down. The differences between studies 
may also have been due to the method of detection the incidents. This study 
recorded incidents reported to the police control room and through observations on 
CCTV whereas Skabardonis et a! (1997, 1999) used probe vehicles and Pal et a! 
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(1998), Giuliano et a! (1989), Jones et al (1991), Golob et al (1987) and Bertini et a! 
(2004) used historical operational data. 
4.3.4 Section Summary 
This section has presented an overview of the characteristics of incidents on the 
south western part of the M25 London orbital motorway for the period between 5th 
November and 11th  December 2003 to enable an understanding of the influence and 
role of ISUs on the M25 Sphere. Incident frequency, durations, locations and ISU 
involvement were examined. 
It was found that: 
• A total of 450 incidents were observed giving an average frequency of 16.1 
incidents per day or 2.32 incidents per million vehicle-km (3.74 incidents per 
million vehicle-miles) for the study area. The majority of recorded incidents, 
64.7%, were breakdowns. 
• 69% of incidents blocked just the hard shoulder and only 7.6% blocked two 
or more lanes. 
• Saturday had both a higher incident frequency and rate than any other day of 
the week. 
• Between 11:00 and 12:00 was found to have the highest occurrence of 
incidents and highest rate during the day. 
Emergency roadside telephones were the most frequent method of incident 
notification. 
• The average incident duration for the study period was found to be 1 hour, 9 
minutes. Approximately 50% of incidents lasted less than 60 minutes and the 
average travel lane blockage was 32 minutes. The longest incident durations 
were recorded between 15:00 and 16:00 and the longest lane closure 
durations were between 13:00 and 14:00 
• The majority of incidents occurred between junctions 8 and 9 but between 
junctions 9 and 10 had the highest incident rate. 
• Incident Support Units attended 21.33% of all incidents and had an average 
response time of 12 minutes. 
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• Incident characteristics between US and UK studies were compared and 
found to be different. 
4.4 Archived Matrix Signal Setting Accident Analysis 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Personal data collection ensures that all data collected is accurate and consistent but 
the time and financial constraints limits the volume of data that can be recorded. To 
provide a larger data set for incident analysis and allow a better understanding of the 
occurrence of incidents on the M25, motorway matrix signal setting archives were 
examined. Historic motorway matrix signal setting archives would enable a very 
large analysis of data, not restricted by data collection times. 
It was chosen to only analyse "accidents" within the motorway matrix signal settings 
archives as these incidents are some of the most frequent and often have the greatest 
impact. 
This section details an analysis of historical accident motorway matrix signal settings 
and their frequency, locations, durations and timings. 
4.4.2 Data Description 
The data for this section was taken from matrix signal settings archives, in a database 
format, for two control rooms on the M25, made available by the Highways Agency. 
Godstone and Heston control rooms record signal settings for the southern part of the 
M25, between junction 2 and 17, covering approximately 62.5 miles in total length. 
The databases were supplied in monthly form with all signal activations recorded. In 
total the data covered all days from 1 January 2000 to 31St  December 2002 - 1,096 
days. 
The signal settings archive databases contain all information relevant to the setting of 
the signal: 
• Log counter, 
• On date and time, 
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Operator who set the signals, 
Signal location (Motorway, marker post, direction, lane) 
Signal setting, 
. Reason for setting (Accident, congestion, incident, debris, etc.) 
• Off date and time. 
Queries were run on the settings archive databases and all activations for accident 
only reasons were extracted. The extracted data was then manually analysed and 
separated into individual accidents. In total, 38,755 accident matrix signal 
activations were examined and 3,399 signal accident activations were identified. 
4.4.3 Accident Data Analysis 
Accident Frequency 
Analysis showed that for the period of the study, there were 3,399 recorded matrix 
signal accidents activations (table 4.3). In 2000 and 2001 there were 1120 accidents 
- exactly the same number. In 2002 however, the number of accident signal 
activations increased to 1,159. 
Table 4.3 Comparison of Accident Data for Different Years. 
Year 
All = 2000 2001 2002 
Total Number of Matrix Signal 
Accident Activations  
- 1120 1120 1159 
Mean Duration (Mins) 01:01:22 - 00:59:28 1 00:59:34 1 01:05:04 
Standard Deviation (Mins) 01:49:59 - 01:56:35 1 01:42:36 01:50:46 
Median Duration (Mins) 00:33:26 - 00:30:08 1 00:32:49 00:37:22 
The increase in the number of accidents is contrary to expectation as several incident 
management programs have been instigated or modified over the 3 year study period. 
The average accident frequency was found to be 1,133 per year, 94.42 per month and 
3.1 per day for the study area. Over the 62.5 miles of the study area this equates to 
an average of 18.13 accidents per mile per year, 1.51 accidents per mile per month 
and 0.05 accidents per mile per day. 
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Figure 4.9 Graph of Accidents by Day of the Week. 
Figure 4.9 shows the variability of recorded accidents by days of the week. The plot 
of data for all years shows that the larger number of accidents occurs on Fridays with 
582 accidents or 17.1% of all accidents in the study period. It can also be seen from 
figure 4.9 that, as expected, there are fewer accidents on Saturdays and Sundays. 
This is because there are fewer vehicles using the motorway at the weekend. The 
individual years data, also plotted, is fairly consistent giving confidence in the 
combined data. 
Figure 4.10 Graph of Accidents by Month. 
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Examination of the accidents by month showed some interesting variability, as 
shown in figure 4.10. The months in the spring season (Mar - May) were the lowest 
for the combined data with the period from October to January recording the highest 
number of accidents. Individual year's data shows greater variability however. In 
January there were 44 accidents between 2000's records and 2001's records. There 
were also 51 accidents between 2000 and 2002 in October. This variability requires 
further investigation as influencing factors, such as weather, were not available to 
this study. 
A review of accident rates per year and per day for each day of the week and every 
month was carried out. It was found that the worst day for accidents was a Monday 
in December with an average of 21.67 accidents per year or 4.643 accidents per day 
for the study area of the M25. In contrast the minimum accident rate is a Saturday in 
May, with 5.67 accidents per year and 1.417 per day. 
Table 4.4 Distribution of Accidents by Time of Day. 
Time of Day 
Total Number of 
 
Accidents 
Average Accident Rate 
(Accidents per Day) 
00:00to01:00 65 0.059 
01:00to02:00 44 0.040 
02:00 to 03:00 44 0.040 
03:00 to 04:00 38 0.035 
04:00 to 05:00 34 0.031 
05:00 to 06:00 69 0.063 
06:00to07:00 119 0.109 
07:00 to 08:00 139 0.127 
08:00 to 09:00 160 0.146 
09:00to 10:00 179 0.163 
10:00 to 11:00 167 0.152 
11:00 to 12:00 220 0.201 
12:00 to 13:00 204 0.186 
13:00 to 14:00 200 0.182 
14:00 to 15:00 190 0.173 
15:00 to 1 6:00 216 0.197 
16:00 to 17:00 259 0.236 
17:00 to 18:00 288 0.263 
18:00 to 19:00 234 0.214 
19:00to20:00 185 0.169 
20:00to21:00 123 0.112 
21:00 to 22:00 91 0.083 
22:00 to 23:001 65 0.059 
23:00 to 24:001 65 0.059 
The number of accidents changes throughout the day. Table 4.4 and figure 4.11 
show the variability of all accidents during the day. It can be seen that the higher 
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level of accidents occurred between 5pm and 6pm. The total of 288 accidents, or 
8.5% of all accidents, during the evening peak period, has a rate of 0.263 accidents 
per day. The minimum number of accidents occurs between 4am and 5am with only 
34 accidents over the study period. The data shown generally follows the number of 
vehicles on the road with the majority of all accidents when the road network is near 
or exceeding capacity. Further work could be done on the timings of accident 
occurrence, as the influence of traffic flows has not been examined. 
Accidents by Time of Day 
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Figure 4.11 Graph of Number of Accidents by Time of Day for All Years. 
Accident Durations 
For the 3,399 accidents, the total accident duration was calculated as the difference 
between the time that the first signal was activated until the last signal was 
deactivated. The average duration of all accidents was ihour, iminute and 
22seconds. For the year 2000 the average accident duration was 59 minutes, 28 
seconds, in 2001 the average was 59 minutes, 34 seconds and in 2002 it was 1 hour, 
5 minutes and 4 seconds. 
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Distribution of Accident Durations 
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Figure 4.12 Comparison of Accident Duration Distributions. 
Figure 4.12 shows the distribution of durations for all accidents. The distribution 
shows that approximately 50% of all accidents last less than 40 minutes, 75% of all 
accidents last less than 80 minutes and 90% of all accidents last less than 120 
minutes. 
Table 4.5 Comparison of A-D test results for duration distributions. 
A-D Test Value = Year - - 
Fitted Distribution 2000 2001 2002 
lognorm - 1.708 - 3.249 - 2.605 
lnvGauss 2.151 3.663 3.313 
Pearson5 3.589 5.562 4.694 
Expon 29.96 18.95 18.2 
ExtValue +lnfinity 39.06 40.27 
Logistic +lnfinity +lnfinity 57.92 
Tnang 1970 1800 1649 
Uniform 2652 2483 2352 
Student 7634 7686 8109 
Pareto2 +lnfinity +lnfinity +lnfinity 
Rayleigh +lnfinity +lnfinity +lntinity 
Pareto +lnfinity +lnfinity +lnfinity 
Normal +lnfinity +Infinity +Infinity 
Ert I - Anfinity I- +lnfinity I- +lnfintty 
Theoretical statistical distributions were fitted against the recorded accident 
durations. A selection of fourteen distributions were examined and the Anderson-
Darling (A-D) test used to measure the goodness of fit between the data and the 
theoretical distributions. In the A-D test, the lower the number indicates a better fit. 
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A review of the A-D test results for the trialled distributions is shown in Table 4.5. It 
can be seen that the lognormal distribution provides the best fit to the recorded 
accident durations. This agrees with previous American studies (Giuliano (1989), 
Jones eta! (1991), Golob et al (1987), Skabardonis (1999)) of incident analysis. 
A review of average accident durations by day of the week and month showed that 
on average the longest accidents are on Sundays in August at 2 hours 6 minutes 18 
seconds in length and the shortest are Saturdays in December at 29 minutes 54 
seconds. On average Wednesdays have the shortest accidents and Sundays have the 
longest durations. During a day the average duration of accidents varies by as much 
as 1 hour 56 minutes 57 seconds as shown in figure 9. The average duration is 
reasonably constant between 8am and 10pm but between 10pm and 8am the 
durations are greatly increased with the maximum average duration between 1 am and 
2am of 2 hours 43 minutes 33 seconds. Extended durations through the night time 
period could be due to the extra time additional equipment can take to reach an 
accident scene, but is more likely to be because accidents may be more severe at 
night. Unfortunately severity data was not available. 
Figure 4.13 Graph of Average Duration Throughout the Day for all Years. 
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Accident Locations 
The matrix signal databases included the marker post location of the activated signal. 
The location of the first activated signal was extracted and then manually sorted into 
junction-by-junction groups. The number of accidents by junction locations is 
shown in figure 4.14. Also shown is the line of the normalised accidents or accidents 
per mile - the number of accidents in each section have been divided by the mileage 
of the section. It can be seen that for a straight count of accidents then the section 
between junctions 5 and 6 has the highest occurrences of accidents. However, this 
section is one of the longest in the sample, which when normalised falls below the 
average accident rate. The highest rate of accidents per mile is for the section 
between junctions 7 and 8, which is 85.31 accidents per mile for the study period. 
Number of Accidents by Location 
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Figure 4.14 Graph of Accident Locations by Junctions. 
4.4.4 Section Summary 
This section has shown an overview of the characteristics of motorway matrix signal 
accident activations on the southern part of the M25 London orbital motorway for the 
period between January 2000 and December 2002. Accident frequency, durations 
and locations were examined. 
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It was found that: 
• The average frequency of accidents was 3.1 accidents per day or 0.05 
accidents per mile per day for the study area. 
• The majority of recorded accidents occurred on a Friday. 
• The spring months were found to have the lowest number of occurrences and 
the winter months were found to be the highest. 
• Between 5pm and 6pm was found to have the highest occurrence of 
accidents. 
• The average accident duration for the study period was 1 hour 1 minute 22 
minutes. 
• A lognormal distribution was shown to fit recorded durations. 
• Sundays in August were shown to have the longest durations. 
• Accident durations through the day were examined with the longest accident 
durations between 10pm and 8am. 
The majority of accidents have occurred between junctions 5 and 6 but 
between junctions 7 and 8 had the highest accident rate of 85.31 accidents per 
mile for the study period. 
It was shown that it is possible to analyse data collected from motorway matrix 
signal accident activation records. The analysis of this data was however very labour 
intensive, requiring manual identification and summary of each incident. This could 
lead to operator errors when identifying the characteristics of incidents contained 
within the records. 
The analysis is also reliant on the accuracy of the original matrix signal activation 
reason. If controllers accidentally selected an incorrect reason for example, 
"obstruction" instead of "accident" this would not have been identified in this study. 
It is believed however that by using a large data set, such as the one used here, these 
errors will be negligible. 
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4.5 Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter involved the collection and examination of motorway incident data in 
order to fully understand the influence and role of ISUs on the M25 Sphere. 
The activities of Incident Support Units on the M25 Sphere were examined in 
chapter 3. As the proportion of ISU attended incidents to all incidents was not 
known motorway incident data was collected by the author through observing 
motorway operations at a police control room. This analysis was shown in section 
4.3. Historical data was also obtained to provide a larger data set for analysis, which 
is detailed section 4. Conclusions for each section are detailed below. 
Section Three 
The collection and analysis of motorway incident data on the south western part of 
the M25, from Surrey Police's Godstone motorway control room, was examined to 
establish an accurate representation of incidents on motorways. One month of daily 
incident data was collected, through observation, by the author. The data was 
examined and incident frequency, durations, locations and ISU involvement were 
established. The following are the key points that can be concluded from the 
analysis undertaken: 
• An average frequency of 16.1 incidents per day was observed, the majority of 
which (64.7%) were breakdowns. It should be noted that ISUs are not 
contractually obliged to assist with general broken down vehicles. This sheds 
further light on the differing benefit-cost ratios discussed in chapter 3 where 
US programmes assisted broken down motorists. 
• 31% of incidents occurred in-lane. The majority of these incidents would 
have involved a request for an ISU to attend. 
• ISUs were requested to attend 21.33% of all incidents, including 40% of all 
accidents, and had an average response time of 12 minutes. 
This section has shown that ISUs play a large role in the incident management of the 
M25 motorway. They were requested to attend more than 90 incidents to provide 
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traffic management, debris clearance and spill containment. Therefore the estimated 
benefit found in chapter 3 has been demonstrated to be a significant one. 
Section Four 
To provide a larger, three year, data set for the analysis of incidents, historic matrix 
signal activations were examined and an analysis was presented. It was chosen to 
only examine "accident" signal activations. Accident frequency, durations and 
locations were examined. 
It was shown that it is possible to analyse data collected from motorway matrix 
signal accident activation records. The analysis of this data was however very labour 
intensive, requiring manual identification and summary of each incident. This could 
lead to operator errors when identifying the characteristics of incidents contained 
within the records. 
The analysis is also reliant on the accuracy of the original matrix signal activation 
reason. If controllers accidentally selected an incorrect reason for example, 
"obstruction" instead of "accident" this would not have been identified in this study. 
It is believed however that by using a large data set, such as the one used here, these 
errors will be negligible. 
Data Set Comparison 
A comparison between the two data sets is detailed below. 
Accuracy - Personally collected data can always be guaranteed to be more 
accurate than any other obtained source. 
. Data set size - Historical records provide much larger sample sizes than those 
obtained manually. 
. Time - Data collection is very time consuming. 
. Cost - Data collection can prove to be very expensive over long periods. 
Accessibility - Historical records are easily obtained for analysis 
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. Data Availability - Historical data is generally available for all times and 
days and not dependent on data collection periods, which can sometimes miss 
incidents. 
Analysis - The ease of analysis of data can be important as errors can be 
introduced is the analysis is very complicated and laborious. 
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FM:] 
5 The Influence of Motorway Incidents on Traffic Flow 
5.1 Introduction 
Incidents are defined as any non-recurrent events that create a temporary reduction in 
roadway capacity, which in turn, impedes the normal flow of traffic. Incidents may 
physically block part or all of a motorway or may be clear of the carriageway and 
only providing a distraction to passing motorists. In order to effectively manage an 
incident on a motorway and reduce its impact, it is essential to accurately estimate 
the incident's impact on the flow of traffic. Once the influence is known and 
understood, appropriate mitigation strategies can be implemented to reduce the 
incident's impact. 
This chapter examines the influence of motorway incidents on traffic flow. Their 
impact on the capacity of the roadway is examined and the impact of rubbernecking 
is investigated. Investigations and analysis are undertaken to evaluate the impact of 
incidents on motorways including the total delay experienced. 
This chapter is structured as follows: 
. Section Two. The loss of capacity due to traffic incidents on motorways is 
characterised. A review of incident capacity reduction estimations from US 
freeways and other studies is presented. The roadway capacity under normal 
and incident conditions was estimated for a sample of incidents, with the 
resulting reduction due to incidents summarised. 
. Section Three. In addition to the impact of physically blocking travel lanes, 
"rubbernecking" by motorists can reduce the capacity of a facility. An 
investigation into the effect of rubbernecking on roadway capacity, capacity 
speed and safety is detailed. 
• Section Four. An assessment of the resulting delays due to incidents was 
presented. 
• Section Five. Chapter summary and conclusions. 
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5.2 Characterisation of Capacity Reduction Resulting from 
Traffic Incidents 
5.2.1 Introduction 
When an incident occurs on a motorway, it temporarily reduces the capacity of the 
road which in turn causes congestion. It has been estimated that incidents account 
for approximately 25% of all congestion on the trunk road network which is thought 
to cost the British economy approximately £750 million per year (National Audit 
Office, 2005). 
In order to effectively manage an incident on a motorway and reduce its impact, it is 
essential to accurately estimate the incident's impact on the flow of traffic. If the 
loss of capacity due to an incident can be estimated, then using current demand flow, 
from loop detectors and simple analysis, such information as queue length, average 
delay and number of vehicles delayed can be estimated. With this information 
proper traffic management and diversion plans can be implemented and accurate 
information can be disseminated to the public. 
This section will categorise the average capacity reduction on a motorway, due to an 
incident, by estimating the roadway capacity under normal and incident conditions 
for a sample of incidents. 
5.2.2 Background 
The capacity of a roadway section is defined as "the maximum hourly rate at which 
persons or vehicles can reasonably be expected to traverse a point or uniform section 
of a lane or roadway during a given time period under prevailing roadway, traffic, 
and control conditions" (TRB, 2000) 
Usually when an incident occurs a bottleneck rapidly forms due to the fact that the 
demand for travel is greater than the remaining capacity. Therefore, the bottleneck 
traffic flow can be taken as the remaining capacity at an incident scene, assuming 
that the roadway section is operating at its (remaining) capacity. 
160 
The Highway Capacity Manual (TRB, 2000) states that the loss of capacity is likely 
to be greater than simply the proportion of original capacity which is physically 
blocked. The added loss of capacity arises because drivers increase their headways 
and slow to look at the incident while they are abreast of it and are slow to react to 
the possibility of speeding up to move through the incident area. This is known as 
"rubbernecking". 
The most commonly cited source of capacity reduction figures is the Highway 
Capacity Manual (TRB, 2000). In Chapter 22, "Freeway Facilities Methodology", of 
the manual, Table 22-6 details the proportion of capacity available under incident 
conditions, based on the number of lanes at the incident location and the number and 
location of lanes blocked. The figures presented in Table 22-6 of the manual are 
shown in table 5.1 below. 
Table 5.1 Portion of Freeway Capacity Available Under Incident Conditions 
(TRB, 2000) 
Number of Freeway 











2 0.95 0.81 0.35 0 N/A 
3 0.99 0.83 0.49 0.17 0 
4 0.99 0.85 0.58 0.25 0.13 
5 0.99 0.87 0.65 0.40 0.20 
6 0.99 0.89 0.71 0.50 0.26 
7 0.99 0.91 0.75 0.57 0.36 
8 0.99 0.93 0.78 0.63 0.41 
It was not possible to determine the original source research for the information 
presented in the table but the most often referenced original research on incident 
capacity reduction was conducted in 1971 by Goolsby (Goolsby, 1971). Goolsby 
analysed 27 accidents and breakdowns that occurred between 1968 and 1969 on a 6.5 
mile section of the Gulf Freeway in Houston. A summary of the effect on traffic 
flow that Goolsby observed is shown in table 5.2. It was estimated that a broken 
down vehicle blocking one lane, out of three, would reduce capacity by 48% and an 
accident blocking one lane would reduce capacity by 51%. These figures are 
consistent with the Highway Capacity Manual figure of 49% remaining capacity. He 
also noted a 79% loss of capacity with the closure of two of the three available lanes. 
161 
The study only used 312 counted 1-minute volumes under normal conditions 
downstream of the study site, not the capacity under prevailing conditions, therefore 
possibly over-estimating the capacity reduction. Also, only 517 1-minute volume 
counts were made of the incident capacity, and the measurement was not well 
described. The inherently unstable nature of using 1-minute flows may also 
contribute to over-estimation or under-estimation (Qin and Smith, 2001). 
Table 5.2 Effect of Differing Incident Conditions on Traffic Flow on a Three- 











Normal - 5,560 - 
Stall 1 2,880 48 
Non-Injury Accident 1 2,750 51 
Accident 2 I 1,150 79 Accident on Shoulder - 4,030 28 
Sullivan (1997) presented as part of an incident impact model, called IMPACT, 
estimates of capacity reduction based on several previous studies. This information 
is presented in table 5.3 and is separated into two categories: Accidents and debris 
and all other incident types. These figures are in general agreement with other 
previous studies. 
Table 5.3 Percent of Original Capacity Remaining for Different Incident Types 
(Sullivan, 1997) 
Lateral Location of 
Incident 
Original Width of Roadway 
4+ 	I 3 	I 2 	I 1 
Accident and Debris  
Median Shoulder 74.0 69.0 64.0 59.0 
Right Shoulder 85.0 83.0 81.0 79.0 
1 Lane Blocked 62.0 53.0 39.0 0 
2 Lane Blocked 26.7 18.4 0 N/A 
3 Lane Blocked 13.9 0 N/A N/A 
4 Lane Blocked 0 N/A N/A N/A 
All Other Incident Types_________  
Median Shoulder 80.0 76.0 71.0 67.0 
Right Shoulder 96.0 90.0 84.0 78.0 
1 Lane Blocked 66.7 57.0 42.0 0 
2 Lane Blocked 28.7 19.8 0 N/A 
3 Lane Blocked 1 	14.9 0 1 	N/A N/A 
4 Lane Blocked 1 0 N/A I N/A N/A 
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A more recent study by Smith et al (2003) examined over 200 accidents that 
occurred on freeways in the Hampton Roads region of Virginia, USA. They found 
that an accident blocking one of three lanes resulted in an average capacity reduction 
of 63% and an accident blocking two of three lanes resulted in an average capacity 
reduction of 77% (table 5.4). These figures vary quite significantly from the ones 
stated in the Highway Capacity Manual, with 12% less capacity for a single lane 
accident and 6% more capacity for a two lane closure. 
Table 5.4 Portion of Freeway Capacity Available Under Accident Conditions 
(Smith et al, 2003) 
Number of Freeway 





3 0.37 0.23 
Information relating to the UK is the rather more conservative. The default value 
which is given as a remaining lane capacity of 0.78 for each of the remaining three 
lanes in a four lane motorway (DETR, 1999) meaning only a 42% reduction. 
A study by Roberts et al (1994) conducted in 1992 and 1993 on several stretches of 
British motorways estimated a 24.2% reduction in capacity across all incidents and 
lane blockages observed. Unfortunately a breakdown of incident type, lane location 
or number of lanes blocked was not given so can not be compared. 
Table 5.5 Capacity reduction According to the Number of Blocked Lanes 
(Huddart & Thompson, 2001) 
% Reduction Number of blocked lanes 
2 3 4 5 
No. _of_Lanes  
2 75 95 N/A N/A N/A 
3 60 85 95 N/A N/A 
4 50 75 90 95 N/A 
5 40 65 75 85 95 
A more recent British report however contained information on capacity reduction 
relating specifically to accidents on the M25 and is detailed in table 5.5. 
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In comparison with the US results the UK results in table 5.5 are relatively similar. 
The major differences are that table 5.5 states a remaining capacity of 5% when all 
lanes are closed. This is a result of vehicles moving into the hard shoulder and thus 
moving through the incident site. A case study in Surrey showed that for the past 2 
years there were no incidents that brought traffic to a complete stand still for more 
than 2 hours (Huddart & Thompson, 2001). Thus motorists have been able to escape 
from the motorway and the 5% rate would account for this. 
5.2.3 Method 
A selection of data, recorded at Surrey Police's Godstone motorway control room, 
was collated to provide a representative sample to estimate the residual capacity at 
incidents on motorways. Once the selected incidents were examined and locations 
established, the four lane road capacities under prevailing conditions were estimated 
by calibrating speed-flow curves for the relative motorway sections using MIDAS 
traffic flow information. An example of loop detector location in relation to the 
incident in shown in figure 5.1. The remaining capacity at the incident was then 
measured as the minimum ten minute flow rate during incident conditions. A ten 
minute flow rate interval was used as it was found that it enabled stable flow rates to 
be calculated and also allowed smaller variations to be identified during an active 
incident. This is less than the fifteen minutes recommended in the Highway 
Capacity Manual (TRB, 2000). A ten minute period was confirmed by Smith and 




Lane  0 0 
Lane  0 El — 
Lane 4 0 El 
Figure 5.1 Example of MIDAS Loop Detectors Location in Relation to an 
Incident. 
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5.2.4 Data Description 
Two data sets were used to estimate the impact of incidents on the M25. 
Godstone Incident Data 
This data is detailed in 4.3.2. 
MIDAS Traffic Data 
The Motorway Incident Detection and Signalling (MIDAS) system records traffic 





• vehicle length category 
The data is stored in binary form and a program called TDAS (Traffic Data Analysis 
System) version 1.0 is used, within Microsoft Access, to extract relevant information. 
Both the TDAS program and MIDAS data was also obtained from Mott MacDonald, 
Glasgow. 
5.2.5 Estimation of capacity 
The capacity of the four lane motorway section of interest was estimated by using 
calibrated speed-flow curves. These use matched speed and flow data to graphically 
show flow breakdown, with the peak of the curve signifying the capacity of the 
section. Traffic flow data for an arbitrary one week period was examined for each 
section which resulted in 40,320 data points. For all incidents examined the section 
capacity ranged from 2725 vehicles per hour per lane (vphpl) to as low as 1750 
vphpl. Two examples are shown below in figures 5.2 and 5.3. 
Figure 5.2 shows the speed-flow curve for incident number 85 which was an accident 
on the M25 between junctions 9 and 10 and MIDAS flow data was obtained from 
loops at 4637A. The numerous data points within the parabola are due to the various 
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traffic conditions experienced over the period. The capacity under prevailing 
conditions was taken as 2,350 vehicles per hour per lane (vphpl) for this incident. 
Godstone Incident No.85. Speed-Flow Curve 
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Figure 5.2 Incident No.85 Speed Flow Curve 
Figure 5.3 shows the speed-flow curve for incident number 93, a suicide, on the M25 
also between junctions 9 and 10. MIDAS flow data was obtained from loops at 
4697A. The capacity under prevailing conditions was taken as 2,215 vphpl for this 
incident. 
Figure 5.3 Incident No.93 Speed Flow Curve 
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Once capacities had been calculated for all incident sections it was decided to reduce 
the capacity by 90% as the majority of speed-flow curves did not have a well defined 
peak. This would improve the accuracy of the capacity estimation by moving the 
value into the more stable peak area rather than a single point at the peak. 
5.2.6 Estimation of incident capacity 
When an incident occurs on a motorway and the demand is larger than the available 
capacity, a bottleneck quickly forms. Therefore, the remaining capacity following an 
incident can be taken as the bottleneck traffic flow. Examples of the two incidents 
detailed above are shown in figure 5.4 and 5.5. The two figures demonstrate the 
significant variations of the short one minute measurement intervals. A moving 
average was used to smooth the flow and reduce the variation in incident capacity. 
Generally the minimum value of the moving average was taken as the bottleneck, or 
incident, capacity of the section. 
Godstone Incident No.85, Example of Incident Vehicle Flow 
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Figure 5.4 Incident No.85 Vehicle Flow 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the initial drop in traffic flow when incident 85 occurred at 
17:43. Due to this artificially lowering the moving average it was decided to not take 
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the lowest value, but to take the second lowest, once flow had stabilised at 18:06 
with a value of 700 vphpl. 
Figure 5.5 also illustrates the initial drop in traffic flow when incident 93 occurred at 
10:01. Again due to this artificially lowering the moving average it was decided to 
not take the lowest value, but to take the second lowest. For this two lane closure 
incident it was decided to select 700 vphpl as the incident capacity. 
Godstone Incident No.93, Example of Incident Vehicle Flow 
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Figure 5.5 Incident No.93 Vehicle Flow 
5.2.7 Calculation of capacity reduction 
When both values of capacity are known the estimation of reduction can be 
calculated. The capacity reduction is the difference between the prevailing 
conditions capacity, section capacity, and the estimated incident capacity. 
Capacity Reduction = Section Capacity - Incident Capacity 
The percentage reduction value is then calculated as the incident capacity over the 
capacity under prevailing conditions. 
Percentage Capacity Reduction = Incident Capacity I Section Capacity 
IM 
5.2.8 Summary of results 
The capacity remaining results for all examined incidents are shown in detail in table 
5.6 and a summary of average capacity by lane is shown in table 5.7. 
Table 5.6 shows the great variability of both section and incident capacities. The 
maximum section capacity was 2,725 vphpl between junctions 8 and 9 and the 
minimum was 1,750 vphpl between junction 7 and 6. The minimum incident 
capacity was 420 vphpl for a three lane blocking accident between junctions 11 and 
12 
Table 5.6 Capacity Remaining Results. 
Incident No. of Lanes No. BlockeC Lane Blocked Absolute Capacity 90% Capacity Reduced Capacity Remaining % Reduced% 
20 4 1 4 2500 2250 825 36.67% 63.33% 
26 4 1 1 2550 2295 1060 46.19% 53.81% 
48 4 1 4 2450 2205 888 40.27% 59.73% 
48 _4_ _2_ 3+4 2450 2205 741 33.61% 66.39% 
85 4 1+2 2350 2115 595.5 28.16% 71.84% 
85 	1 _4 - _1 - 1 2350 2115 700 33.10% 66.901/6 
93 _4_ 2 3+4 2215 1993.5 700 35.11% 64.891/6 
93 _4_ _0_ H/S 2215 1993.5 927 46.50% 53,50°!, 
123 _4_ _1 - 1 1 	2150 1935 804 41.55% 58.45% 
123 4_ _1_ 1 2150 1935 1009.5 52.17% 47.83°!. 
123 _4_ _0_ H/S 2150 1935 1380 71.32% 28.681/6 
161 _4_ _1_ 1 2640 2376 960 40.40% 59.60°!. 
161 _4_ _2_ 1+2 2640 2376 780 32.83°!. 67.17% 
161 _4 - _1 - 1 2640 2376 1069.5 45.01% 54.99°!. 
203 _4_ _2_ 3+4 2525 2272.5 843 37.10% 62.90% 
203 _4_ _0_ H/S 2525 2272.5 1330.5 58.55% 41.45% 
208 _4_ _1_ 1 2525 2272.5 1025 45.10% 54.90'!. 
208 _4_ _0_ H/S 2525 2272.5 1293 56.90% 43.10% 
269 _4_ 2 2025 1822.5 729 40.00% 60.00% 
269 4 - - - 4 1 	2025 1822.5 1030 56.52% 43.48% 
283 1 	4 - - - 4 1 2725 2452.5 913.5 37.25% 62.751!. 
283 _4 - _0_ H/S 1 	2725 2452.5 1072 43.71% 56.29°!. 
289 _4 - _3_ 2+3+4 1850 1665 430 25.83% 74.17!. 
289 _4 - _2_ 1 	3+4 1850 1665 700 42.04% 57.96°!, 
289 _4 - - - 4 1850 1665 1093.5 65.68% 34.32% 
401 _4 - _1 - 4 2350 2115 840 39.72% 60.28% 
405 _4 - _2 - 1+2 2200 1980 	- 721 36.41% 63.59°!. 
428 _4 - _3 - 2+3+4 2375 2137.5 420 19.65% 80.35% 
428 _4 - _2 - 3+4 2375 2137.5 630 29.47% 70.531/6 
556 _4 - - - 1 2600 2340 1260 53.85% 46.15% 
574 _4 - _2 - 3+4 2000 1800 590 32.78% 67.224/6 
579 _4 - - - 2+3 1750 1575 640 40.63% 59.371!. 
579 - - _0_ I-I/S 1750 1 	1575 1000 63.49% 36.51% 
594 4_ - - 4 2125 1912.5 1 	840 1 	43.92% 56.08% 
682 - - - - 3+4 2175 1957.5 880 44.96% 55.04% 
- - H/S 2175 1957.5 1380 70.50% 1 	29.50% 
706 - - - - 1+2 2150 1935 1 	1120 1 	57.88% 1 	42.12°!, 
Table 5.7 shows both the average percentage capacity remaining and reduction for all 
incidents. These incidents are all for four lane sections of motorway. 
Table 5.7 Average Capacity Reduction Results Summary. 
Lanes Blocked Remaining % Reduced% 
0 58.71% 41.29% 
1 45.16% 54.84% 
2 37.38% 62.62% 
3 22.74% 77.26% 
5.2.9 Discussion 
A total of 21 incidents were examined and 37 readings taken. The chosen data 
provided a cross-section of incidents blocking just the hard shoulder to blocking 3 of 
4 lanes. All incidents occurred on the 4 lane sections of the M25. 
It can be seen that incidents greatly reduce the available capacity of the road, beyond 
that of the physical blockage. This shows that incidents with minimal physical 
impacts can have a considerable impact on traffic flow. A graphical comparison 
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Figure 5.6 Comparison of Percentage Capacity Remaining Between Studies. 
In comparison to the Highway Capacity Manual and the majority of other studies the 
calculated reductions are quite different. Virtually all other studies follow the same 
trend but this study's results cross it, with a greater impact of lesser incidents and a 
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lesser impact on more major incidents. The Highway Capacity Manual suggests 
85% capacity remaining at an accident on the shoulder but this study suggests 59% 
remaining. For a single lane out of four blocked, this study found the remaining 
capacity to be 45% while the Highway Capacity Manual states 58%. Another study 
on the M25 by Huddart and Thompson is closer to this study at 50% remaining 
capacity for a single lane closure out of four lanes. Two lanes blocked reduced the 
capacity of the motorway to 37% and three lanes blocked suggested that 23% of 
roadway capacity was available. In comparison to the Highway Capacity Manual 
these values are much higher than 25% and 13% respectively. It should be noted that 
the sample size for the three lane blockages was very small at 2 incidents, which may 
be the cause of the discrepancies. 
Differences in vehicle characteristics and capabilities, as well as driver behaviour, 
may account for some of the considerable differences between studies. 
The presented information demonstrates that incidents should be cleared as quickly 
as possible to reduce their impact. There are numerous actions that can be taken to 
reduce the impact of an incident on motorway traffic. These include: 
• faster detection of incidents 
• reduction in response times 
• improved incident handling and clearance 
• faster vehicle recovery 
Another example may be to request recovery vehicles immediately, on notification of 
an incident, and either requested to respond directly to the incident scene or wait at 
the previous junction until required. This would reduce the total incident timeline as 
incidents could be cleared quicker. Responding recovery vehicles would also not be 
delayed by congestion as a result of the incident. 
With the high capacity penalty from rubbernecking motorists, due to an emergency 
vehicles just being on the hard shoulder, any incident where there are no injuries 
should be relocated to the next junction, clear of the roadway. This would not only 
increase safety but would also reduce delay from the capacity reduction. 
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5.2.10 	Section Summary 
It has been shown that incidents on motorways significantly reduce the available 
capacity of the road, greater than just the proportion of original capacity physically 
blocked. 
It was shown that: 
• an incident blocking three lanes out of four reduced the roadway capacity by 
77.26% 
• an incident blocking two lanes out of four reduced the roadway capacity by 
62.62% 
• an incident blocking one lanes out of four reduced the roadway capacity by 
54.84% 
• an incident only blocking the hard shoulder of four lane motorway reduced 
the roadway capacity by 41.29% 
• the results varied from those of previous studies 
5.3 The Impact of Rubbernecking on Motorways 
5.3.1 Introduction 
When an incident on a motorway occurs, the capacity of the carriageway and the 
opposite carriageway is often also affected by passing motorists "rubbernecking", 
trying to see what is happening. This "rubbernecking" not only causes delay to many 
motorists but also decreases the safety of the network, as motorists attention is no 
longer where it should be- on the road ahead. 
A CCTV image showing an example of rubbernecking is shown in figure 5.7. It can 
be seen on the opposite carriageway than the incident, at the top of the picture 
headways are very small, whereas headways are much increased as the traffic is 
leaving the picture to the right. The queue resulting from rubbernecking at this 
incident was observed to extend some 2.5 kilometres. 
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Figure 5.7 CCTV Image Showing an Example of Rubbernecking. 
This section will examine the impact of rubbernecking on motorways. 
5.3.2 Background 
"Rubbernecking" is defined in the Chambers English dictionary as "someone who 
stares or gapes inquisitively or stupidly". Motorists driving past incidents on 
motorways and in the opposite direction are often easily distracted and are curious to 
see what is happening. As they do this they reduce their speeds and increase their 
headways, which leads to congestion. It has already been shown in section 5.2 that 
rubbernecking causes a reduction in capacity with 41.3% less capacity on a 4 lane 
road when an incident is on the hard shoulder and not blocking any lanes. 
There has been very little work on the impact of rubbernecking on roadway capacity 
in the opposite carriageway from the incident. Two studies in the UK, Roberts et al 
(1994) and Huddart and Thompson (2001), both identified that rubbernecking was an 
issue. Huddart and Thompson (2001) stated that traffic capacity in the reverse 
direction than the original incident is also reduced, perhaps by 30%, as a result of 
drivers increasing their safety spacing while trying to see details of the incident. 
Roberts et al (1994) measured a reduction of 13% while another incident involved a 
reduction of 38%. 
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In the US the Highway Capacity Manual (TRB, 2000) suggests that rubbernecking 
could be responsible for a reduction in capacity in the direction of travel opposite to 
that in which the incident occurred. The reduction can range from 5% for a single 
car accident and one emergency vehicle to 25% for multiple-vehicle accident with 
several emergency vehicles. Masinick and Teng (2004) conducted a thorough 
examination of the impact of rubbernecking due to accidents on the Hampton Roads 
freeway system, in Virginia, USA. They found that approximately 10% of accidents 
caused rubbernecking on the opposite carriageway, which on average caused an 
average delay of 107 vehicle/hours and reduced the capacity of the roadway by 
12.7%. 
Incidents caused by drivers being distracted while rubbernecking have been 
estimated to account for as many as 35% of accidents (Masinick and Teng, 2004). 
5.3.3 Method 
Godstone motorway incident data was examined for records of rubbernecking. Once 
the selected incidents were examined and locations established, the four lane road 
capacities under prevailing conditions were estimated by calibrating speed-flow 
curves for the relative motorway sections using MIDAS traffic flow information. 
This data was then filtered for consistency and accuracy, resulting in a total of eight 
incidents involving rubbernecking to be examined. The capacity reduction due to 
rubbernecking at the incident was then measured as the minimum ten minute flow 
rate during incident conditions. The influence of incidents on speed will also be 
examined. 
5.3.4 Results 
A summary of results found is shown in table 5.8. 
It can be seen that on average over all eight incidents the average speed of traffic, on 
the opposite carriageway to the incident, fell by approximately 45.29% compared 
with just prior to the incident. The average speed at one incident even fell to as low 
as 15.5 km/h. The greatest reduction in speed was at incident number 579 where 
speeds fell by 80.65%. A plot of vehicle speed against time is shown in figure 5.8 
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and clearly demonstrates the impact of the incident. It should be noted that incident 
number 579 was a major incident which involved a complete carriageway closure 
and the response of many emergency vehicles, all of which motorists do not 
regularly see on a motorway. 
At three incidents there was no visible reduction in flow as a result of an incident. 
For the remaining incidents however there was an average theoretical maximum 
capacity reduction of 39.9%, with a maximum reduction in flow at incident number 
428, of 48%. Another indicator of rubbernecking may be the reduction of flow 
compared to that just prior to an incident. In comparison to pre-incident flows, 
rubbernecking reduced the flow by 15.63%. 
Godstone Incident No.579, Example of Rubbernecking Vehicle Speeds 
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The overall results from eight incidents involving rubbernecking indicated the 
following: 
(I) Incidents on the opposite carriageway affected speeds greater than flows. 
Several incidents showed no visible signs of change in speed or flow. 
The average speed at one incident was reduced by 80.65% during emergency 
operations on the opposite carriageway. 
On average the "average speed" dropped by 45.29% from pre-incident 
conditions. 
The theoretical absolute capacity of the carriageway was reduced by a 
maximum of 47.98%. 
The average maximum capacity reduction was 39.88% 
Comparing pre-flows to incident flows, the flow was reduced by 15.63% 
5.3.5 Discussion 
The above data shows that rubbernecking on the M25 causes a greater reduction in 
capacity than is shown in the Highway Capacity Manual. 
When trying to establish the effect of rubbernecking, traffic flow on the opposing 
carriageway must be running at capacity so that any reduction in flow is a function of 
decreased vehicle speed and not variable vehicle demand upstream of the incident. 
Alternatively flows could be below capacity, but it would be necessary to ensure that 
flows prior to, during and after the incident were constant to avoid measuring 
speed/flow effects associated with variable demand. 
The effect on the opposite carriageway to an incident can be affected by many 
factors: roadway characteristics, number and type of emergency vehicles, vehicle 
lighting on scene (number of blue lights), severity of incident, whether motorists can 
actually see the incident, location of incident within carriageway and the general 
light levels. It was observed that incidents had a greater influence if it was dark, 
there were numerous emergency vehicles, especially fire engines, with their blue 
lights flashing and they were located in lanes nearer the central reservation. At the 
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majority of locations on the M25, carriageways are only separated by a centre 
reservation barrier, therefore there is nothing blocking motorists' view of an incident, 
but at locations where carriageways are grade separated or there is vegetation 
between them, the impact is lessened. 
Figure 5.9 Example of Incident Visibility From Opposite Carriageway. 
An example of the visibility of an incident from the opposite carriageway is shown in 
figure 5.9. This demonstrates how easily incident management operations can be 
seen from the opposite carriageway on some sections of motorway. It can also be 
seen how high visibility markings and clothing, used to improve responder safety can 
actually prove to be a distraction to drivers. 
During the data gathering at Godstone motorway control room, two incidents were 
observed that occurred due to rubbernecking, both involving injuries: one on the 
opposite carriageway and the other in the next lane to an existing incident. This 
demonstrates the impact of rubbernecking on the safety of other motorists and 
incident responders. 
The impact of rubbernecking on traffic and safety further demonstrates the need to 
clear incidents as quickly as possible. 
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In an attempt to reduce rubbernecking on the M25 a new portable incident screen 
system is soon to be trialled. The system will be used at major incidents to block 
passing motorists' view from the opposite carriageway. The system is mounted to 
the central reservation crash barrier and a demonstration is shown in figure 5.10. 
The system is currently used in the Netherlands where it has had a major impact on 
rubbernecking congestion and similar results are expected on the M25. The use of 
increased height concrete safety barrier would also limit the view of motorists into 
the opposing carriageway. 









Figure 5.10 Photographs of a new portable incident screen system (Source: Mr. 
Bob Wadsworth). 
5.3.6 Section Summary 
It was shown that: 
• Rubbernecking can significantly reduce the capacity of the carriageway- on 
average traffic flow dropped by 15.63% during an incident. 
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• Rubbernecking can also reduce the speed of vehicles on the opposite 
carriageway- average speed dropped by 45% during an incident. 
• The safety of operatives and other motorists can be compromised by 
rubbernecking- two incidents were witnessed as a result of rubbernecking on 
the opposite carriageway during this study. 
• Possible mitigation strategies have been discussed. 
5.4 Calculation of Incident Delays on Motorways 
5.4.1 Introduction 
It has been shown, in section 5.2, that incidents reduce the available capacity of 
motorways. Therefore if traffic flows are greater than that of the available capacity 
of the roadway, motorists will experience delay. 
This section will detail the calculation of estimated delays due to incidents on 
motorways. 
5.4.2 Background 
Incident induced delays have been calculated using a variety of methods. There are 
two basic ways to determine delays on motorways: either to measure directly or 
simulate it. To measure it directly requires an extensive network of accurate loop 
detectors, accurate incident information and extensive computation. Simulation of 
the delay due to incidents is far more popular. 
The most commonly used simulation approach is to use the deterministic queuing 
method which involves performing simple calculations incorporating roadway 
capacity, duration of the incident and the reduced incident capacity. Another way to 
simulate delay is to use a micro-simulation or macro-simulation package. These 
commercial packages require extensive input data and calibrating to produce 
accurate incident delay estimation. Other methods using shock wave analysis and 
traffic simulation have also been used to determine incident delay. 
The most frequently used method was developed by Morales (1987) and used a 
cumulative volume approach to calculate delays on US freeways due to incidents. 
Morales' approach was to use two cumulative volume curves (one for arrivals and 
the other for departures at the incident location) which are plotted on the same time 
axis. The area between the two curves represents the delay experienced by motorists 
due to the incident. His model enabled delay, time-to-normal-flow and the 
maximum queue length to be quickly and easily established. 
Al-Deek et al (1995) developed a new method and made improvements to Morales' 
approach by looking at delays in time slices. Traffic volumes were used in 
conjunction with traffic speeds in the new delay formula with incident delay being 
calculated using a reference average speed which reflects the normal traffic 
conditions. 
5.4.3 Method 
Delays caused by incidents will be estimated by using a cumulative arrival-departure 
curve. The magnitude of delay varies with the traffic volume, number of lanes 
blocked and the duration of the incident. This information was obtained from 
Godstone incident records and MIDAS traffic flow data. 
The cumulative demand and capacity method is one of the most commonly used in 
traffic engineering. It is based on a static model which implies constant traffic 
demand D0 upstream of the incident location. The advantage of this method is its 
simple analytical formulation. The total delay D is expressed through the formula: 
D= [02  _t l )2 X(C_C r )X(Q_ CJ] 2X(C_Q) 	[Eq. 5.1] 
Where C is the roadway capacity under normal conditions, C,, is the reduced 
capacity, Q is the volume of the demand upstream of the incident and (t2 -0 the 
duration of the incident. This formula shows that the total delay due to an incident is 
proportional to the square of the incident duration, demonstrating the importance of 
quick incident clearance. 
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The delay due to an incident can also be graphically represented, as shown in figure 
5.11 below. The horizontal axis is a time line indicating the occurrence of the 
incident related event and the overall duration of their impact on traffic flow. The 
vertical axis is the cumulative traffic volume - the sum of vehicles passing any given 
point on the motorway in a defined time period. Time to normal flow (TNF) and 
maximum queue (Qm)  can also be calculated. 
C 
	
I 	 Time T 1 	T2 	T3 
4 	 I I 





T5 	 I 
0 .6 '4 
T6 
Figure 5.11 Graphical Representation of Incident Delay. 
The demand flow or volume - the total number of vehicles using the motorway at a 
given time is represented by line S2. When an incident occurs, the reduced roadway 
capacity (S3) is less than the demand flow because of a lane blockage. This reduced 
capacity remains in effect until something is done. In the example shown in figure 
5.11 there is a short total closure, at T2 where Sb=O, when the police would stop the 
traffic to clear all vehicles to the hard shoulder. Once lanes are no longer blocked, 
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the capacity would be increased, but still not fully, shown as S4. When the incident 
is fully cleared, the queued traffic can begin to flow at getaway capacity, which is the 
same as the roadway capacity (S 1 ). When the last vehicle in the queue reaches the 
normal flow speed and the traffic resumes flowing at the demand volume, the effects 
of the incident are over. The total delay is the area within the flow lines. 
The total delay, time to normal flow and queue length is then calculated using the 
below equations: 
TotalDelay = 
- s3Xs5 - s3 )+T22s1 s5 + i 2 (s, —s2Xs, - s5 )+ 2TS 1 (S 5 —s 3 ) 
+ 277(s, - s4Xs5 —s 1 )+ 27T4 (s, —s3Xs2  —s 5 )+ 27s5 (s, —s 4 ) 	[Eq. 5.2] 
+2T2T4 S 1 (S 2 —s 5 )+2T3T4 (s, —s 4 Xs 2 —s i ) 
42(s, —s 5 )] 
TNF = {T1 (S 1 - 53 ) + TS 1 + i'3 (S 1 - S4 ) + T4 (52 - S5  )]/(s1 - s) 	[Eq. 5.31 
Q =1S,+7Ss -7S 3 —Td S4 -7S I 	 [Eq. 5.4] 
S1 - Capacity now rate of road (veh/hour) 
S2 — Demand flow rate 
53 — Capacity due to incident, initial bottleneck 
Sb - Road closed, zero capacity = 0 
S4 - New capacity, adjusted bottleneck capacity 
S5 - Revised demand flow rate. 
T— Incident duration until first change (Detection and response time) 
T2 -  Road blocked for removal of vehicles to hard shoulder, time of total closure 
1— Time of incident clearance 
- Time under initial demand 
1'5 — Incident duration 
T6 - Time until normal flow resumed = TNF 
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Ta 7,, T., Td  and T are functions of the conditions being considered. 
5.4.4 Results 
A worked example for Godstone incident number 405 using a cumulative arrival-
departure curve will now be performed. 
Incident 405 involved an accident blocking lanes one and two of the anti-clockwise 
M25 between junctions 13 and 12 at marker post 4857B. The incident was first 
observed by a police patrol on the opposite carriageway at 08:40 and lane control 
signals and VMS were immediately activated. An Incident Support Unit was on 
scene at 08:45 and the police arrived at 08:51. The incident involved two HGV's 
with one stuck in lane two due to its brakes seizing on. All travel lanes were cleared 
by 09:34 with all vehicles moved to the hard shoulder. The scene was completely 
cleared by 10:34. 
The flow diagram for this incident is shown in figure 5.12 and demonstrates the three 
clear phases of the incident: (1) the initial capacity reduction prior to the travel lanes 
being cleared, (2) the improved flow of opening all travel lanes and (3) the traffic 
recovery period. 
Using the above incident information the following data for the delay calculation can 
be established: 
T 1 - 54 minutes 	 T4 - 0 minutes 
T2 —0 minutes 	 T5 - 114 minutes 
T3 - 60 minutes 
As demand was assumed to be constant T 4 is assumed to be zero. 
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Figure 5.12 Graphical representation of Godstone incident No. 405 delay. 
Using the MIDAS traffic flow data for the roadway section, all required flow data 
can be established. A selection of data was examined to establish a historical 
demand flow for the time of the incident. The section capacity was calculated using 
the same method detailed in section 5.2.5 above, which was then modified using the 
capacity reduction figures detailed in section 5.2. As the traffic was not stopped to 
remove vehicles to the hard shoulder Sb is zero. Also, it is assumed that there is no 
reduction in the demand flow therefore S5 = S2. Therefore the following flows will 
be used for the delay calculation: 
- 7920 veh/hour 
	
S4 - 4649.832 vehlhour 
S2 - 5800 veh/hour 
	
S 5 - 5800 veh/hour 
S3 - 2960.496 veh/hour 	 Sb —0 veh/hour 
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As all necessary required information to perform the delay calculation is now known, 
equations 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 will be used to calculate the estimated total incident, time 
to normal flow and the maximum queue length: 
Therefore, the Total Delay is approximately 7519 Vehicle Hours. The Time to 
Normal Flow (TNF) is 218.9 Minutes and the maximum queue length (Qm) is 2555 
Vehicles, approximately 5.8 kilometres (3.57 miles) (assuming 9 metres per vehicle 
over 4 lanes). 
5.4.5 Section Summary 
It has been shown that it is possible to calculate the delay associated with motorway 
incidents. By estimating the delay experienced by motorists it will enable new 
incident management techniques to be trialled and the benefits quantified. For 
example if supplying ISUs and HATOs with flashing headlights would reduce their 
response time to incidents by 2 minutes then the corresponding delay reduction could 
be estimated. 
The accuracy of this method is dependent upon the input values and quality of input 
parameters. A real time system installed in control rooms could assist in setting of 
emergency diversion routes and support decision making regarding motorist welfare. 
5.5 Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the influence of motorway incidents on traffic flow. 
Their impact on the roadway capacity and the influence of rubbernecking were also 
examined. Finally, the total delay experienced by motorists due to incidents was 
calculated. 
Conclusions for each section are detailed below: 
Section Two 
It was shown that incidents on motorways significantly reduce the available capacity 
of the road, by an amount greater than just the proportion of original capacity 
physically blocked. This result agrees with previous research however the extent to 
which the capacity is reduced varies depending on the number of lanes blocked- this 
study found that minor incidents, blocking only the shoulder or one lane, had a 
greater impact and that more severe incidents had a lesser effect than that found in 
other studies. These differences may be accounted for by differences in traffic 
makeup, vehicle characteristics and capabilities, as well as driver behaviour. 
This information with traffic flow data can be used to accurately estimate delays 
associated with incidents on motorways. 
Section Three 
The influence of rubbernecking on traffic flow was examined. It was shown that it 
can significantly reduce the flow and speed of traffic on the opposite carriageway to 
an incident. The safety of operatives and other motorists can also be compromised 
by rubbernecking- two incidents were witnessed as a result of rubbernecking on the 
opposite carriageway during this study. 
Several factors were identified to have an influence on rubbernecking: 
• roadway characteristics, 
• number and type of emergency vehicles, 
• vehicle lighting on scene (number of flashing blue lights), 
• severity of incident, 
• whether motorists can actually see the incident, 
• location of incident within carriageway 
• general light levels. 
Additionally, it was observed that incidents had a greater influence if it was dark, 
there were numerous emergency vehicles, especially fire engines, with their blue 
lights flashing and they were located in lanes nearer the central reservation 
Several mitigation strategies were also discussed including incident screening and 
higher central reservation barriers. 
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These results further enforce the need for quick clearance of incidents. 
Section Four 
It has been shown that it is possible to calculate the delay associated with motorway 
incidents. By estimating the delay experienced by motorists it is possible to quantify 
the benefits of any new incident management techniques that are trialled. 
As with any model or calculation, the output is only as good as the input data and 
parameters. The data used within this study was used with confidence as the author 
personally collected it but for larger impact studies less reliable sources may have to 
be used. 
The use of a real time system delay estimation system, using the presented method, 
in motorway control rooms could be used as a decision support system to support 
choices in setting of emergency diversion routes and motorist welfare assessment. 
Understanding the breakdown of incident delays enables a better understanding of 
methods to mitigate their impact. This will be valuable in subsequent chapters, 
where the effectiveness of motorway signals in reducing delay is assessed, and the 
role of ISUs in reducing delay is also investigated. 
88 
6 Effectiveness of Matrix Signals and Signs 
6.1 Introduction 
Matrix signals and variable message signs are a very common sight on British 
motorways and trunk roads. Basic matrix signals have been in use since 1967 
providing motorists with valuable safety information, and warning of hazards ahead. 
They were designed to influence traffic flow to prevent collisions or control traffic 
by displaying advisory speed limits and indications of available lanes during 
incidents. Originally signals were controlled by the local Police control office but 
this activity is currently being transferred to the Highways Agency. 
Today matrix signals are installed over the majority of the majority of the motorway 
road network and on busier stretches of trunk roads. These signals are now often 
automatically controlled to provide protection to queuing motorists following 
automatic detection of incidents. New more advanced signals are now used to 
display mandatory speed limits to automatically control the flow of traffic. 
This chapter will present a review of motorway matrix signals and signs in use on the 
motorway and trunk road network in Britain. Applications of the discussed signals 
and signs will also be detailed. The effectiveness of matrix signals and signs will 
then be assessed including compliance rates with mandatory signals and the impact 
of variable messages on driver route choice. 
This chapter is structured as follows: 
. Section Two. A background and review of matrix signals and their uses, 
both as a method of imparting general information to the motorist (e.g. of 
adverse weather ahead) and as a tool used to reduce delay and congestion 
caused by an incident is presented. 
. Section Three. An assessment of motorists' compliance with motorway 
matrix signals is presented. To date there has been no study into driver 
compliance with matrix signals on a wide motorway, and this is required in 
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order to determine the likely effectiveness of the use of matrix signals in any 
incident management strategy. 
• Section Four. This section assesses the impact of variable messaging signs 
on delay experienced by motorists, and consequently the level of reliance that 
should be put on the use of variable messaging signs in the management of 
traffic to reduce delay. 
• Section Five. Chapter summary and conclusions. 
6.2 Background 
Matrix signals, often known as aspects, are electronic signs which are used to inform 
motorists about speed restrictions, lane closures, or even adverse weather conditions. 
These motorway traffic control signals are usually set for safety reasons. They are a 
simple method of incident management and allow motorists to be warned of an 
incident ahead, prior to any responding vehicles arriving at the incident scene. This 
also offers protection to responders at incident scenes. Variable Message Signs 
(VMS) are also used, often in conjunction with matrix signals, to provide 
information to motorists. All signal types use the same basic equipment and are 
designed to provide legible displays from 200 metres, with their flashing amber 
lanterns designed to attract motorists' attention to the signal visible from 500 metres 
(Harbord, 1991 and Russam, 1984). 
6.2.1 Matrix Signals and Signs 
On the M25 there are four similar examples of motorway matrix signs. Firstly, there 
are central reservation post-mounted signals that can be used for up to 3-lane 
motorways and trunk roads. The signs are also known as MS l's as they were the 
first generation matrix signs, first installed on the M4 motorway in 1967 (May, 1971) 
and still serve some 70% of the motorway network (National Audit Office, 2005). 
These are on all 3-lane sections of the M25 and are spaced at approximately 3 km 
intervals. They are however limited to displaying advisory fog warnings, speed 
restrictions and lane restrictions (using "wicket" symbols) with amber flashing 
warning lamps that apply to all carriageway lanes. 
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Figure 6.1 Example of Central Reservation Post Mounted Matrix Signal. 
A further example of the post-mounted signal are those mounted in pairs- one either 
side of the lanes at the entry slip roads. These signals are identical to the standard 
central reservation ones but have the additional feature to display red lamps. This 
allows for the mandatory closure of an entry slip road. Entry slip signals are usually 
only installed on the busier road sections. 
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Figure 6.2 Example of Slip Road Post Mounted Matrix Signal. 
The next example is a gantry based system, used on busier road sections or at 
interchanges, provides control for each lane of traffic and is more flexible as a 
different matrix signal for each lane on the road are used. In addition to the standard 
features of the post mounted signal these signals can display lane diversions and red 
"X" with red flashing lamps which allows for mandatory lane closures. These 
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Figure 6.3 Example of Gantry Matrix Signals and Enhanced Message Sign. 
The final example of standard matrix signals, on the M25, is a variation of a gantry 
mounted signal. These are used within the "Controlled Motorway" section, between 
junctions 10 and 16, with Controlled Motorway Indicators (CMIs) replacing standard 
matrix signals. The CMIs can display all of the previously described functions but 
when displaying mandatory speeds the figures are surrounded by red rings. This 
differentiates between the advisory speed limit of standard matrix signals and the 
mandatory ones shown on the Controlled Motorway section. 
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Figure 6.4 Example of Controlled Motorway Gantry Matrix Signals and 
Enhanced Message Sign 
In addition to the standard matrix signals, Variable Message Signs (VMS) have also 
been used on the road network since the 1970s. A VMS or Enhanced Message Sign 
(EMS) is an electronic sign which can display text information concerning incident 
or hazards. EMSs can be mounted either on cantilever posts or alongside gantry 
mounted matrix signals. They can display 2 lines of 12 or 16 characters, with each 
cell displaying one character. These signs often provide motorists with explanations 
for the signal settings, in an attempt to improve compliance rates. 
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Figure 6.5 Example of a Cantilever Post Mounted Enhanced Message Sign 
In 1991 a new signal called Motorway Signal Mark 2 (MS2) was installed on the 
M25 as part of a trial (Harbord, 1991). This new signal comprised of two elements-
an Enhanced Matrix Indicator (EM!) and an EMS. The EMI's were larger than the 
standard matrix signal and capable of displaying information for 4 lanes of traffic, 
with a 20x 14 matrix of cells rather than the 13xll of standard matrix indicators. 
MS2s were only cantilever post mounted next to the carriageway. These signs are 
now obsolete and have been replaced by Motorway Signal Mark 3 (MS3) for new 
installations. 
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Figure 6.6 Example of a Cantilever Post Mounted Motorway Signal Mark 2 
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MS3s are larger and more advanced versions of MS2s with 2 lines of 16 characters 
or 3 lines of 18 characters and an EM!. As with MS2s, these signs are also only 
cantilever post mounted next to the carriageway. Standard VMS, without the matrix 
signal, are also used just to provide just text information to motorists, dependent on 
location requirements. 





Figure 6.7 Example of a Cantilever Post Mounted Motorway Signal Mark 3. 
The latest generation of signs, Motorway Signal Mark 4 (MS4), were initially 
installed as a trial on a section of the M4 motorway, between junctions 12 and 14 in 
late 2003, where thirty-six signs were spaced at nominally 1.5 kilometres. These 
signs use the latest, state of the art, LED technology which has increased flexibility 
and visibility of the display. As motorists now expect more information from road 
signs, these signs are capable of displaying standard text but also use graphics to 
convey their message. Drivers can process and understand picture based messages 
up to a second faster than a pure text message, allowing more time to react 
(Highways Agency, 2005b). These new signs are also more aesthetically pleasing 
than previous signs, with approximately 33% smaller surface area than MS3s. The 
use of LED technology also allows the signs to be lighter and more easily mounted, 
thus reducing costs. The trial was concluded at the end of 2004 and as a 
consequence MS4 signs are at present being installed on the M42 Automatic Traffic 
Management (ATM) pilot, replacing small EMS on gantries. 
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Figure 6.8 Example of a Cantilever Post Mounted Motorway Signal Mark 4. 
Signal Settings 
As already stated a wide variety of information can be displayed on the matrix 
signals. The signs can be used to display temporary reduced speed restrictions, to 
control speeds near incident scenes. Emergency lane closures can also be achieved 
using the signals before responders and any proper traffic management (cones and 
warning signs) arrives at an incident scene. This is helpful in order to protect 
stranded motorists and warn of debris blocking lanes of the carriageway. A graphic 
showing most of the available directions is shown in figure 6.9. Full details of 
displayable information is given in the Traffic Signs Regulations and General 
Directions 2002 (HMSO, 2002). The information displayed on the signals is 
enforceable; motorists disobeying these messages can be prosecuted. 
Temporary Maximum Speed Limit 
Lane(s) Closed Ahead 
Change Lanes 	Leave Motorway Do Not Proceed Further at Next Exit 	In This Lane 
End Of 	National 	Fog 	Queue 
Restriction Speed Limit Ahead 
Figure 6.9 Examples of Matrix Signal Messages. 
Full available display information, or legends, for Variable Message Signs is also 
given in the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2002 (HMSO, 2002). 
These legends include "Tactical", "Driver Information" and "Strategic" messages. 
Only approved messages are allowed to be set, with operators having to choose 
which legend is required from a menu system. An example of a tactical message 
would be "Accident Ahead" or "Lane Closure Slow Down" where immediate action 
is required to manage a safety hazard locally. Tactical legends are restricted to a two 
lines by 12 character format for consistency and to reinforce their impact. Driver 
information messages such as "M25 Closed At Next Junction" or "Ml North 
Congestion" are used to inform motorists of incidents, either on the road that they are 
travelling or on one which they may soon be travelling on. Strategic messages are 
typically set by the HA's National Traffic Control Centre (NTCC) to inform 
motorists of significant delays on a route and advise strategic diversions. An 
example strategic message could be "M40 Closed Jl0, For London, Use M6 (5), Ml 
(5)". Strategic messages are often set a great distance away from an incident in an 
attempt to influence motorist's journey choices. 
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Example Incident Signal Settings 
Figure 6.10 shows a CCTV image of an example emergency lane closure using 
motorway matrix signals and VMS. This incident involved tyre debris in lane one 
approximately 200 metres past the red "X" signal in the image. It can also be seen 
that a tactical message has been set on the VMS to convey to motorists the reason for 
the lane closure. 
4 
Figure 6.10 CCTV Image of an Example Lane Closure 
Figures 6.11 shows a schematic of example incident signal settings for an accident in 
lane three of a three lane carriageway, with centre reservation post mounted signals 
installed. It can be seen that the signal nearest the incident is showing a "wicket" 
symbol representing the right hand lane being closed and that the proceeding signal 
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Figure 6.11 Example Incident Signal Layout and Settings for Post Mounted 
Signals 
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Figures 6.12 shows a schematic of example incident signal settings for an accident in 
lane four of a four lane carriageway, with overhead gantry mounted signals installed. 
This example would be similar to an incident on the M25 controlled motorway 
section, where mandatory speed limits can be displayed. On another stretch of 
motorway, the only difference would be that the speed limits would not have red 
rings around them and would only be advisory. With this incident it can be seen how 
much more flexile the gantry mounted system is and how motorists receive improved 
information. The signal nearest the incident, in the appropriate lane is displaying a 
red "X" with flashing red lanterns and the proceeding signal is automatically 
showing a left divert arrow. It can also be seen that VMS can be used to provide 
motorists with information of the situation ahead, in this case warning of "Accident 
Ahead", "Lane Closure Slow Down" and "Accident Slow Down". 
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Figure 6.12 Example Incident Signal Layout and Settings for Gantry Signals 
Method of setting 
All matrix signals and VMS on the English motorway and trunk road network are 
controlled by the police, but this function is gradually being transferred to the HA 
following the Roles and Responsibility review (Highways Agency, 2005a). They are 
managed by the appropriate HA Regional Control Centre (RCC) or Police Control 
Office (PCO). Control room staff activate signs and signals using the Highways 
Agency Traffic Management System (HATMS) or the Control Office Base System 
(COBS) respectively, which through the National Motorway Communication System 
Mark 2 (NMCS2) activates the required settings. The control system (COBS or 
HATMS) is an interactive graphical picture of the road network with signals, signs, 
CCTV, MIDAS system and emergency roadside telephones. This allows the 
operators to choose quickly the exact signs and signals which should be set for the 
individual incident. When the controller selects the desired signal and chooses from 
the system menus the reason and aspect required, associated settings are 
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automatically set. For example with an emergency lane closure- the signal nearest 
the incident is selected, the reason for setting chosen and the aspect to be displayed 
selected, the system would automatically set the proceeding signals either to lane 
diverts or advisory speed limits. This ensures that signals are set safely and 
efficiently. In the near future, message signs will also be automatically coordinated 
with signals settings. 
Public Attitudes 
In recent years the British press have publicly criticised the setting of motorway 
signals on roads all over Britain as being inaccurate and inappropriate. They are 
often held in low regard by many drivers. On some stretches of road, without 
CCTV, controllers must rely on the accuracy of incident locations and severity 
reports from the general public. As this information is often erroneous it can 
consequently lead to situations where signals are set with the wrong meaning and in 
completely wrong location or over very large areas. It is normal practice for the 
location and symptom to be updated once responders reach the incident scene and the 
situation has been assessed. The police have acknowledged however that signals 
sometimes get left on after an incident. After ensuring that casualties are attended to, 
the carriageway is cleared, traffic is moving safely and witnesses' statements are 
collected, signals become relatively low priority and are sometimes forgotten 
(Rutley, 1992). 
In a survey of public attitudes carried out in 1986 (Rutley, 1987) drivers were asked 
whether they thought the signals were switched on and off when they should be. 
Although most motorists were satisfied that they were switched on when needed 
there was considerable criticism that the signals were not switched off when they 
were no longer needed. 
Similarly, in a survey carried out in 1978 (Cross and Parker, 1980) many drivers 
reported dissatisfaction with motorway signals. Approximately 15% of drivers felt 
that the signals served no useful purpose and 54% said they only "sometimes" 
complied with the signal settings displayed. The majority of drivers interviewed, 
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83%, did however clearly regard the matrix signals as an integral safety feature of the 
motorway network. 
6.2.2 MIDAS System 
The Motorway Incident Detection and Signalling (MIDAS) system is used to detect 
incidents, and automatically set upstream signals and message signs, to provide 
motorists with advanced warning of queuing traffic and incidents. The system was 
designed to minimise the impact of motorway incidents and improve driver safety. 
The main components of the system were first trialled, by the HA, on the Ml 
motorway (Automated Incident Detection (AID) system) and the M4 motorway 
(Autowarn system). The Ml motorway AID system was trialled between 1985 and 
1990 between junctions 10 and 19 (Cooper et al, 1992). The M4 Autowarn system 
was installed to protect motorists queuing on approach to toll booths at the Severn 
Bridge (Hobbs and Clifford, 1989). The M25 controlled motorway scheme used the 
basic infrastructure of the MIDAS system and was modified to provide a more 
advanced system. More detailed information on the development of the MIDAS 
system on the M25 is available from Morris and Negus (1997). 
The MIDAS system consists of a pair of 3 turn inductive loops, buried in the surface 
of the road in each lane, spaced at approximately 500 metres along the length of each 
MIDAS section (figure 6.13). The magnetic field of passing vehicles induces a 
current in each loop. The system is wired so that the carriageway and lane number of 
the vehicle can be identified. The system controller uses this information to give 
each vehicle a timestamp, this can then be compared to the timestamp of the previous 
vehicle and the front to front time headway can be obtained. The difference in 
activation times and longitudinal separation of each half of the loop pair may be used 
to estimate the speed of each vehicle. The activation and deactivation times may also 
be used to calculate the time over loop, which combined with the speed estimate, can 
be used to calculate the vehicle length. All of this information is recorded in one 
minute intervals. 
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Figure 6.13 Example of MIDAS Loop Arrangement. 
Each group of loops is connected to an outstation and all outstations are then linked 
to an instation, usually at the controlling office, via the transmission network. Each 
outstation examines the data using the High OCCupancy (HIOCC) incident detection 
algorithm and transmits "high occupancy" alerts to the instation. The system then 
automatically sets lower speed limits (40 mph, 50 mph and 60 mph) on proceeding 
signals, to protect the back of the queue and give advanced warning to approaching 
motorists. The system also monitors the queue as it moves upstream, setting signals 
as necessary to continue to provide motorists with protection. Each outstation 
produces flow and speed alerts, using a flow and speed threshold algorithm 
(congestion alerts), warning of areas of high flows or low speed. The thresholds at 
which the alerts are generated are configurable for each site in order to make 
allowances for local road configurations. Both high flows and low speeds alerts are 
used to set a sequence of speed signals (60 mph and 50 mph) depending on whether 
the levels continue beyond the second threshold. 
The signal setting output for the system also has two additional algorithms. Firstly a 
time smoothing algorithm is used to prevent the signals being changed too 
frequently. Once a series of signals have been implemented following an alert, the 
signals will remain on for a set period of time, even if the alert is clear. Any new 
alerts will however be immediately implemented. Secondly an algorithm monitors 
which signals are set along the motorway and will "fill the gaps" between any sites 
that are displaying reduced speeds. For example, two MIDAS sites may be showing 
a speed of 60, due to flow alerts, but the site in-between may be showing a blank 
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symbol. If this situation occurs the algorithm would automatically set the dividing 
signals also to a speed of 60. These algorithms reduce the number of speed limit 
changes experienced by motorists as they drive along the motorway. 
The MIDAS system has been installed and is now operational on more than 800 
kilometres of the HA's motorway network. Before permanent installation a 
candidate road sections must meet the following criteria (Highways Agency, 1997): 
. Traffic Flow: The flow of traffic should exceed 15,000 vehicles per lane 
AADT on an existing motorway. On a new motorway, MIDAS should be 
installed if the traffic forecast will exceed the above limit within 5 years. 
Length: The section length should not be less than 20 kilometres, based upon 
3 kilometre signal spacing. However, when there is greater density of signals 
a minimum of 10 signal sites should be covered. 
• Other Considerations: MIDAS should be considered if areas have at least 
20% higher than the national annual average accident rate for motorways, if 
sections of motorway have abnormal design standards for example tunnels, 
crawler lanes, steep gradients etc, closer than normal interchanges with a high 
density of joining and leaving traffic and if a junction queues back onto the 
motorway on a daily basis. 
A recent study by the Transportation Research Laboratory, for the HA, examined 
accident rates on 600 kilometres of motorways where MIDAS had been operational 
for more than six months. They compared accidents rates before the introduction of 
MIDAS and after, over a ten-year period to September 2003. It was found that on 
motorway stretches where MIDAS was operated the number of injury accidents had 
fallen by 13%, which equates to an estimated annual saving of £40 million or 
£50,000 per kilometre of motorway. 
6.2.3 M25 Controlled Motorway 
Since August 1995, on the south-western part of the M25, the London Orbital 
Motorway, a "Controlled Motorway" pilot scheme has been operated. Initially the 
pilot operated between junction II (M3) and junction 15 (M4) but was extended in 
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November 1995 down to junction 10 (A3) following the completion of widening 
works. The scheme was again extended in March 2002 up to junction 16 (M40) 
giving a total of approximately 32km (20 miles). At present all roads within the 
Controlled Motorway are dual 4-lane. By the end of 2005 however junction 16 to 15 
will be dual 6-lane and junction 15 to 12 will be dual 5-lane. 
Traffic control is accomplished by using Controlled Motorway Indicators (CMIs) 
which are advanced motorway matrix lane control signals, and are capable of 
displaying "red rings" around the displayed variable speed limit, thus making it 
mandatory. These CMIs are installed above each lane on standard motorway 
gantries which are installed at nominal 1 kilometre intervals, depending on junction 
layouts. CMIs are also installed at entry slip roads to provide merging traffic with 
warning of the speed limit. Enhanced Message Signs are also installed on every 
gantry to provide additional driver information. 
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Figure 6.14 M25 Controlled Motorway 
The philosophy behind Controlled Motorways is to manage congestion using 
mandatory variable speed limits that are correct for the traffic conditions. This 
uniforms traffic speeds and reduces the seriousness of shockwaves (thus reducing 
stop-start driving). Smoothing traffic flow in this way helps to delay the onset of 
flow breakdown and advances the recovery of traffic flow from congested conditions 
(Highways Agency, 2004b). Using technology developed for the MIDAS system the 
Controlled Motorway system monitors traffic conditions and attempts to predict flow 
breakdowns and will reduce the speed limit to reduce their impact. 
_ 
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Initially when the Controlled Motorway scheme was first installed a fixed time plan 
(setting mandatory speed limits at certain times of day, regardless of traffic 
conditions) was used to control speeds. The plan was developed by examining 
historical traffic flow data and establishing when flow thresholds were expected to be 
exceeded. The fixed plan system was intended only to operate for a 3-month period 
to allow motorists to become accustomed to the system, after which a live traffic 
flow driven system would be introduced. During monitoring of the fixed time plan 
system it was noted that the speed limits were not always suitable for the traffic 
conditions, which was confirmed by the number of complaints received by the I-IA 
from motorists using this section of road. In response, an automatic live flow based 
operation was introduced earlier than planned, in September 1995. 
The control system has been continually evaluated and enhanced to allow optimum 
operation. Parameters such as the flow trigger levels and the signal change timings 
were modified and their impact examined. To stop the speed limits changing too 
often, the traffic flow data input to the signal system was smoothed using a 
continuous moving average. An optimal set of control parameters for the whole 
scheme was established in April 1996. The parameters are continually reassessed as 
traffic conditions change over the years and each control site is assessed individually 
as traffic behaviour varies between locations. 
In February 1997 the HA adapted the signal control algorithm to operate on both 
flow and speed data following complaints from motorists that the speed control 
signals were increasing or switching off while they were in heavy congestion. These 
complaints were caused by flow levels in queues falling below the specified 
thresholds as the system was unable distinguish between low flows during 
congestion and free flowing periods. 
The HIgh OCCupancy (HIOCC) incident detection algorithm was introduced in 
October 1997 to detect queuing or slow moving traffic and protect it by 
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automatically setting lower speed limits upstream (40mph, 50mph and 60mph). The 
HIOCC algorithm works in parallel with the controlled motorway system. 
Between junction 10 and 13 in October 1998, the setting of Enhanced Message Signs 
(EMS) was coordinated with the signal settings. This feature provided motorists 
with appropriate and relevant information regarding the signal settings and warnings 
of congestion or queues ahead. This was expanded to the other areas of the 
controlled motorway in July 1999. 
In order to realise the anticipated benefits of the Controlled Motorway scheme a high 
level of compliance with the mandatory speed limits was needed. To ensure this an 
automated enforcement system was developed to detect and record vehicles 
exceeding the speed limit. The enforcement equipment is capable of covering all 
lanes and is securely mounted in weatherproof enclosures on the rear of the 
motorway gantries. The enforcement system uses similar technology to that found in 
normal speeding and red-light cameras installed on many roads in Britain and around 
the world. The system consists of radar speed measuring equipment, flash, a 35mm 
camera, a "Rugby" clock receiver and a Controlled Motorway Indicator interface. A 
radar based speed detection system and conventional film technology is used as they 
provided the only proven method to meet the requirements of the Home Office 
Speedmeter Handbook. All of the speed enforcement systems are always live 
however there are only a few cameras, due to costs, which are moved between 
gantries to provide area wide coverage. As with standard roadside speed 
enforcement systems there is no way for the motorist to know if there is a camera or 
film in the unit as the system will still flash if an offence is detected. The Controlled 
Motorway Indicator interface is used to inform the enforcement system what speed 
limit is currently set by a primary (electrical) and secondary (optical) system. The 
trigger level of the unit can be varied by the Police and is set in accordance with 
agreed Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) guidelines. There is also an 
adjustable delay between the change of speed limit and the start of enforcement to 
allow drivers to safely change their speed. Once the system detects an offence two 
photos are taken, separated by 0.5 seconds, allowing the distance travelled between 
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the two photos to be measured, providing a secondary method of speed measurement 
as required by the Home Office's Speedmeter Handbook. Each photograph includes 
information regarding date, time, location, speed of the offending vehicle and what 
speed was displayed on the CMI, confirmed by both electrical and optical systems. 
The enforcement system was extensively tested both off road and on road, and was 
given Home Office Type Approval in May 1995. (Harbord and Jones, 1996) 
There has been continual monitoring of the controlled motorway pilot since its 
implementation in 1995 (Highways Agency, 2004b and Harbord, 1998) with several 
benefits identified: 
• Journey times improved, 
• Journey time reliability 
improved, 
Increased throughput, 
Speed compliance increased, 
• Lane utilisation improved, 
• Headways more uniform, 
• Less lane changing, 
• Reduction in accidents, 
• Reduction in emissions, 
• Reduction in traffic noise. 
The Active Traffic Management (ATM) Pilot, currently underway, on the M42 
motorway in the West Midlands is using enhanced features developed for the M25 
Controlled Motorway pilot. ATM involves the use of existing, enhanced and new 
technology with tried and tested traffic management techniques (Aston, 2005). 
Using loop technology similar to the MIDAS system on the M25, but spaced at 100 
metre intervals, variable mandatory speed limits will be used to manage traffic and 
actively manage the hard shoulder as a running lane. An enhanced enforcement 
system, Highways Agency Digital Enforcement Camera System (HADECS), has 
been developed for this pilot. It will be digital camera based and capable of 
enforcing speed limits, hard shoulder usage and red "X" signals (Narroway and 
Jones, 2005, Cowling and Dewhurst, 2003). 
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6.3 Compliance with Matrix Signals 
6.3.1 Introduction 
This section will examine compliance rates with motorways matrix signals on the 
M25 motorway, particularly with mandatory red "X" lane control signals. 
Matrix signals are used by the Highways Agency (HA) and the police to provide 
emergency traffic management for incidents on motorways and trunk roads 
throughout England. If a lane has to be closed, a red "X" (TSRGD, 6031.1), 
accompanied by red flashing beacons, will be displayed above the required lane. 
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Figure 6.15 Examples of Motorway Matrix Signals Displaying a Red "X" STOP 
signal. (a) Controlled Motorway Indicator, (b) Standard Gantry Signal 
6.3.2 Background 
If an emergency lane closure, using motorway matrix signals, has to be made, either 
a centre reservation post mounted signal will display a lane closed "wicket" or on 
busier sections of road where gantries are installed, a lane control signal will display 
a red "X" STOP (Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2002 (HMSO, 
2002), Section 38), accompanied by red flashing beacons, above the required lane. 
Centre reservation post mounted signals can only display advisories to motorists, but 
overhead gantry red "X" signals are mandatory and it is an offence under the Road 
Traffic Act 1988 (HMSO, 1988a) not to comply with their instructions. A detailed 
summary of the appropriate sections of the Traffic Signs Regulations and General 
Directions 2002 and Road Traffic Act 1988 are provided in appendix B. 
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(a) 
There is anecdotal evidence, from the police and other emergency responders, that 
compliance with red "X" signals is poor, however there has been no any 
investigations into this. 
Two CCTV images in figure 6.16 show examples of emergency lane closures using 
red "X" signals on the M25. The first image shows lanes three and four closed, with 
2 red "X" above the lanes, but there are several vehicles still using the lanes. The 
second image shows a lane four closure with an incident support unit already on 
scene and numerous vehicles still using the lane, placing the ISU operative at 
increased danger. 
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Figure 6.16 CCTV Image Examples of Red "X" Violations 
6.3.3 Study Area 
The study area is shown in figure 6.17 and includes some of the busiest sections of 
the M25, with the AADT regularly passing 200,000 vehicles per day. CCTV 
cameras, emergency roadside telephones (ERT), gantry matrix signals for speed and 
lane controls and MIDAS are installed over the complete study area, between 
junctions 6 (marker post 4416) and junction 14 (marker post 4919), 50.3 kilometres 
(31.3 miles). 
Kill 
Figure 6.17 Map of Surrey Police's Section of the M25. (Picture source: Mott 
MacDonald) 
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6.3.4 Data Description 
Three sets of data were used to assess the level of compliance with motorway signals 
on the M25. 
Godstone Incident Data 
Detailed in section 4.3.2. 
Matrix Sign Databases 
Whenever a signal is set on the road network the following information is recorded: 
• Date and time of signal activation 
• Who set the sign (Either automatic through fog sensors and MIDAS or 
manually by a controller) 
• The type of signal 
• The location of the signal (Including motorway, marker post and lane) 
• The aspect required 
• The reason for setting 
• Date and time of de-activation 
• Any faults are also recorded 
This information is recorded at the relevant police control office from where the 
signals were set and provides a legal record of all signal and sign settings. The 
relevant information for this study was obtained in database form from Mott 
MacDonald, Glasgow, who maintain the records for the Highways Agency. 
Within the signal logs, a lane closure, or red cross ("X"), is identified by "STOP" in 
the 'aspect code' field and lane diverts are "LDL" or "LDR" depending on whether 
the divert is to the left or the right. Speed limits are identified just by the number that 
was displayed ( for example, 50 = 50mph) with mandatory speed limits including an 
"R" following the number. 
MIDAS Traffic Data 
The Motorway Incident Detection and Signalling (MIDAS) system records traffic 






• vehicle length category 
The data is stored in binary form and a program called TDAS (Traffic Data Analysis 
System) version 1.0 is used, within Microsoft Access, to extract relevant information. 
Both the TDAS program and MIDAS data was also obtained from MacDonald, 
Glasgow. 
6.3.5 Method 
The recorded incident data, from Surrey Police's Godstone motorway control room, 
was examined and all lane blocking incidents extracted. The 132 incidents, 
approximately 29.3% of all incidents, were then matched against the signal activity 
logs. All STOP signals and other relevant signal settings were extracted for each 
incident. MIDAS traffic data was then also matched against the recorded incident 
data. All of the information was then filtered for consistency and accuracy giving a 
total number of incidents of 60 and a total number of signal lane closures of 105. 
There are a higher number of signal lane closures in comparison to the number of 
incidents due to the fact that several incidents blocked multiple lanes, which caused 
the closure of those lanes and lead-in lanes. Control room staff may also have set the 
second preceding gantry when motorist compliance with the lane closure signals was 
poor. The filtered data has a much lower number of incidents than the total number 
recorded because not all in-lane incidents involved signalled lane closures and also 
due to several loop faults within the MIDAS data. Additionally in some cases there 
was not an appropriate downstream loop site close enough to the signal gantry, but 
prior to the incident, to give confident results. Ideally the loop site should be 
positioned adjacent to the signal site to give positive results. An example of an ideal 
loop location in relation to a signal gantry and incident are shown in figure 6.18. 
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Figure 6.18 Example of Ideal MIDAS Loop Detectors Location in Relation to a 
Signal Gantry and Incident. 
MIDAS flow data were converted into vehicle counts and were summed for each 
lane closure. Matrix signal activity is recorded to the second but the MIDAS data is 
recorded for 1-minute averages, therefore counts were only taken for the next whole 
minute through the last whole minute of activation. For example if a signal was 
recorded as being activated at 13:04:45, the count would be taken from 13:05:00 in 
the MIDAS data. If the signal was deactivated at 14:11:19 the count would be 
stopped at 14:10 to ensure confidence. Vehicle speed data was also treated in the 
same way. Four offence counts within incidents were not available, due to data 
inconsistency. Because of this a conservative approach has been taken whereby 
these totals have been zeroed. 
6.3.6 Results 
Example 1 
On the 14th November 2003 at marker post 4737A, between junctions 10 and 11 on 
the M25, there was an incident involving a collision between three cars and one 
Large Goods Vehicle (LGV), Godstone study incident number 203. The motorway 
control room at Godstone was first notified of the incident by a 999 call received at 
09:49. The incident was verified on CCTV with two cars blocking lanes three and 
four and the other vehicles on the hard shoulder a little distance further downstream. 
Once verified, signals were activated closing lanes three and four, to protect the 
incident scene, at the nearest upstream signal gantry. From the settings archive, 
shown in table 6. 1, it can be seen that the controller activated STOP red "X" signals 
at 4734A in lanes three and four, approximately 400 metres upstream from the 
incident, with the automatic lane diverts activated at MP 4721A and 4717A. It can 
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also be seen that the MIDAS system had detected the incident using the HIOCC 
algorithm and had automatically set 40 mph speed signals several minutes before the 
police had been notified of the incident. Once all vehicles had been moved to the 
hard shoulder by the police at 09:58 all lane closure signals were deactivated. 
Table 6.1 Signal Compliance Matrix Signal Logs - Example 1 
Settings Archive  
Log Counter OnDateTime By Type Device Aspect Code Reason Off DateTime 
72284 14/112003 09:44:02 AUTO MID SIC SIC M25/4721A1 60 INCIDENT 14:11200309:46:59 
72285 14/11/2003 0944:02 AUTO MID SIC SIC M25/4721A2 60 INCIDENT 141 12003 09:46:59 
72286 14/11/200309:44:02 AUTO MID SIC SIC M2514721A3 60 INCIDENT 14/11/200309:46:59 
72287 14/11/2003 09:44:07 AUTO MID SIG SIC M25/4725K1 60 INCIDENT 14/11/200309:46:57 
72288 14/11/2003 09:44:07 AUTO MID SIC SIC M25/4725K2 60 INCIDENT 14/11/2003 09:46:57 
72289 14/11/2003 09:44:07 AUTO MID SIC I SIG M2514734A1 40R INCIDENT 14/11/2003 10:01 :27 
72290 14/11/2003 09:44:07 AUTO MID SIC SIC M25/4734A2 40R INCIDENT 14/11/2003 10:01:27 
72291 14/11/2003 09:44:07 AUTO MID SIC SIC M25/4734A3 40R INCIDENT 14/11/2003 09:49:57 
72292 14/11/200309:44:07 AUTO MID SIC SIC M25/4734A4 40R INCIDENT 14/11/2003 09:49:57 
72293 14/11/200309:44:07 AUTO MID SIC SIG M25/4741A1 40R INCIDENT 14/11/2003 10:01:02 
72294 14/11/200309:44:07 AUTO MID SIC SIC M25/4741A2 40R INCIDENT 14/11/2003 10:01:02 
72295 	1 14/11/200309:44:07 AUTO MID SIC SIC M25/4741A3 40R INCIDENT 14/11/2003 10:01:02 
72296 14/11/200309:44:07 AUTO MID SIG SIG M25/4741A4 40R INCIDENT 14/11/2003 10:01:02 
72297 14/11/2003 09:46:57 AUTO MID SIC SIC M25/4725K1 40 INCIDENT 14/11/2003 10:10:29 
72298 14/11/2003 09:46:57 AUTO MID SIC SIC M25/4725K2 40 INCIDENT 14/11/2003 10:10:29 
72299 14/11/2003 09:46:59 AUTO MID SIC SIC M25/4714A1 50 INCIDENT 14/11/2003 09:52:24 
72300 14/11/2003 09:46:59 AUTO MID SIC SIG M25/4714A2 50 INCIDENT 14/11/2003 09:52:24 
72301 14/11/2003 09:46:59 AUTO MID SIC SIC M25/4714A3 50 INCIDENT 14/11/200309:49:52 
72302 14/11/2003 09:46:59 AUTO MID SIC SIC M25/4714J1 50 INCIDENT 14/11/200309:52:24 
72303 14/11/2003 09:46:59 AUTO MID SIC SIC M25/4721A1 40 INCIDENT 14/11/2003 10:10:31 
72304 14/11/2003 09:46:59 AUTO MID SIC SIG M25/4721A2 40 INCIDENT 14/11/2003 09:49:52 
72305 14/11/2003 09:46:59 AUTO MID SIC SIG M25/4721A3 40 INCIDENT 14/11/2003 09:49:52 
72310 14/11/2003 09:49:52 01F6 SIC SIC M25/4706A1 50 ACCIDENT 14/11/2003 09:58:40 
72316 14/11/2003 09:49:52 OIF 6 SIC SIC M25/4721A3 LDL JACCIDENT 14/11/2003 09:58:48 
72315 14/11/2003 09:49:52 OIF 6 SIC SIC M25/4721A2 LDL JACCIDENT 14/11/2003 09:58:48 
72314 14/11/2003 09:49:52 OIF6 SIC SIC M25/4714A3 LDL JACCIDENT 14/11/2003 09:58:48 
72313 14/11/2003 09:49:52 OIF6 SIC SIC M25/4706A4 50 JACCIDENT 14/11/2003 09:58:40 
72311 14/11/2003 09:49:52 OlE 6 SIC SIC M25/4706A2 50 ACCIDENT 14/11/2003 09:58:40 
72312 14/11/2003 09:49:52 OF 6 SIC SIC M25/4706A3 50 ACCIDENT 14/11/200309:58:40 
72317 14/11/2003 09:49:57 OIF 6 SIC SIG M25/4734A3 20R ACCIDENT 14/11/200309:50:01 
72318 14/11/2003 09:49:57 OIF 6 SIC SIG M25/4734A4 20R ACCIDENT 14/11/200309:50:01 
72323 14/11/2003 09:50:01 OF 6 SIC SIC M25/4734A3 STOP ACCIDENT 14/11/200309:58:52 
72324 14/11/2003 09:50:01 OF 6 SIC SIC M25/4734A4 STOP ACCIDENT 14/11/2003 09:58:52 
72411 14/11/2003 09:58:48 OIF5 SIC SIC M25/4714A3 40 CLEAR 14/11/2003 10:10:31 
72412 14/11/200309:58:48 OF 5 SIC SIC M25/4721A2 40 CLEAR 14/11/2003 10:10:31 
72413 14/11/2003 09:58:48 OIF 5 SIC SIC M25/4721A3 40 CLEAR 14/11/2003 10:10:31 
72414 1 14/11/2003 09:58:52 1 	OF 5 1 SIC SIC M25/4734A3 40R CLEAR 14/11/2003 10:01:27 
72415 14/11/2003 09:58:521 OIF5 1 SIC I SIGM25/4734A4 40R CLEAR 1 14/11/200310:01:27 
The nearest appropriate loop data was found to be at 4737A, which is not an ideal 
loop location as it is a reasonable distance away from the signal gantry. Any vehicle 
recorded in the closed lanes can however be confirmed as committing an offence due 
to the distance from the gantry, as the motorists will have had sufficient time to 
change lanes. MIDAS flow data from the location was examined in lanes three and 
four for the time period between 09:50 and 09:57, due to the limitations of 1-minute 
averages of the MIDAS data. It was found that for the 7 minutes of the closure 156 
vehicles were observed to use the closed lanes, 113 in lane three and 43 in lane four. 
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These 156 vehicles account for nearly 36% of all traffic on this section of road. A 
graph showing the traffic flow over the time period of interest is shown in figure 
6.19. It can be seen that as the lanes are re-opened more people used lane 4 prior to 
the signals being deactivated. 
Incident No. 203, Lane Closure Traffic Flow Example 
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Figure 6.19 Graph of Example Lane Closure Traffic Flow. 
Speed compliance was very good at the incident scene. The signal gantry with the 
lane closures, 4734A, was displaying a mandatory speed limit of 40 mph across lanes 
one and two with other advisory speed limits further upstream as gantry 4734A was 
just inside the controlled motorway section, allowing mandatory speeds to be set and 
enforced. Across all four lanes, at 4734A, the average speed was less than 12 mph, 
well below the speed limit. This speed may have been artificially lowered due to 
motorists "rubbernecking" and by the police stopping traffic to tow the incident 
vehicles to the hard shoulder. It can be seen from table 6.2 that the highest speed 
was in lane one. This is most likely due to less weaving and lane changing, slowing 
the traffic, than in lane two where more vehicles will be trying to merge out of the 
incident affected lanes. 
Table 6.2 Incident No. 203, Average Speed by Lane (MPH). 
Lane 1 Lane  Lane 3 Lane 4 
14.52 1 	10.87 8.77 11.57 
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For the ten minutes prior to the incident the average speed was 67 mph across all 
four lanes and 76 mph in lane four, with no mandatory or advisor speed limits being 
displayed at that time. This shows the major impact that motorway incidents have on 
the speed of traffic. 
Example 2 
On the 6th December 2003 at marker post 4780B, between junctions 11 and 10 on 
the anti-clockwise M25, there was an incident involving one car, Godstone study 
incident number 594. The vehicle had a major mechanical failure leading to it being 
stranded in lane 4. The control room staff were notified by a passing motorist using 
an emergency roadside telephone at 09:28 and once verified activated signals closing 
lane four at 478513, some 500 metres upstream of the incident. As can be seen from 
settings archive in table 6.3 a 40 mph mandatory speed limit was initially instated 
across all lanes, prior to the positive identification of the stranded vehicle's location. 
The police were on scene at 09:33 and promptly cleared the disabled vehicle to the 
hard shoulder but it had left a large pool of oil in the carriageway that required 
clearing. An ISU was then requested and arrived at 09:41, promptly dealing with the 
spill, allowing lane four to be cleared at 09:57 and the lane closure signals to be 
deactivated. 
The nearest appropriate loop site was found to be at 478313, 200 metres downstream 
of the signal gantry and approximately 300 metres from the incident. MIDAS flow 
data, from the location, was examined in lane four for the time period between 09:32 
and 09:56. For the duration of the 24 minute closure, a total of 1,487 vehicles passed 
over all four lanes at loop site 473813, 95 vehicles passed lane four, equating to 
nearly 6.5% of the total traffic passing under the red "X" signal. The traffic flow 
over the time period of interest is shown in figure 6.20, clearly showing again that as 
the lanes are physically cleared of the obstruction, more people move back over to 
lane 4 prior to the signals actually being deactivated. 
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Table 6.3 Signal Compliance Matrix Signal Logs - Example 2 
Settings Archive - 
Log Counter OnDateTime By - Device Aspect Code Reason Oft DateTime 
32935 06/12/2003 09:29 13 OIF 8 - SIG I SIG M254785131 40R OBSTRUCTION 06/12/2003 10:00:2 
32936 06/12/200309:29:13 OIF 8 - SIG I SIG M25/4785B2 40R OBSTRUCTION 06/12/2003 10:00:9 
32937 06/12/2003 09:29:13 OIF 8 - SIG I SIG M25/4785B3 40R OBSTRUCTION 06/1212003 10:00:2 
32938 06/12/200309:29:13 OIF 8 - SIG I SIGM25/4785B4 40R OBSTRUCTION 06/12/200309:31:46 
32939 06/121200309:29:13 CIF 8 - SIG SIGM25/4794B1 60R OBSTRUCTION 06/12/200309:31:46 
32940 06/12/200309:29:13 OIF 8 - SIB SIG M25/4794132 60R OBSTRUCTION 06/12)200309:31:4 
32941 06/12/200309:29: 3 OIF 8 - SIG SIG M25/4794133 60R OBSTRUCTION 06/12/200309:31:46 
32942 06/12/2003 09:29:13 OIF 8 - SIG SIG M25/4794B4 60R OBSTRUCTION 06/12/2003 09:31:46  
32943 06/12/2003 09:29:33 OIF 8 - SIG SIG M25/4776B1 40R OBSTRUCTION 06/12/2003 09:57:20  
32944 06/12/2003 09:29:33 OIF 8 - SIG SIG M25/4776132 40R OBSTRUCTION 06/12/2003 09:57:20 
32945 /12/2003 09:29:33 OIF 8 - SIG I SIGM25/4776B3 40R OBSTRUCTION 06/12/200309:57:20 
32946 06/12/2003 09:29:33 01F8 - SIB I SIG M25/4776134 40R OBSTRUCTION 06/1212003 09:57:20 
32947 06/12/2003 09:31:46 OIF 1 - SIB I SIG M25/4785134 20R OBSTRUCTION 06/12/200309:31:49 
32948 06/12/2003 09:31:46 CIF 1 - SIB I SIG M25/4794131 50R OBSTRUCTION 06/12/200309:34:03 
32949 06/12/2003 09:31:46 OIF I - SIB I SIG 1025/4794132 50R OBSTRUCTION 06/121200309:34:03 
32950 06/12/2003 09:31:46 OIF 1 - SIB I SIGM25/4794B3 50R OBSTRUCTION 06/12/200309:34:03 
32951 06/12/2003 09:31:46 OlE I - SIG I SIB M25/4794B4 LDL OBSTRUCTION 06/12/200309:57:17 
32952 06/1212003 09:31:46 OIF - SIG SIG M25/480681 50R OBSTRUCTION 06/1212003 09:39:24 
32953 06/12/2003 09:31:46 OIF1 - SIB SIB M25/4806B2 50R OBSTRUCTION 06/121200309:39:24 
32954 06/12/200309:31:46 OIE1 - SIB SIG M25/480663 SOR OBSTRUCTION 06/12/2003 09:39:24 
32955 06/12/2003 09:31:49 OIF1 - SIB I SIB M25/4785134 STOP OBSTRUCTION 06/121200309:57:17 
Speed compliance was very good at the incident scene. The signal gantry with the 
lane closures, 478513, was displaying a mandatory speed limit of 40 mph across lanes 
one, two and three. Across all four lanes, at 478313, the average speed was less than 
20 mph, well below the speed limit, but as before the speed may have been 
artificially lowered due to motorists "rubbernecking" and by the police stopping 
traffic to tow the incident vehicle to the hard shoulder. 
Incident No. 594, Lane Closure Traffic Flow Example 
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It can be seen from table 6.4 that the highest speed, in a legal lane, was in lane one 
which, as before, is most likely due to less weaving and lane changing, slowing the 
traffic than in lane three were more vehicles will be trying to merge out of the 
incident effected lanes. The recorded speed is highest in lane four, mainly due to the 
fact that there were very few vehicles in it and free flow was available. Figure 6.21 
shows two CCTV images of the incident, showing numerous vehicles illegally using 
lane four approaching the incident scene and demonstrates the differences in flow 
between the four lanes. 
Table 6.4 Incident No. 594, Average Speed by Lane (MPH). 
Lane 1 Lane 2 Lane 3 Lane 4 
19.20 1 	18.92 14.81 23.72 
For the ten minutes prior to the incident the average speed was 56 mph across all 
four lanes and 60 mph in lane 4, with no mandatory or advisor speed limits being 
displayed at that time. This again shows the major impact that motorway incidents 
have on the speed of traffic. 
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Figure 6.21 CCTV images of lane closure at incident 594. 
Example 3 
A lane closure was requested by one of Carillion's ISUs to undertake an emergency 
repair on two potholes in lane one on the clockwise M25 between junctions 9 and 10, 
MP 4697A, at 08:47 on 16th November 2003, Godstone study incident number 255. 
The control room staff duly set signals and signs at 08:48 to support the operatives 
while they were in the carriageway, the signal and sign logs are shown in tables 6.5 
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and 5.16. It can be seen that lane one was closed using a STOP red "X" at gantry 
4697A and an advisory speed limit of 50 mph was set both at the lane closure gantry 
and the preceding gantries upstream, 4677A and 4685A. 
Table 6.5 Signal Compliance Matrix Signal Logs - Example 3 
Settings Archive  
Log Counter OnDateTime By Z= Device Aspect Code Reason OflDateTime 
76410 16/11/2003 08:48:49 OIF 4 SIG SIG M25/4677A1 50 OBSTRUCTION 16/11/2003 09:34:1 
76411 16/11/200308:48:49 OIF4 SIC SIGM25/4677A2 50 OBSTRUCTION 16/11/200309:34:1 
76412 16/11/200308:4849 01F4 SIC SIGM25/4677A3 50 OBSTRUCTION 16/11/200309:34:1 
76413 16/11/200308:48:49 01F4 SIG SIGM25/4677A4 50 OBSTRUCTION 16/11/200309:34:1 
76414 16111/2003 08:48:59 OIF 4 SIG SIC M2514685A1 LDR OBSTRUCTION 16/11/2003 09:34:1 
76415 16111/2003 08:48:59 OIF4 SIG SIGM25/4685A2 50 OBSTRUCTION 16/11/200309:34:1 
76416 16/11/200308:48:59 OIF4 SIG SIGM25/4685A3 50 OBSTRUCTION 16/11/200309:34:1 
76417 16/11/2003 08:48:59 OIF4 5G SIGM25/4685A4 50 OBSTRUCTION 16/11/200309:34:1 
76418 16/11/200308.4859 OIF4 SIC SIC M25/4697A1 20 OBSTRUCTION 16/11/200308.49:03 
76419 16/11/200308:48:59 OIF 4 SIG SIG M25/4697A2 50 OBSTRUCTION 16/11/200309:34:1 
76420 16/11/2003 08:48:59 OlE 4 SIG SIG M25/4697A3 50 OBSTRUCTION 16/11/2003 09:34:1 
76421 16/11/2003 08:48:59 OIF 4 SIG SIC M25/4697A4 50 OBSTRUCTION 16/11/200309:34:1 
16111/200309:3471 11  76422 1 16/11/2003 08:49:03 1 	OF 4 SIC M25/4697A1 I 	STOP )BSTRUCTIOt 
Once the signals had been visually confirmed active, at 08:51, the ISU operatives 
started to lay traffic management cones and signs out into lane one from their vehicle 
to give themselves an emergency buffer area while they filled the potholes. 
Table 6.6 Signal Compliance VMS Logs - Example 3 
Settings Arcflive 
Log Counter OriDateTime I 	By T9pe Device Aspect Code Reason OtfDatelime 
15196 161112003084954 0614 MSS MSS M25/4497A WORKFORCE IN ROAD-SLOW JOBS1RUCTION 16/112003 0934:40 
15197 1 16, 1120030850191 0611 IMSSIMSS M254385AI WORKFORCE IN ROAD-SLOW JOBSTRUCTION1 161120030934:40 
At 09:19, the ISU operatives had finished patching the holes and started to back track 
towards the hard shoulder, collecting their traffic management as they went. They 
were clear of lane I at 09:31 and contacted the control room. The signals and signs 
were then deactivated at 09:34. 
The nearest appropriate loop site was found to be at 4697A, adjacent to the signal 
gantry. MIDAS flow data, from the location, was examined in lane one for the time 
period between 08:49 and 09:33. For the duration of the 43 minute closure, a total of 
2,034 vehicles passed over all four lanes at loop site 4697A, 72 vehicles passed lane 
one, equating to nearly 3.54% of the total traffic passing under the red "X" signal. 
The traffic flow over the time period of interest is shown in figure 6.22, showing the 
understandable low flow levels of a Sunday morning and relatively good compliance 
rate. The relatively good compliance rates may be due to several factors including 
the low flow conditions where finding space to change lanes is not an issue, there 
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was no delay in changing lanes early, poor driving habits such as lane discipline 
where drivers do not return to the near side after overtaking thus the lower count in 
lane one, the ISU operatives placed a large TM taper and signs encouraging 
motorists to change lanes and also the fact that the ISU was a large crash cushion and 
light arrow vehicle which can be seen from several miles. 
Incident No. 255, Lane Closure Traffic Flow Example 
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Figure 6.22 Graph of example lane closure traffic flow 
Speed compliance was very poor for this incident with traffic in all lanes exceeding 
the displayed advisory speed limit. The average speeds by lane for the duration of 
the lane closure are shown in table 5.17. On average across all four lanes vehicles 
were travelling at 63.4 mph and vehicles in lane four alone were exceeding the 
advisory speed limit by more than 25 mph and the national speed limit by almost 6 
mph. 
Table 6.7 Incident No. 255, Average Speed by Lane (MPH). 
Lane 1 Lane 2 Lane 3 Lane 4 
53.17 57.79 66.76 75.75 
For the ten minutes prior to the lane closure the average speed across all four lanes 
was 78 mph with the average in lane four alone greater than 91 mph. This shows 
that there was an approximate 14.5 mph reduction in speed following the activation 
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of the advisory speed limit signs but speeds were still excessive. The speeds 
observed at gantries further upstream also showed very poor compliance, with lane 
four at gantry 4677A recording an average speed of 93 mph. 
Results Summary 
A summary of all 60 incidents and 105 signal activations are shown in tables 6.8 
through 6.12 with the results showing a great variability in the number of vehicles 
passing under a red "X". 
General Results 
The number of vehicles observed to be committing an offence of driving under a red 
"X" per incident varied from 0, or complete compliance, to 3,450 vehicles over a 2 
hour 46 minute closure. In total for all red "X" signal activations there were 23,788 
offences recorded which equates to an average of 396.47 offences per incident or 
226.55 offences per signal activation. A red "X" was displayed for an average of 36 
minutes per incident and while activated there was an average rate of 8.73 offences 
per minute. 
Table 6.8 Summary of offences by lane. 
Lane 1 Lane 2 Lane 3 Lane 4 All Lanes 
No. of Recordings - 40 10 16 39 105 
No. of Offences - 5416 1681 6309 10382 23788 
Average - 135.4 168.1 394.3125 266.2051 226.5524 
Percentage - 22.8% 7.1% 26.5% 43.6% 100.0% 
A summary is shown in table 6.8 detailing the number of offences by lane. It can be 
seen that lane three has the highest average number of offences. 
Lane Utilisation 
Percentage lane utilisation varied considerably from 0%, complete compliance, to as 
high as 49.2% for a one lane closure on a two lane sup road and 43% for a two lane 
closure on a four lane carriageway. Table 6.10 presents results for all incidents and 
shows that on average 15.26% of traffic passed under a red "X" per incident. 
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No Incident No Time  Of Da' Incident Location Signal Location I Count Location Lariat - Lane2 - Lane3 - Lane4 - Total 
Duration Offences Recorded Duration Offences Recorded Duration Offences Recorded Duration Offences Recorded Duration Vehicle Count 
19 1521 4630 4638B 46388 1333206 101 003201) 101 
2 20 16:54 4859A 4851A 4853A - [3)1000 149 3)10,00 149 
3 26 0548 4527A 4522A 4522A 01 1000 675 - 01:10 00 675 
29 1049 4791A 4795A 4787A  00:17 00 279 00 1700 279 
30 0901 4 73 1 0 47346 47326 00.0600 151 - 00 05 00 151 
48 1532 47736 47766 I 	47726  3)03(11 44 00:13:13) 85 CX) 16(1) 129 
49 1713 4830A 4825A 4826A 0022 596  (022(0 596 
63 11.05 45516 4556B 45560 0024,00 32 1312400 30 
85 17.48 4636A 4616A 4517A 011 369 (036(0 2B4  015600 653 
1751  4629A 4033A 01 1500 429 003300 261  01 4800 810 
10 93 1005 4897A 4685A 4697A 02.33(1) 1983 0233(1) 523 050500 2485 
1010  4677A 4577A 022600 2102 02:26:00 1289 045800 3391 
11 123 1520 470BA 4705A 4705A 003600 201 (03600 201 
1520  4697A 4697A 003600 205  (036(0 265 
1531  47055 4705.5 DO 12 00 114 001200 114 
12 145 11.47 4494J 4411)J 4492:1 003900 204 (039(0 204 
13 161 1407 4860.5 4660A 4858A 00.45010 77 (0(5(0 63  005300 160 
II 179 10.67 4856A 4851A 4853A 000100 45  0001 00 46 
15 190 10:55 46670 46776 46770 001000 14 (010.10 14 _16 198 0846 47900 47856 47636 0001001 10 0001 00 10  
0545  47946 47928 1 - - (007(0 73 01)0700 73 
0551  4(11)6 	- 48068 (1)02)1) 42 000200 42 
17 199 11157 4868A 4667A 	- 4666A 0021 69  0021 00 59 
18 203 0950 4737A 4734A 4737A 00:07:001 113 (1)07(8) 43 (014(0 156 
19 214 13,05 44456 44476 44470 031100 125 0011 00 125 
20 217 1426 4430A 4435A 4435A 00 06:00 24 000600 24 
T.  241 13:50 46758 46776 46770 00 02M 0 (002(0 0 
46856 4684B 0003001  (003(0 3 
22 265 1050 4027A 4697A 4697A 0043 72 004300 72 
23 269 1535 44910 45066 	- 45060 (1104(0 39 0242:10 3411 0246130 3450 
1547  449130 N/A 000010 0 
15.44  441106 441108  0017:00 140 (033(0 123 (05013) 263 
24 283 09.19 4582A 4577A 4577A 00 12 154 00 1200 154 
25 289 13:07 45100 45066 45150  0)0000 0 
45178 46128  00.14:00 60 02:53:110 280 0526:00 46 (045(0 
26 307 1058 4890A 4063A 4883A  1103:11 52 00:031 11 (0(0 53 
27 313 1466 4860A 4860A 4863A (011.10 12 - 01)1100 12 
28 314 1529 4003L 4006L 4805L (3)19:00 76 00 1900 78 
29 317 1721 45930 45956 45926  000210 26 0002:10 26 
30 345 1859 46618 46586 46586 (031.11) 240 (011.10 64 ____________ ____________ 0041 00 334 
31 396 16:35 44798 44836 44836 1025(8) 377 002600 377 
441106 44908 1025.10 575 26(0 575 
32 401 07:20 45108 45066 45(188 01,28:11) 936 012 28 (0 936 





No Incident No I Time Of Day Incident Location Signal Location Count Location Lariat - Larie2 - - Lane3 Lane4 Total 
Duration Offences Recorded Duration Offences Recorded Duration Offences Recorded Duration Offences Recorded Duration Vehicle Count 
33 405 99:55 48570 48708 46686 00 38:00 428 0(138(0 445  01:16:00 873 
- 4850B 48588 00391X' 62 003900 162  0118 244 
34 420 16:51 4820A 4813A 4817A 996699 61 31:99 136 (0310(1 169 01:08.00 366 
36 446 10:33 46358 46386 46386 006600 20 000600  
36 464 1426 4916J 4915,1 4917J 0023.001 7 002300 7 
371 468 	1 16:32 4627A 4616A 4617A 003700 133 1 0037 133 
- 16:33 	- 4629A 4633A [038(0 99  003800 99 
38 484 07.50 4743A 4741A 4742A 00 1000 5 001099 6 
39 469 . 	 12:22 4604A 4490A 4490A 09)1100 64 00:11_1)0 64 
- 4501A 4501A  99.1103 23 (0-1199 213 
- 1237  4490A 4493A  9901(9) 0 0001 00 0 
- 4501A 4501A  00 9 000100 9 
40 481 85:01 44908 44908 44998 000:99 36 990900 38 
99:01  44968 N/A  990000 0 
41 486 1037 46692 48708 46688 000399 10  990300 10 
42 49(1 11.44 46736 4677B 46776 00 1300 6 99:13.99 6 
46856 46846 001399 17  (0:13(0 17 
43 494,496 12:25 46096 45176 45126 022800 61 -  022899 51 
- 1343 4509A 4501A 4501A 990400 5 (004(0 5 
1144 4509A 4509A N/A  99(9)99 0 
44 497 14.00 4774A 4764A 4767A 100171)) 36  99:17.99 1 	30 
14:01  4776A N/A  (0.99:99 0 
46 505 9909 4800J 47962 4900J 01.19:0) 63  01:1999 63 
46 599 08:36 4675A 4667A 4672A 00 33 00 360 99 . 33. 99 360 
47 520 16.32 46198 48196 48176 990499 104 000499 104 
16:38  48256 48226 (E01.0) 48 0001 _CX) 48 
48 566 1624 4649A 4649A 4649A 0213.99 19  03_1399 19 
4637A 4637A 0147.99 401  01.47.00 1 	401 
49 567 17:01 44528 1 	44586 44566 99:21:99 321 (0:21 :99 321 
50 562 1842 4641A 4637A 4637A 000300 14  (0030) 14 
51 574 11.51 4506B 45178 45176  01:11199 405 01:12:99 45 02 23(0 450 
45996 45996  01:1199 210 0111:99 12 022200 222 
52 575 12:01 4525A 4522A 4522A 0004.99 9  990499 9 
53 579 13:36 44300 44408 44408 00:12:99 135 001200 33 002400 168 
541 594 1 	0932 47806 47858 1 	47838 (024(0 95 99.2499 95 
561 596 1 	1018 4890A 4883A 4993A (009(X) 20 (009(X) 28 
56 666 09:25 4776A 4667A 4672A 1 0&22 00 289 002200 289 
9627  4677A 4877A (021(0 348 0021:99 348 
57 567 96:40 4645A 4637A 4637A 00 0100 53 000299 24 0004,00 77 
58 662 07:50 4823A 4613A 4817A  [012(0 153 00.1200 118 0)24(9) 271 
- 4821A 4822A  991100 163 99.11(X) 83 (022(0 245 
59 701 16:46 48948 49006 48976 (021 0) 215 0021 - 99 215 
60 7136 18:04 46708 46706 I 	48686 1001600 193  9916(0 193 
- 48768 48738 100 16001 187  9916(0 187 
- 	







No Incident No. ILanel -   Lane2 -  Lane3 -  Lane4  AJI Lanes  - 
Duration Offences Recorded Other Traffic Duration Offences Recorded Other Traffic Duration Offences Recorded Other Traffic Duration Offences Recorded Other Traffic Oflences Other Traffic Percentage 
1 IS (Xt.32:t1) 101  63)  697  0 101 1197 7.78% 
: 2  177  190 0010(X) 149  149 553 2113% 
3 26 0110:86 575  1293  1522  1768 675 4583 1260% 
4 29  N/A  459  N/A 00 17 . 00 279  279 459 N/A 
- 30 05.86 151  36  176  198 151 412 2682% 
48  217  225 86.0386 44 175 8613(X) 85 0 129 617 1729% 
- 49 CXI 596  209  3)7  461 596 1037 36.58% 
: 
30  481  588  42 36 1191 246% 
- 65 1 3)9  (X136:86 254 736  1368  1417 653 3523 15 64% 
_____ 1 429  W33C6) 361 703  1576  1929 610 4286 1614% 
-To- 
 
 93  2529  2703 0233:86 1963 0233.86 523  2486 5232 3221% 
1749  1735 0228:86 2102 02:28.86 1  3391 3484 49.32% 
11 123 00 36 00 201  219  273 1  337 201 799 2010% 
86 36 00 265  641  759  778 1 	265 1 	2178 1095% 
86 1200 114  219  273  307 114 799 1249% 
_1 145 00 39 00 204  229  204 229 47.11% 
1 161 86 77 0)8686 63 756  938  1222 100 2916 520% 
_7-4 179 -  50  43  48 8601.86 46  46 141 2458% 
1 tO) 8610(X) 14  254  263  209 14 746 1.84% 
_16 198  10  19  20 8601(0 10  10 49 1695% 
82  162  248 860786 73  73 492 1292% 
 63  113 8602(X) 42  42 176 1927% 
17 199 8621:86 59  465 1  575  490 59 1530 371% 
1 203  145  134 1007:111 113 0107.86 43  196 279 3586% 
19 214  235  276  389 861186 125 030 1220% 
_20 217 868600 24  71  111  114 24 296 750% 
_21 241 000286 0  17  23  13 0 53 0.86% 
8603(X) 3  83  112  81 1 	3 276 1138% 
22 255 00:43 00 72  757  616  389 72 1962 3.54% 
23 269  1583  2754 1004:0) ' 	39 3154 02 42 : 00 3411 7501 3150% 
 0 0 N/A 
533  556 8617:86 140 275 863311) 123  253 1354 16.16% 
24 283  209  N/A  193 861200 154  154 402 N/A 
25 289 1 0 0 N/A 
6621 1111486 60 8440 0253.86 286 6421 (3)38(X) 46  2% 21482 177% 
26 307  103 13)03(X) 52 860386 11  63 103 37.95% 
27 313 86:11:86 12  172  230  276 1 	12 678 1.74% 
28 314  257 861986 78 1   78 1 	257 2328% 
29 317  60  89  N/A 8602:86 26 26 149 N/A 
3) 345 1O86 240 8611:86 54 ¶92  473 3)4 120) 1944% 
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For all examined incident speed compliance was good overall with an average traffic 
speed 9.55 mph less than the posted advisory or mandatory speed limit. Twenty-six 
signal activations however had greater average speeds than those displayed. The 
largest speed limit difference recorded was 13.4 mph over but the average was 7 
mph. The impact of displaying speed limits is difficult to establish as speed may be 
artificially lowered near incident scenes. Traffic may be slow due to congestion 
caused by irregular merging and weaving as well as drivers increasing their headway 
and slowing down while passing incident scene, also known as rubbernecking. 
Time of Day 
Figure 6.23 shows the variability of offences rate against the time of day. It can be 
seen that in general there is a higher rate of offences during the peak periods of the 
day. This may be because the road section is at or very near capacity and there is 
nowhere for affected vehicles to go, or it could be that drivers are under more 
pressure to reach their destination during peak periods. 
Offences Rate Against Time of Day 
Frequency 
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Figure 6.23 Graph of Offences Rate Against Time of Day 
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Incident-Signal Separation 
It can be seen in figure 6.24 that there is generally a greater rate of offences with an 
increased distance from an incident. The trend line shows a steady increase with 
distance from the actual incident scene. This may be due to motorists not reacting to 
the signals and preferring to rely on their own judgement, continuing to travel along 
the closed lane until they have a physical reason for moving. 
Figure 6.24 Graph of Offences Rate Against Distance from Incident 
Multiple Signal Activation 
It was noted that twenty incidents involved more than one red "X" activation in an 
attempt to increase motorist compliance and protect the incident scene. A summary 
is shown in table 6.11 and it can be seen from the offence rates that signal 
compliance is greater with the second (nearest to incident) stop signal. When 
multiple signals were used the average rate for the furthest gantry was 10.25 and the 
closer one was 7.54 offences per minute demonstrating how the gantry closest to the 
incident has a lower offences rate. As noted above however that compliance is less 
with a greater distance from the incident. 
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Table 6.11 Signal Compliance Rates (1st / 2nd Signals) 
Incident No. Time Of Day Incident Location Signal Location Count Location Total Rate (Offences per Minute) 
Duration Vehicle Count  
85 17:48 4638A 4616A 4617A 01:55:00 653 5.68 
17:51  4629A 4633A 01:48:00 810 7.50 
93 10:05 4697A 4685A 4697A 05:06:00 2486 8.12 
10:10  4677A 4677A 04:56:00 3391 11.46 
123 	1 15:20 4708A 4706A 4706A 0036;00 201 5.58 
15:20  4697A 4697A 00:36:00 265 7.36 
198 08:46 47908 4785B 47838 00:01:00 10 10.00 
08:46  4794B 47928 00:07:00 73 10.43 
08:51  4806B 48068 00:02:00 42 21.00 
241 1350 46758 4677B 46778 00:02:00 0 0.00 
4685B 4684B 00:03:00 3 1.00 
269 15:35 4491B 45088 45088 02:46:00 3450 20.78 
15.47  44968 N/A 00:00:00 0 N/A 
15:44  44908 44908 00:50:00 263 5.26 
289 13:07 45108 45088 N/A 00:00:00 0 N/A 
45178 4512B 09:45:00 386 0.66 
395 16:35 44798 44838 44838 00:25:00 377 15.08 
44908 44908 00:26:00 575 22.12 
405 08:55 4857B 4870B 48688 01:16:00 873 11.49 
4860B 4858B 01:18:00 244 3.13 
458 16:32 4627A 4616A 4617A 1 	0037:00 133 3.59 
16:33  4629A 4633A 00:38:00 99 2.61 
469 12:22 4504A 4490A 4490A 00:11:00 64 5.82 
4501A 4501A 00:11:00 23 2.09 
12:37  4490A 4490A 00:01:00 0 0.00 
4501A 4501A 00:01:00 9 9.00 
481 08:01 44908 44908 44908 00:09:00 38 4.22 
08:01  44968 N/A 00:00:00 0 N/A 
490 11:44 46738 4€77B 4677B 00:13:00 6 0.46 
4685B 4684B 00:13:00 17 1.31 
497 14:00 4774A 4764A 4767A 00:17:00 30 1.76 
14:01  4776A N/A 00:00:00 0 N/A 
520 16:32 4819B 4819B 4817B 00:04:00 104 26.00 
16:38  48258 48228 00:01:00 48 48.00 
556 16:24 4649A 4649A 4649A 02:13:00 19 0.14 
4637A 4637A 1 	01:47:00 401 3.75 
574 11:51 4506B 45178 4517B 02:23:00 450 3.15 
4508B 4508B 02:22:00 222 1.58 
666 09:26 4676A 4667A 4672A 00:22:00 289 13.14 
09:27  4677A 4677A 00:21:00 348 16.57 
682 07:50 4823A 4813A 4817A 00:24:00 271 11.29 
4821 A 4822A 00:22:00 1 246 11.18 706 W. 4870B 4870B 48688 00:16:00 193 12.06 48768 48738 00:16:00 187 11.69 
Controlled Motorway Comparison 
Table 6.12 demonstrates the comparison between the Controlled Motorway section 
and the MIDAS section of the M25 covered by this study. The controlled motorway 
section has fewer offences per incident than the MIDAS section, 197.16 compared to 
538.83, but this is mainly due to the shorter signal duration, some 32 minutes less. 
There is also more than 6.5% greater percentage of traffic offending in the controlled 
section and the offence rate is nearly double that of the MIDAS section. Speed 
compliance was greater on average within the controlled section than just the 
MIDAS section by 3 mph, which is most likely to the enforcement system and 
mandatory speed limits in operation. 
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Table 6.12 Controlled Motorway Section Comparison. 
- 
Controlled 




No. of Incidents 25 
 : 
60 
No. of Activations - 41 - 64 - 105 
Offences Recorded - 4929 - 18859 - 23788 
Offences per Incident - 197.16 - 538.83 - 396.47 
Offences per Activation - 120.22 - 294.67 - 226.55 
% Traffic Offending - 19.25% - 12.57% - 15.26% 
Ave. Signal Duration - 00:16:28 - 00:48:39 - 00:36:05 
Offences Rate - 12.20 - 6.62 - 8.73 
Speed Compliance (mph) - -11.44 - -8.40 1 - -9.55 
Summary 
The overall results from 60 incidents indicated the following: 
105 red "X" matrix signal activations 
23,788 offences of driving under a red "X" matrix signal were recorded 
396.47 average offences of driving under a red "X" matrix signal per incident 
226.55 average offences of driving under a red 'X" matrix signal per signal 
activation 
15.26% of traffic passed under a red "X" signal 
Average red "X" duration was 36 minutes 
Average offence rate of 8.73 offences per minute. 
The average traffic speed was 9.55 mph less than the posted advisory or 
mandatory speed limit 
Offences rate varied with the time of day 
Compliance fell with the distance from the incident scene 
For multiple signal activation compliance was greater with the signals closest 
to the incident scene 
Many differences were found between the MIDAS section and the Controlled 
Motorway sections of the M25. 
6.3.7 Discussion 
Compliance with overhead gantry motorway signals has been shown to be very 
variable. In some circumstances, it was found that there was complete compliance 
but in others it was very poor, with up to 43% of vehicles offending, and on average 
15.26% traffic using the road was observed to be contravening the red "X" signals. 
tIM 
With some 23,788 vehicles illegally driving through emergency lane control signals 
there are major safety implications for both incident victims and responders. 
There are numerous possible reasons for the poor compliance with red "X" signals. 
It may be that motorists just do not understand what the signal means, how they are 
supposed to react or what the penalties are for contravening its instruction. A 1987 
report by the Transport and Road Research Laboratory (Rutley, 1987) detailed the 
response to a public attitude survey in which only 50% of interviewees correctly 
identified the meaning of a red "X" signal. As there is currently no re-testing of 
drivers, many older aged drivers may have never been introduced to motorways or 
motorway signals since their construction so may have no knowledge of the signals. 
If the understanding of the signal is the issue, drivers must be further educated to the 
reasons for setting emergency signals and the possible major safety implications if 
they do not comply with them. On the M25 specifically, lack of compliance may 
partly be due to the very frequent daily use of matrix signals either for queue 
protection using MIDAS or within the controlled motorway section. Drivers may 
have become complacent to the meaning of the signals, or sign blind, choosing to 
drive as they want not as requested. Ultimately it may be that many drivers within 
the study area are just very inconsiderate and aggressive in their driving habits. 
Matrix signals are effective for the majority of the time but are reliant on motorists to 
comply with their instructions to ensure the operational safety of the facility. 
May (197 1) found in 1969, on the elevated section of the M4 motorway in London, 
that between 8% and 13% of the total traffic stream violating red "X" signals. This 
is similar to the 15.26% stated above, but slightly lower, which may be due to the 
increased volume of traffic using the roads today. 
Speed compliance was good overall for incidents but as previously stated these 
speeds may have been externally influenced. Webb (1980) found that the average 
car speed was reduced by approximately 4.9% when an advisory speed limit was 
displayed on a post mounted matrix signal. A study on the M4 motorway in London 
by May (1971) found that advisory speed limits attracted compliance from less than 
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15% of drivers. Several studies by the Transport and Road Research Laboratory 
have examined the effect of motorway signals on vehicle speeds including both post 
mounted and gantry mounted signals. Lines (1978) found that on an urban stretch of 
the Ml motorway with 3 lane gantry signals there was an average reduction in speed 
of 7%, or approximately 5mph, when a 50 mph advisory speed limit was displayed. 
A similar result was also found for the rural stretch of the Ml, which used post 
mounted signals, in the same study. Another study by Lines (1981), also on the Ml, 
found that there was an average 4 mph, or 6%, decrease in speed, again when a 50 
mph advisory speed is displayed. Smaller reductions were recorded for 60 mph 
advisory speed limits and slightly larger reductions were observed for 50 mph limits 
and lane closures. In a survey of driver opinions reported by Cross and Parker 
(1980) only 45% of drivers said they always complied with the speed restrictions. 
The main reason given for not complying was that drivers were in too much of a 
hurry. 
6.3.8 Section Summary 
Compliance with overhead gantry signals has been shown to be very variable. A 
total of 60 incidents and 105 red "X" matrix signal activations were examined. The 
following was found: 
23,788 offences of driving under a red "X" matrix signal were recorded, this 
represents 15.26% of traffic. 
396.47 average offences of driving under a red "X" matrix signal per 
incident, with 226.55 average offences of driving under a red "X" matrix 
signal per signal activation 
Average red "X" duration was 36 minutes 
Average rate of 8.73 offences per minute 
The average traffic speed was 9.55 mph less than the posted advisory or 
mandatory speed limit at the incident scene 
Offence rate varied with the time of day 
For multiple signal activation compliance was greater with the signals closest 
to the incident scene, but in general, compliance fell with the distance from 
the incident scene. 
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8. Many differences were found between the MIDAS section and the Controlled 
Motorway sections of the M25. 
In summary it can be concluded that motorway matrix signals are effective for the 
majority of the time but are completely reliant on motorists to comply with their 
instructions. Subsequently, although motorway matrix signals can be an effective 
tool in traffic management and delay reduction, matrix signals should not be solely 
relied upon for responder and motorist protection, and traffic management at an 
incident scene. 
6.4 The Effectiveness of Variable Message Signs 
6.41 Introduction 
Large strategic variable message signs (VMS) are now installed prior to every 
junction within the study area on the M25 and the majority of motorway gantries are 
also equipped with tactical VMS, spaced at nominal 1 kilometre intervals. These 
message signs are capable of displaying a variety of information, detailed in section 
6.2.1. VMS are used to provide motorists with information to increase safety and to 
influence route choice. The effect of this influence is however not completely 
understood. The section will examine the impact of incident delay warning messages 
on the Surrey police section of the M25. 
6.4.2 Background 
Several studies have reported wide ranging values of motorist reaction to messages 
displayed on variable message signs. Hidas and Awadalla (2003) reported evidence 
of traffic diversion in the range of 5% through 80% (Wardman et al., 1997). In 
London, Hounsell et al (1998) and Chatterjee et al (2002) surveyed driver's views on 
VMS with 54% of responders stating they would divert at the very next opportunity, 
when presented with an accident delay message on VMS. Approximately a third of 
drivers (32%) however stated that they would not divert at all. Another 
questionnaire study (Swann et al., 1995) found that drivers diverted in 16% of the 
cases when a message indicated there was a problem on their route in the Forth 
Estuary area, near Edinburgh. Another study in Scotland, Messmer et al. (1998), 
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also using questionnaires, showed that drivers expressed higher levels of confidence 
with the accuracy of information displayed by VMS when compared to other sources 
of traffic information. In and around Amsterdam, Emmerink et al (1996) reported 
that VMS or Route Information Amsterdam signs "sometimes" influenced the 
behaviour of up to 70% of motorway users. They showed that women and 
commuters are more reluctant to be influenced by this information and that flexibility 
of arrival time is of no importance in VMS influence, with drivers who have the 
possibility of late arrival at their destination less inclined to change their route. 
Tarry and Graham (1995) assessed the impact of VMS upstream of key decision 
point junctions when the most commonly used messages were displayed on the 
Midland Driver Information System (MDIS) in the Midlands area of the UK. They 
found diversion rates of 27% through 40% when messages reporting accidents with 
instructional advice to use the West route around Birmingham were displayed. 
When messages displaying warnings of congestion, but no instructional advice, were 
used the diversion rate was much lower, 2-5%. 
Much research has also suggested that motorist response is highly dependent on 
message content, subjects network knowledge and on the extent of any implied 
diversion (Hato et al., 1995; Thao et al., 1995; Bonsall et al., 1995; Bonsai! and 
Merrall, 1997; Bonsall and Palmer, 1998; Mast and Ballas, 1976 and Wardman et al. 
1997). 
6.4.3 Data Description 
Three sets of data were used to assess the influence of Variable Message Signs on the 
M25 
Godstone Incident Data 
Detailed in section 4.3.2. 
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Variable Message Sign Databases 
Whenever a message sign is activated on the road network the following information 
is recorded: 
• Date and time of signal activation 
• Who set the sign (Either automatic through MIDAS or manually by a 
controller) 
• The type of sign 
• The location of the sign (Including motorway, marker post and carriageway) 
• The aspect (legend) set 
• The reason for setting 
• Date and time of de-activation 
• Any faults are also recorded 
This information is recorded at the relevant police control office from where the 
signs were set and provides a legal record of all settings. The relevant information 
for this study was obtained in database form from Mott MacDonald, Glasgow, who 
maintain the records or the Highways Agency. 
MIDAS Traffic Data 
The Motorway Incident Detection and Signalling (MIDAS) system records traffic 





• vehicle length category 
The data is stored in binary form and a program called TDAS (Traffic Data Analysis 
System) version 1.0 is used, within Microsoft Access, to extract relevant information. 




VMS activation databases were examined for operator set messages giving advanced 
warning of incident related delays over the study area for the study period. These 
messages were then matched with incidents recorded in the Godstone incident data. 
This data was then used to identify the required MIDAS traffic flow data. All of the 
information was then filtered for consistency and accuracy giving a total of 7 
incidents with 25 VMS activations. 
MIDAS traffic flow data was analysed at every off-slip road downstream of an 
activated VMS for the period of sign activation as recorded in the databases. 
6.4.5 Results 
Example 1 
Example Incident No. 93, J8 Slip Road Flow (4497J) 
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Figure 6.25 VMS Effectiveness Junction 8 Slip Road Traffic Flow - Example 1 
A suicide occurred on 08/11/2003 at 4696A on the M25, between junctions 9 and 10, 
Godstone study incident number 93. The incident occurred at 10:01, lanes were 
cleared at 12:37 and the incident was all clear at 13:35. Six VMS signs, with 
motorist information, were activated at approximately 10:35 at 4435A (J647), 
4442A (J6-J7), 4474A (J748), 4483A (J7-J8) and 4598A (i849), with relevant logs 
shown in table 6.13. Traffic flows were taken at the three slip roads off the 
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motorway downstream of the VMS signs at junctions 7 (4455J), 8 (4497J) and 9 
(4617J). VMS activations and de-activations are shown as red lines on figure 6.25 
and 6.26. 
Table 6.13 VMS Effectiveness VMS Logs - Example I 
Settings Arctve  
Log Counter OnDatelime By Type Device Aspect Code Reason OffDateTime 
8182 08111/2003 10:34.54 OIF 4 MSS MSS M2514435A LONG DELAYS AFTER J9 ACCIDENT 08/11/2003 124523 
8183 08/11/2003 10:34:54 OIF 4 MSS MSS M25/4474A LONG DELAYS AFTER JO ACCIDENT 08/11/2003 1243:59 
8184 08/11/2003 10:34:55 OIF 4 MSS MSS M25/4483A ACCIDENT AFTER JO ACCIDENT 08/11/2003 12:43:50 
8185 08/11/2003 10:35:00 OIF 4 MSS MSS M2514442A ACCIDENT AFTER JO ACCIDENT 08/11/2003 12:45:10 
8186 08/11/2003 10:35:51 OIF 4 MSS MSS M23/3336B M25 J9 ACCIDENT ACCIDENT 08/11/2003 12:44:35 
8187 08/11/2003 10:35:53 IF 4 MSS MSS M23133278 LONG DELAYS AFTER JO ACCIDENT 08/11/2003 12:44:24 
8188 08/11/2003 10:37:40 OIF 4 MSS MSS M25/4 598A ACCIDENT AFTER J9 ACCIDENT 08/11/2003 11:37:34 
8194 08/11/2003 11:37:34 AUTO MID MSS MSS M25/4598A QUEUE AHEAD AUTOMATIC 08/11/2003 11:41:34 
8198 08/11/2003 11:41:34 AUTO MID MSS MSS M2514598AI ACCIDENT AFTER J9 AUTOMATIC 08/11/2003 12:42:22 
At 4455J (J7) only limited if any response to signal activation was seen but at 4497J 
(J8), figure 6.25, and 4617J (J9) figure 6.26, the flow on the slip road increases 
greatly following the sign activation. At junction 8 the flow increases approximately 
47% from approximately 560 vehicles per hour to approximately 1060 vehicles per 
hour and equates to an increase of approximately 1130 less vehicles joining the 
queue ahead. At junction 9 a flow increase can also be seen, increasing from 
approximately 420 vehicles per hour to 870 vehicles per hour, a 52% increase. 
Approximately 907 extra vehicles used the slip while the signs were activated. It 
should be noted however that the flow is a lot less stable than junction 8 and may 
have been influenced by the length of queue from the incident. 
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Figure 6.26 VMS Effectiveness Junction 9 Slip Road Traffic Flow - Example 1 
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Example 2 
On 05/12/2003 a vehicle overturned between the slip roads at junction 8 (4506B) of 
the anticlockwise M25. The incident occurred at 11:50 and blocked 2 lanes, all lanes 
were opened and the incident was cleared by 13:04. Six VMS signs were activated 
at 12:07 by Traffic Control Centre (TCC) at 4876B (J13—J12), 4838B (J1241 1), 
4764B (JI 1-J10), 4756B (ii 1-J10), 4677B (J 1049)and 4669B (J 1049). Traffic 
flows were taken at four junctions downstream of the VMS signs at junctions 12 
(4843L), 11 (4806L), 10 (4727L) and 9 (4637L) 
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Figure 6.27 VMS Effectiveness Junction 9 Slip Road Traffic Flow - Example 2 
The flows at the junctions 12, 11 and 10 slip roads (4843L, 4806L and 4727L) show 
that there was very little or no reaction to the VMS message. The flow at junction 9 
(figure 6.27) however shows a clear reaction to the VMS signal activation, increasing 
flow from approximately 625 vehicles per hour to 860 vehicles per hour, a 27% 
increase. 
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Table 6.14 VMS Effectiveness VMS Logs - Example 2 
Settings Arthrve 
Log Counter OnDateTime By Type Device Aspect Code Reason Oft DateTime 
6023 05/1212003 12:07.57 AUTO ICC MSS MSS M25/4669B M25 J9-J8 ACCIDENT AUTOMATIC 05/12/2003 133457 
6024 05/12/2003 12:07:58 AUTO TCC MSS MSS M254838B M25 J9-J8 ACCIDENT AUTOMATIC 05122003 1307 31 
6025 05112/2003 12:07:59 AUTO TCC MSS MSS M2514756B M25 J9-J8 ACCIDENT AUTOMATIC 05/12/2003 1307:32 
6026 05/12/2003 12:07:59 AUTO TCC MSS MSS M25/4764B M25 J9-J8 ACCIDENT AUTOMATIC 05/1212003 13:07:32 
6027 05/12/2003 12:07:59 AUTO TCC MSS MSS M2514876B M25 J9-J8 ACCIDENT AUTOMATIC 05/1212003 13:07:32 
6028 05112/2003 12:08:011 AUTO TCC MSS MSS M2514677B I 	M25 J9-J8 ACCIDENT I AUTOMATIC 05/121200313:07:31 
6.4.6 Discussion 
In a number of cases, in terms of traffic flow, there were clear reactions to VMS 
legends with up to 52% increase of flow on the next downstream slip road recorded. 
In other cases however there was no reaction whatsoever. Success of a VMS 
message appears to be dependant on whether an appropriate diversion is available 
and the distance of the VMS message from the incident. For example, diverting 
between junction 8 and 6 to junction 5 is straightforward, with the A25 running 
parallel for some of the road's length, but easy diversions are not available at all 
exits. Local knowledge will also assist drivers with the choice of a diversion. 
Several incidents occurred during or continued through the peak periods of the day, 
therefore making it is very hard to see any effect of the VMS messages as the traffic 
flow was naturally increasing and decreasing with demand. There were also some 
data inconsistencies with loops failing sporadically. At several incidents the MIDAS 
system overrode the operator set messages, to warn of queuing traffic ahead, and 
reinstated it once the alert was cleared. This may have caused some motorists not to 
be warned of the non-recurrent delays ahead. 
A selection of mixed messages showing for example "Accident after junction X" 
followed on the next VMS by "Long delays after junction X" have the greatest 
impact. On the M25 there are an abundance of VMS in most locations so the above 
type of messages should be easily displayed. The blanket setting of messages on 
every available VMS should be avoided, especially long distances from an incident, 
as it could lead to sign blindness with motorists missing very import tactical 
messages from the police such as "Debris in road". Many motorists may also find 
this method very annoying, especially if they are not travelling as far as the incident. 
Some messages were somewhat vague, for example "M25 J745 Accident" possibly 
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leading to motorist confusion. As previously stated a combination of two messages 
could avoid these issues, one giving the problem and another giving the impact. 
6.4.7 Section Summary 
It has been shown that motorists do acknowledge the presence of VMS messages and 
in some cases react to them, with up to a 52% increase of flow at downstream slip 
roads recorded. The motorist diversion rates could be influenced by an appropriate 
alternate route and by the level of local knowledge of the motorists. 
As it has been shown that VMS messages influence motorist route choice, the use of 
VMS should be encouraged to provide more information. This in turn will reduce 
driver stress, increase safety, improve journey time reliability and minimise the 
effects of congestion and incidents. 
6.5 Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter has presented a review of motorway matrix signals and signs in use on 
the motorway and trunk road network in Britain and their functions. The 
effectiveness of matrix signals and signs was examined including compliance rates 
with mandatory signals and the impact of variable messages on driver route choice. 
Conclusions for each section are detailed below. 
Section Three 
An assessment of motorists' compliance with motorway matrix signals was 
presented. A total of 60 incidents and 105 red "X" matrix signal activations were 
examined. It was found that compliance with overhead gantry matrix signals is very 
variable. In addition, the following key findings emerged: 
. 23,788 offences of driving under a red "X" matrix signal were recorded, 
which represented 15.26% of traffic. 
• 396.47 average offences of driving under a red "X" matrix signal per 
incident, with 226.55 average offences of driving under a red "X" matrix 
signal per signal activation 
No 
• The average traffic speed was 9.55 mph less than the posted advisory or 
mandatory speed limit at the incident scene 
For multiple signal activation compliance was greater with the signals closest 
to the incident scene, but in general, compliance fell with the distance from 
the incident scene. 
Many differences were found between the MIDAS section and the Controlled 
Motorway sections of the M25. 
It was concluded that motorway matrix signals are effective for the majority of the 
time but are completely reliant on motorists to comply with their instructions. 
Subsequently, although motorway matrix signals can be an effective tool in traffic 
management and delay reduction, matrix signals should not be solely relied upon for 
incident responder and motorist protection, and traffic management at an incident 
scene. Motorway matrix signals should only be seen as a form of emergency traffic 
management that should be physically reinforced as soon as possible to ensure 
safety. 
Compliance rates could be improved by the use of enforcement cameras, but a more 
user friendly method would be to educate motorists of the reasons for the settings of 
signals and why they should be complied with. A national safety awareness 
campaign would be beneficial. 
Section Four 
This section assessed the impact of variable messaging signs on delay experienced 
by motorists, and consequently the level of reliance that should be put on the use of 
variable messaging signs in the management of traffic to reduce delay. 
It has been shown that motorists do acknowledge the presence of VMS messages and 
in some cases react to them, with up to a 52% increase of flow at downstream slip 
roads recorded. The motorist diversion rates could be influenced by an appropriate 
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7 Optimal Deployment Strategies for Incident Support Units 
7.1 Introduction 
Rapid response to traffic incidents is essential for the effective management of non-
recurrent congestion. As stated previously in section 5.4.3, the total delay due to an 
incident is proportional to the square of the incident duration, it can be seen that even 
a very short reduction in response times can have a large influence on an incident's 
impact. 
By optimally locating ISUs at strategic sites around the M25 road network their 
response time can be minimised to reduce the impact of incidents and also ensure 
that they comply with their contractual response time requirements. Goolsby (1971) 
found that a 2 minute reduction in response time saved 411 vehicle-hours of delay 
for a one-lane accident, reinforcing the importance of rapid response. 
This chapter will examine optimal deployment strategies for incident support units 
on the M25 road network. This will be completed via the development of a 
computer model that will determine the shortest response route for a particular 
network setup. This shortest response route in turn will produce the shortest travel 
(response) time for each ISU vehicle. Four location strategies will then be 
considered to optimally locate ISUs on the M25 and for each strategy the optimal 
number of ISUs is determined. The objective is to minimise the total travel time to 
incidents with the minimum number of ISU vehicles required to meet the service 
provider's contractual response time. 
This chapter is structured as follows: 
• Section Two. A background is presented on optimal deployment 
strategies. This includes a literature review of previous applications 
and methods. 
• Section Three. An introduction to network analysis is presented, 
including details on how to represent a road network as a matrix and 
obtain the shortest route and minimal travel time between locations. 
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Section Four. The development of the optimal deployment computer 
model and location strategies are discussed. 
• Section Five. The results from the computer model are summarised 
and discussed. The optimal strategy and number of ISUs is also 
presented. 
• Section Six. Once the M25 model had been validated, a more 
complex M25 Sphere model is considered. 
Section Seven. An operational comparison is presented to show the 
differences between theory and practice. 
• Section Eight. Chapter summary and conclusions. 
72 Background 
The problem of optimal deployment of ISUs is similar to that of emergency service 
locations. There has been much research into optimal placement strategies for 
emergency vehicles, such as police patrols in relation to crime and fire stations and 
paramedics in relation to high incident frequency areas. 
Many location-allocation models have been utilised to minimise response times, with 
the first by Cooper in 1964 (Cooper, 1964). A set covering model to locate 
emergency service facilities was proposed by Toregas et al. (1971), with the basic 
inputs to the model being: a set of demand points, a set of potential vehicle locations 
and a the set of demand points that can be covered by the specified location, within 
the accepted response time. 
Set covering models have been used by a number of authors in locating ambulances 
and other emergency service vehicles including Voltz (1971), Walker (1974), Plane 
and Hendrick (1977), Daskin and Stern (1981), Goldberg and Paz (1990) and 
Goldberg et al (1990). 
Toregas' model was however viewed as being too conservative in that an identical 
service was provided to every demand point, whether it was required or not. Church 
and ReVelle (1974) suggested maximising the number of covered demand locations 
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which could be covered within a specific service standard using a given number of 
vehicles. He used this maximum covering model for locating emergency vehicle 
depots. Later it was used by Eaton et al. (1985) to locate medical rescue services in 
the city of Austin, Texas. It was also used by Daskin (1982) and Belardo et al 
(1984). 
A fire engine relocation model by Kolesar and Walker (1974) was a dynamic model 
for emergency response. Any unassigned emergency vehicles in stations were 
optimally repositioned, when a fire-related incident occurred, to minimise the loss in 
coverage from the dispatched vehicles. 
A stochastic emergency response model employing a hypercube model for 
dispatching strategies and location plans was presented by Larson (1974). Based on 
the hypercube model, Larson (1975) presented an approximate procedure for 
computing selected performance characteristics of an urban emergency service 
system. 
The location of fire companies in Denver, Colorado, USA has been studied by Plane 
and Hendrick (1977). A hierarchical objective function for the set covering problem 
was developed. The level of fire service was held constant, while the costs were 
lowered. This paper resulted in a saving of approximately $1.2 million annually 
through the optimisation of the Denver fire department. 
A computer program for specifying the number of police vehicles which should be in 
a geographical area was developed by Chaiken and Dormont (1978). The program 
determined the minimum number of police vehicles needed to meet specified 
performance criteria. A further algorithm for deploying a crime directed patrol force 
was developed by Chelst (1978). The optimisation problem examined the police unit 
allocation within high crime zones to maximise the probability of a police patrol 
intercepting a crime. 
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A maximal expected covering location model for locating emergency response 
vehicles was proposed by Daskin (1983). It was based on the idea that during 
emergency times not all vehicles allocated to serve a particular zone in the network 
would be available. Zografos et al. (1993) used a districting model to obtain optimal 
locations of vehicles which would minimise the total average incident response 
workload per vehicle on freeways, subject to a constraint on the maximum number of 
available vehicles. 
Saccomanno and Allen (1988) presented a model for locating emergency response 
capability for hazardous goods transportation on a road network. The model was 
treated as a minimum set covering problem with a minimum acceptable level of 
response at all potential spill sites. Matrix reduction techniques were used to obtain a 
non-redundant set of candidate sights for response capability. The model was then 
applied to a rural road network in southwest Ontario, Canada. 
A mixed-integer programming model for the simultaneous location, dispatching and 
routing of incident response vehicles was developed by Daskin (1987). A similar 
model by Pal and Sinha (1997) also used the mixed-integer programming method to 
determine the optimal locations for response vehicles that minimised annual response 
vehicle costs, given the frequencies of incidents on the network, and constrained by 
the maximum number of vehicles. 
Nathanail and Zografos (1995) developed a simulation tool for evaluating the 
effectiveness of freeway incident response operations. A priority list of incidents 
was created so that when multiple incidents needed response the effect of loss in 
coverage was minimised. It was also noted that response from multiple vehicles to 
incidents could reduce the response time. 
Ball and Lin (1992) proposed a reliability model for emergency service vehicle 
location. The model used a set of demand points, a set of vehicles and a set of 
locations for vehicle depots to assess how reliable a system was at achieving targets. 
Ball viewed the problem as one of optimising the reliability of the system, where 
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failure was defined as the inability of a vehicle to respond to a demand call within an 
acceptable amount of time. 
Of more relevance to this study are the papers by Zografos et al (1993), Wilminik 
and Immers (1996), Petty et al (1997) and Joseph and Chang (2002). 
Zografos et al (1993) attempted to optimally deploy a fleet of traffic-flow restoration 
units (TFRUs) to minimise freeway incident delays from incidents. By reducing the 
dispatch and travel (response) time of the TFRUs they expected to produce 
substantial savings in incident delay. Wilminik and Immers (1996) applied a model 
to determine possible locations of additional tow truck services in the road network 
around Utrecht in Holland. Using a simulation model they evaluate various location 
strategies and number of vehicles. They found that if the allocation of vehicles is 
based on shortest travel time total incident delay was reduced by 6%. Additionally if 
an additional tow vehicle was made available during peak hours peak delays would 
be reduced by 42%. Petty et al (1997) presented a methodology for determining the 
optimal locations for freeway service patrol tow trucks. They demonstrated their 
methodology on the 1-880 interstate near Los Angeles, using estimated benefit cost 
values. Finally Joseph and Chang (2002) used an inter-programming method to 
locate emergency response vehicles on the capital beltway around Washington DC. 
They demonstrated that four units could be optimally placed to provide a reduced 
average response time of 5 minutes. 
7.3 Network Analysis 
Since time began, man has used primitive forms of optimal location, whether he was 
looking for a place to live or for defence. This may have centred on personal 
demands for food, water and safety but it demonstrates how long this process has 
been in existence and how much it has advanced to its present day form. 
7.3.1 Basic Definitions 
To analyse a network the road network must be reduced to its most basic form, 
consisting of nodes joined by links. By definition the links in a highway network are 
stretches of highway. The network must be simplified so that information about the 
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direction, shape and length are ignored whilst emphasising the essential structure, 
stating which locations (nodes) are linked directly and which are not. 
It 
Figure 7.1 Original Road Network. 
P4  
P3 
Figure 7.2 Simplified Road Network. 
For example figure 7.1 shows roads linking four towns (links joining nodes). In 
figure 7.2 the road network is simplified in such a way that the links are shown as 
straight lines. This emphasises the essential structure of the network through 
confining itself to stating which places are linked directly and which are not. In 
network analysis figure 7.2 represents the kind of network which is termed a Graph. 
The branch of mathematics which concerns itself with studying the properties of 
figures like this which consist of points and lines joining them is called graph theory. 
In the notation of graph theory the places (points or nodes) on the network are called 
vertices and each route or link joining two places is called an edge. 
In reducing the network to its essential structure, the following guidelines must be 
adhered to: 
. Each network has a finite number of places 
• Each link joins two different places 





Graph theory can be viewed as a part of a type of geometry called topology. 
Topology is a very basic kind of geometry concerned with those properties which 
remain unchanged under continuous transformations of the object. Topology is 
mainly concerned with whether objects are connected or not. It is not primarily 
interested in the length or orientation of their links. 
Therefore in terms of topology all of the networks and graphs shown below, in figure 
7.3, are identical. 
Figure 73 Diagrams of Example Networks. 
The topological distance between two places is the number of edges on the shortest 
path between them. In the above networks (figure 7.3) the topological distance from 
AtoDisl, from AtoBis2 and from AtoFis3. This is true in all of the four 
graphs as they are identical topologically. Topology measures links on a binary scale 
of measurement (either I or 0). If two places are linked this is recorded as a "1". 
Zero indicates the absence of a link. 
7.3.2 Network Connectivity 
The networks shown in figure 7.3 have 5 edges and just enough links to make it 
possible to travel from any of its 6 vertices (v) to any other. Networks with (v-I) 
links are called branching networks or trees. In these networks the following rules 
apply: 
There is only one path between any two places and 
No circuits are possible - return journeys follow the same path as the outward 
journey. If the number of links was to equal the number of nodes then circuits 
would be possible. 
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Columns (Destinations) 






River networks have the same form as branching networks though they only flow in 
one direction. 
Given a graph or network with v vertices and e edges the beta index () provides us 
with a very simple measure of connectivity by taking the number of links as a ratio 
of the number of nodes. 
[Eq.7.1] 
In figure 7.3, 8 = 5/6. The greater the connectivity, the larger is 9. A network 
with no links has /1=0. 
Representing Networks as Matrices 
Any graph or network can be represented by a matrix. The example shown in figure 
7.4 demonstrates how to represent a network as a matrix. The rows and columns of 
the matrix represent the nodes of the network. 
Figure 7.4 Example Network and Connectivity Matrix 
When placed in a row, the node is being considered as an origin of a route and when 
placed in a column, as a destination. When a direct link exists between an origin and 
a destination a 1 is placed in the appropriate element, aij, of the matrix and a 0 if there 
is no direct link. There is a link from the first node to the second node therefore the 
cell in the first row and second column of the matrix contains a I. There is no direct 
link from the first node to the third node therefore the cell in the first row and third 
column of the matrix contains a 0. By convention diagonals are given a value of 0 as 
there is no link between a node and itself. Therefore this connectivity matrix 
essentially includes all the main information contained within the network and has 
the additional advantage that it makes the information easy to manipulate 
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mathematically. The matrix in figure 7.4 demonstrates how symmetry about its main 
diagonal axis shows that two way traffic is permitted on all routes. The connectivity 
matrix can just as easily represent one way travel by entering a value of I in element 
aii if flow is allowed from node i to node j and a value of 0 in element a, j if flow is 
not allowed in the other direction. 
7.3.3 Shortest Route and Minimal Travel Times 
If the connectivity matrix is squared, the resulting matrix gives the number of two-
link routes between nodes. If the initial connectivity matrix is cubed, it then gives 
the number of three-link routes and so on. Using the respective link length and link 
speed it is then possible to establish the shortest time between any two nodes. The 
result of this is a matrix containing the minimum route times from every node to 
every other node where a route is possible. 
The shortest route between any two nodes in a network can be found using the 
following method: 
I. Define the connectivity of the network (i.e. take each individual node and 
state which other nodes it is directly linked taking into consideration the flow 
of traffic, also noting the link length and free-flow travel speed). 
Construct a connectivity matrix of dimensions i x j (where i = j = number of 
nodes in the network) containing one's and zero's using the connectivity data. 
For every element a ii in the connectivity matrix, calculate the duration of a 
journey along the route using the respective link length and link free-flow 
travel speed information (and any additional factors to take account of 
slowing due to congestion, etc.). Place this calculated value in element bij in 
a new route-times matrix. This matrix will eventually have dimensions i x j 
and contain the shortest times for all possible routes between all nodes. 
Apply a power of 2 to the initial connectivity matrix to produce a matrix 
which indicates how many two-link connections there are for every node. 
NM 
For every non diagonal element a,,.,, in the route times matrix that has yet to 
be assigned a value, look in the new powered matrix to see if there is a 
possible two-link route between nodes m and n. 
If there is a possible two-link route, use the route times matrix to find the 
instance where an element x in row m and element x in column n are non-
zero and find the sum of the two elements. If there are several possible two-
link routes between m and n (i.e. a value greater than I found in element in 
the new powered matrix) then find every instance where element x in row 
m and element x in column nare non-zero and compare the sums in each 
instance to find the lowest value and hence the shortest route. 
Put this shortest route time into the route times matrix as element b,,.,. 
Repeat for every element of the route times matrix. 
Repeat process 5, after applying a power increased by 1 to the initial 
connectivity matrix. 
Repeat until all possible route times have been found. 
The result of this is a matrix containing the route times from every node to every 
other node where a route is possible. 
This route times matrix is the main focus of this investigation. Once the route times 
matrix is obtained, various deployment strategies can then be investigated to 
establish the minimal total travel time to respond to incidents. 
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7.3.4 The Objective Function 
Integer variables are used to define whether a location is to be used as a position for 
an ISU. The following notation is used to represent the location problem: 
j 	Indicates an incident site 
i 	Indicates the possible location of an ISU 
K 	Is the number of ISUs provided 
I 	Indicates the set of possible locations for ISUs 
J 	Indicates the set of possible incident sites 
Pj 	Probability that an incident occurs at a particular site j. 
tii 	Travel time from location ito incident site j. 
The objective function of the formulations for ISU locations can be set to minimise 
the total travel time or the maximum response time. The formulation gives a 
placement similar to the strategy where the vehicles are close to the locations of high 
incident occurrence. 
Variables: 
Xi 	= I if an ISU is located at i 
=0 if not 
Z U 	= 1 if an ISUati serves site j 
=0 if not 




Minimising the result of this function will minimise the expected total travel time. 
This can be constrained with the condition: 
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This ensures that the number of vehicles located is not greater than the number 
available. The constraint: 
z il < x 
ensures that only if an ISU is located at a particular site, an incident can be served by 
that location. 
The constraint: 
I z =1 
iE I 
means that each possible incident site needs to be served by only one vehicle. Using 
this function it is possible to evaluate possible vehicle arrangements. 
7.4 Computer Modelling 
The model was constructed within Mathworks' MATLAB software. MATLAB is a 
technical computing language and interactive environment for algorithm 
development, data visualisation, data analysis, and numeric computation. All of the 
data for the model was input into Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, to simplify data 
processing. 
To establish the effectiveness of the model the main M25 motorway ring was 
constructed first, before the more complicated M25 Sphere road network. 
7.4.1 Node Definition 
The M25 consists of 33 junctions numbered sequentially (IA, 113, 2, ..., 29, 30, 31). 
Each junction is specified as a node and is numbered sequentially, giving 66 nodes in 
total. These will be joined by one-way links. Each junction will be represented by a 
pair of nodes with each being linked by additional links of negligible length. These 
additional links preserve connectivity without interfering with travel times or 
statistical analysis. As there are clockwise and anti-clockwise carriageways with 
only one-way traffic, two separate rings are defined, joined at the nodes (junctions). 
Accurate location information was obtained from Carillion's ISU CAD data as it 
records all incident locations using the Global Positioning System (GPS) to aid in 
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dispatching the ISUs to incidents. All marker posts, SOS boxes (emergency roadside 
telephones) or feature on the side of the carriageway, such as gateways, are contained 
within the data. This information was manually checked for consistency and 
accuracy. Finally, the locations were plotted on electronic 1:25000 scale Ordnance 
Survey maps, using GIS software, to ensure graphically the accuracy of locations. 
All of the location information was collated into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet table 
which defined the nodes and their coordinates, which is included in appendix C. 
7.4.2 Node Connectivity 
Once the network's nodes had been defined they needed to be connected. Node 
connectivity was manually calculated and inputted into a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet table. This worksheet contained all information to be inputted into the 
connectivity matrix. A selection of the Excel file is shown in appendix D 
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1 
Figure 7.5 Plot of the M25 as a Transport Network. 
253 
1 
7.4.3 Network Model 
With the network's nodes and connectivity now defined the M25 model could be 
examined. The graphical plot, from MATLAB, of all nodes and links is shown in 
figure 7.5. The two carriageways separated by short links can be clearly seen. A 
copy of the MATLAB script is shown in appendix E. 
7.4.4 Incident Demand Rates 
Using two years of historical Carillion ISU CAD data the incident frequency of each 
carriageway section (link) was established. Therefore each link within the network 
has a separate demand rate and incidents can occur on any of the 66 links between 
junctions. The variation in incident frequency across the network is shown in figure 
7.6 with thicker link lines representing higher incident frequency. 
Figure 7.6 Plot of the M25 as a Transport Network with Incident Probabilities 
Represented by Line Thickness. 
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7.4.5 ISU Response Speed and Range 
The optimal location of the ISUs is dependent on how far they can travel within their 
contractual 20 minute response time. Their range is entirely dependent on the 
average speed they can achieve between notification of the incident and arrival at the 
scene. A conservative approach has been chosen in that the average assumed 
response speed is 20 mph. This is equivalent to having to respond the full distance 
using only the hard shoulder which has a nominal 20 mph speed limit for safety. 
Table 7.1 shows the response ranges depending on average response speed over 20 
minutes. It can be seen that in free flowing traffic the range available would be much 
greater. 
An ISU located at a node on the clockwise carriageway could serve incidents just as 
well if it was positioned on the same node but on the anti-clockwise carriageway. 
Therefore, there are effectively 33 possible ISU locations. 
Table 7.1 Response Speeds and Ranges. 
Speed (MPH) Speed (KPH) Range (Miles) Range (Km) Remarks 
10 16 3.33 5.33 
20 32 6.67 10.67 Hard Shoulder Limit 
30 48 10 16 
40 64 13.33 21.33 
50 80 16.67 26.67 
60 96 20 32 LGV Speed Limit 
70 112 23.33 37.33 Motorway Speed Limit 
7.4.6 Travel Time 
An incident can occur at any point along a link. Should an incident occur on a link 
just short of a junction, and should an ISU be stationed at that particular junction, it 
cannot simply travel the short distance back along the link to the incident in the 
contra-flow link direction. The travel time to an incident on an incident therefore 
includes the time taken to travel along the entire length of that link. 
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7.4.7 Location Strategies 
There are many ways to position ISUs on a road network. Previous methods have 
included just using practical experience to deploy vehicles or using a length of string 
equivalent to the response time and speed lain over a map of the road network. 
The different proposed strategies will be compared by defining a quantitative factor 
that measures the strategy's effectiveness. The cumulative travel time (response 
time) will be used: 
Cumulative travel time = 	number of incidents x 1 mm (T) 
rE, 	
j€J 
In addition to a lower cumulative travel time, ISUs should experience lower running 
costs and potentially more time available for routine network maintenance. 
Four ISU location strategies will be examined: 
Even spacing - junctions 




The simplest strategy employed will involve spacing ISUs evenly around the road 
network by junction. Ideally this would give good overall coverage to respond to 
incidents which can occur anywhere. However due to the random nature of 
motorway junctions which are spaced at unequal distances, potentially this can leave 
areas of poor coverage where there are long stretches between junction. Areas where 
junctions are very close together subsequently will have very unnecessary high ISU 
coverage. 
Strategy Two 
The second strategy is similar to the first, in that it also spaces the ISUs evenly 
around the road network, however this strategy's spacing is calculated on distance. 
The results for this strategy should be an improvement on that of strategy one, 
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making better use of the ISU resources and spreading them more consistently around 
the network. 
Strategy Three 
Strategy three uses historical traffic flow data to locate ISUs in order to cover 
incidents where they will have the greatest impact. This strategy is intended to 
minimise the congestion related with incidents by giving a higher priority to areas 
where more motorists would be affected by an incident. 
Strategy Four 
Finally, strategy four involves using historical ISU CAD records to position the ISUs 
at locations with the highest probability of incident occurrence. This strategy will 
generally reduce response times to most incidents as on average there is greater ISU 
coverage in areas of high incident occurrence. Areas of low incident probability will 
consequently experience higher response times. 
7.4.8 Model Assumptions 
• This model assumes that the responding ISUs are always available and 
always at their allocated location. In reality however the ISUs may already 
be dealing with an incident, carrying out minor maintenance tasks on the 
network or the ISU operatives may be having a break. It should be noted 
though that these tasks may actually reduce response times as well as increase 
them depending on the vehicle location. 
. An assumption is made that the travel speed of the ISU vehicle is fixed. A 
worst case scenario was taken in that the speed was 20mph, the highest speed 
allowed on a hard shoulder. The further assumption is therefore that the hard 
shoulder will always be clear - one which may not always be true in reality. 
• In considering the distributions of incidents, the optimisation model has 
assumed that incidents occur at the nodes. This of course may not occur in 
reality. 
• This model also does not account for the time taken at junctions, for example 
changing directions while responding to incidents. 
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7.5 Results 
The four specified strategies were examined for 1 to 20 ISUs. The results from the 
analysis are shown in table 7.2. It can be seen there is great variability between the 
presented strategies. The four strategies are also shown graphically in figure 7.7. 
Strategy One 
Strategy one used even spacing based on junctions. For 20 ISUs it was the third best 
strategy with a total estimated incident response time of 144.57 vehicle hours. As 
already stated, due to the random nature of motorway junctions spaced at unequal 
distances, some areas were left with poor coverage where others had unnecessary 
high ISU coverage. As the number of ISUs was decreased the response improved in 
relation to the other strategies. This is due to the influence of junction distances 
having less of an effect. To guarantee 100% 20 minute ISU coverage a minimum of 
six vehicles would be required. 
Strategy Two 
Strategy two used even spacing based on distance. This strategy for 20 ISUs had the 
lowest total estimated incident response time, 63.7 vehicle hours. This is due to the 
even spacing of vehicles around the network providing consistent coverage. Strategy 
one also required the lowest number of ISUs, five, to provide 100% 20 minute 
coverage. 
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Table 7.2 Summary of ISU Location Strategies Results 
Total Incident Response Time (Hours) 
Number Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4 
of Even Spacing Even Spacing Traffic Flow Incident Frequency 
ISUs Junctions Distance Spacing Spacing 
20 144.57 63.675 240.135 66.34 
19 150.67 89.135 324.695 71.4 
18 - 152.32 92.01 325.67 108.44 
17 - 160.72 95.79 335.57 117.94 
16 - 164.42 105.24 344.22 132.36 
15 201.97 135.105 368.07 140.16 
14 215.885 156.395 379.37 145.36 
13 262,645 156.18 609.665 155.425 
12 - 299.12 212.95 627.265 194.05 
11 268.43 194.48 1074.005 226.945 
10 323.825 212.06 1075.655 246.91 
9 343.965 309.87 1100.735 256.85 
8 380.805 331.73 1148.135 338.98 
7 468.595 385.59 1505.155 512.365 
6 492.37 424.885 2017.51 565.69 
5 708.595 518.295 2230.635 705.61 
4 849.41 630.75 2312.21 842.41 
3 990.095 964.25 2412.36 1022.245 
2 1340.95 1356.83 2561.355 2324.325 
1 2740.895 2740.895 2652.255 2662.2 
Strategy Three 
Strategy three used the historical traffic flow records to distribute ISUs around the 
network. This was the worst of the four strategies with almost four times the total 
estimated incident response time of strategy two. It also required the most ISU 
vehicles, thirteen, to guarantee 100% 20 minute coverage. As this strategy only 
utilised traffic flow data it meant that the majority of vehicles were all grouped 
around the busier south western sections of the M25 rather than being spread across 
the network. This resulted in some incidents having very short response time but 
also some having very high. 
Strategy Four 
Strategy four used historical incident data to distribute ISUs around the network. 
This strategy achieved the second best results with 20 ISUs, very close to strategy 
two. As the number of ISUs dropped below eight the performance did not match 
strategy two however but did match strategy one, also requiring six ISUs to 
guarantee coverage. This strategy meant that the majority of incidents were attended 
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within a short time but as the ISUs were concentrated around these high incident 
locations other areas experienced larger response times. 
Figure 7.7 Comparison of ISU Location Strategies 
7.5.1 Summary 
It can be seen that there is great variability between ISU deployment strategies. 
Strategy two, using even spacing based on distance, was shown to be the best to 
locate ISUs on the M25. This strategy only required five optimally positioned ISU 
vehicles to guarantee a 20 minute response time to incidents given a response speed 
of 20 mph and thus is proposed as the optimal deployment strategy for the M25 
network. 
A plot of this deployment strategy, represented by red circles, placed on the M25 
network is shown in figure 7.8. However, whilst it has been shown that this is an 
optimal deployment strategy for the M25 network, it does not consider the whole of 
the M25 Sphere. The next section discusses the widening of the investigations to 
cover the whole network. 
PMI 
Figure 7.8 Plot of M25 Network Showing Optimal ISU Locations. 
7.6 M25 Sphere 
The model shown in figure 7.8 is a 33 node network of the M25 motorway. In reality 
Carillion manage the more complex 236 node M25 Sphere and thus consideration 
needs to be made of the modelling of such a network. 
As before all of the location information was collated into a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet table which defined the nodes and their coordinates. For this network 
however there were many more nodes than the M25. Emergency turnaround points 
were added to the main M25 ring and all other M25 Sphere roads, including the 
Ml 1, M20, M23, M26, M4, A 1(M), Ml, A3 and M3, were also added to the node 
definitions. By adding these other roads it necessitated a more complex definition of 
each junction, thus increasing the number of nodes, to allow access for ISUs to reach 
incidents. Several junctions were simplified from their real geometry as this is not 
required for the network analysis. In total the M25 Sphere network required 236 
nodes to be manually defined. 
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Once the nodes had been defined the node connectivity was defined. This was far 
more complex than the M25 network and required 497 links to be defined. The 
much larger number is mainly due to the increased complexity of junctions defined 
within the network. 
As with the M25 network all node definitions and connection information was 
manually checked for consistency and accuracy. Additionally the network was 
plotted on electronic 1:25000 scale Ordnance Survey maps, using GIS software, to 
ensure graphically the accuracy of locations. A graphical plot, from MATLAB, of 
all nodes and links is shown in figure 7.9. 
Figure 7.9 Plot of the M25 Sphere as a Transport Network. 
Incident demand rates and ISU response speed were applied as detailed above in 
sections 7.4.4 and 7.4.5. 
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7.6.1 Modelling 
The new M25 Sphere was then run to evaluate the shortest route and minimal travel 
times for the network to evaluate new complete ISU strategies. The same method as 
the M25 network was utilised as detailed in 7.3.3. 
Unfortunately the revised model for the M25 Sphere however did not run 
successfully. It is thought that the model required too many iterations were required 
and that limitations with the developed MATLAB program would not allow full 
analysis of all values. This is clearly an area for further work. 
7.7 Operational Comparison 
Currently on the M25 Sphere Carillion operate a fleet of sixteen ISUs who have on 
average a response time of approximately 12 minutes for the complete M25 Sphere, 
not just the M25 ring. These vehicles are currently located around the network using 
practical experience. They currently achieve their contractual 20 minute response 
time approximately 95% of the time. The missed 5% is usually due to extraordinary 
circumstances or during peak periods where travel times are lengthened. 
Using the developed M25 network model with the selected location strategy 
(Strategy no. 2, discussed in Section 7.5.1) the ISUs would be expected to achieve 
complete coverage and an average response time of 16.6 minutes for five ISUs. 
Seven ISUs would be required to achieve a 12 minute response time using the same 
deployment strategy but would also add some redundancy to the system. 
A like for like operational comparison unfortunately can not be done due to the 
failure of the complete M25 Sphere model. It is likely though that this method of 
optimal deployment could provide operational savings for the service provider and 
an improved service for the general public. 
7.8 Chapter Conclusions 
To optimise the response times for a fleet of ISUs is clearly of utmost importance to 
the service provider. In the case of Carillion on the M25 Sphere, there is a 
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contractual obligation for a significant proportion of incidents to be responded to 
within 20 minutes during day time hours. To manage this, the service provider must 
therefore deploy the fleet of ISUs optimally. This deployment has two main factors: 
• the location of ISU vehicles, 
• the number of ISU vehicles. 
This chapter has examined optimal deployment strategies for incident support units 
on the M25 road network via computer models which were developed to establish 
the shortest route and minimum travel times between any two nodes of the modelled 
road network. The approach used was to model just the M25 motorway (a network 
with a total of 33 nodes). A model of the whole of the M25 Sphere network (236 
nodes) was discussed in section 7.6 but this was shown to be too computationally 
complex to analyse in this study. The intention was to apply four location strategies 
to these models, each strategy considering a varying number of vehicles (1-20). 
These strategies were outlined in section 7.4.7. 
It was found that the strategy which provided a combination of the shortest response 
time for the lowest number of vehicles was strategy two (see figure 7.7) which was 
based on a geographically even distribution of ISUs around the network. The worst 
performing strategy was number three which was based on biasing the location 
towards those parts of the network with the greatest traffic flows. 
That strategy two should be the best performing is what would be expected - the 
strategy itself is based on the assumption that for the model's even traffic congestion 
(i.e. represented by a fixed speed) equal spacing will provide minimum response 
times. However, three of the strategies actually gave very similar results in that the 
optimal number of vehicles only varied by I vehicle. In reality, is this a practical 
strategy? It may not always be possible to locate an ISU at the location that the 
strategy indicated is the best position. The model is based on the assumption that 
ISUs are at nodes - i.e. junctions, but junction design, layout and operational 
differences may mean this is not always possible. 
The possible surprise in these results was with strategy number three. In this case the 
number of ISU vehicles needed to meet the 20 minute cut off was more than double 
that of the other three - 13 vehicles. Clearly this strategy was not ideal but closer 
inspection reveals that because these results were based on averages - the results are 
made up of the response times to incidents at each node, i.e. 33 - there were actually 
wide variations. A lot of incidents occurred in the higher traffic flow areas and these 
received very good response times - but this was at the expense of those incidents at 
the nodes that had lower traffic flows and thus, through the strategy, fewer ISUs. 
In reality the actual location of the ISU vehicles is based on somewhat more arbitrary 
decisions. By coincidence, Carillion have the same number of depots on the M25 
Sphere as the optimal number of ISUs shown by strategy two (five) and these are the 
default positions of the vehicles. They currently use a total of sixteen units (see 
section 7.7) but these need to service the whole of the M25 Sphere and the model 
only considers the M25 itself. Further, on a day to day basis the location for any one 
vehicle can and will change. The main principle is that they are located in 'safe' 
areas - of which there are many, such as service areas or larger junctions - but as 
Carillion also employ the ISUs to do maintenance also they could be at any single 
point on the whole network. Direct comparison is thus very difficult. 
What has been shown in this chapter is that it is possible to develop strategies for the 
optimal location of ISU vehicles. It has also shown that these strategies can meet the 
operational and contractual requirements for the network and that this management 
approach could work in a live situation. The model is flexible enough to allow for 
changes in incident frequency and locations or temporary network changes (such as 
highway renewals) and thus could be implemented easily. Further work needs to be 
done to enhance the model for more complex networks, such as the 236 node M25 
Sphere, but this is essentially a computationally more advanced version of the 
optimisation model presented. 
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8 Conclusions and Future Work 
8.1 Introduction 
It has been estimated that incidents on motorways and trunk roads in Britain account 
for approximately 25% of all congestion, which costs the British economy an 
estimated £750milIion a year (National Audit Office, 2005). Incidents represent any 
non-recurrent occurrence or unplanned event that creates a temporary reduction in 
roadway capacity, which in turn impedes the normal flow of traffic (TRB, 2003). 
Incident management programmes have been developed to mitigate non-recurring 
congestion from incidents. Incident management is the process by which incidents 
are cleared from the road returning them to normal traffic conditions. The purpose of 
incident management programmes is to rapidly detect, verify and clear temporary 
obstructions from roads to restore normal traffic flow as quickly as possible. In 
Britain the Highways Agency, as the operator of the British strategic road network, 
developed the Incident Support Unit (ISU) to support the effective management of 
incidents. 
This study has investigated the nature and impact of incidents and the incident 
management process on the M25 Sphere. This conclusion chapter will reflect on the 
work presented here in the following sections. 
. Section Two. This section will provide a summary of each chapter 
within the thesis. 
. Section Three. The original project aims and objectives will be re-
examined in this section with a conclusion of and how and where they 
were met 
. Section Four. Specific points that have emerged will be detailed. Key 
findings of interest or practical value and benefit will be detailed. 
Section Five. Finally, potential further work will be identified and 
discussed. 
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8.2 Thesis Summary 
A summary of each chapter within this thesis is presented below. 
• Chapter 1. Chapter 1 provided an overview of the problems addressed 
within this research study and the basic project approach and the methods 
used to address the problems. The research aims and objectives were also 
established. 
• Chapter 2. Chapter 2 presented an examination of the motorway 
incident management process and provided a background to this work on 
the M25 London Orbital Motorway. The five stages of incident 
management- detection, verification, response, clearance and recovery-
were detailed, with programme stakeholders identified and their roles and 
responsibilities at motorway incidents examined. An introduction to the 
M25 London orbital motorway was also presented, including the history, 
future and current maintenance and management arrangements. The 
Highways Agency's approach to incident management in Britain was also 
described with their response capabilities through Incident Support Units 
and Traffic Officers examined in detail. Finally an incident management 
programme comparison between Britain and four US states was carried 
out. 
Chapter 3. Chapter 3 presented a review of the ISU service on the M25 
motorway, operated by the HA's service provider Carillion plc, including 
quantitative (analysis of incident data) and qualitative examinations (via 
questionnaire survey), and a benefit-cost estimation. An analysis of ISU 
attended incidents, an estimation of ISU benefits and qualitative police 
and ISU operative survey results was presented. 
• Chapter 4. Chapter 4 described the influence and role of ISUs on the 
M25 Sphere. A detailed study of all incidents which occur on the road 
network was undertaken. To enable this, motorway incident data was 
collected by the author through observing motorway operations at a 
police control room. 
• Chapter 5. Chapter 5 examined the influence of motorway incidents on 
traffic flow. Their impact on the capacity of the roadway was studied and 
the impact of rubbernecking investigated. Investigations and analysis 
were undertaken to evaluate the impact of incidents on motorways 
including the total delay experienced. 
• Chapter 6. Chapter 6 presented a review of motorway matrix signals and 
signs in use on the motorway and trunk road network in Britain. 
Applications of the discussed signals and signs were also detailed. The 
effectiveness of matrix signals and signs was examined. This included 
compliance rates with mandatory signals and the impact of variable 
messages on driver route choice. 
• Chapter 7. Chapter 7 examined optimal deployment strategies for 
incident support units on the M25 road network. This was completed via 
the development of a computer model that determined the shortest 
response route for a particular network setup. This shortest response 
route in turn produced the shortest travel (response) time for each ISU 
vehicle. Four location strategies were considered to optimally locate 
ISUs on the M25 and for each strategy the optimal number of ISUs was 
determined. The objective was to minimise the total travel time to 
incidents with the minimum number of ISU vehicles required to meet the 
service provider's contractual response time. 
8.3 Evaluation of Aims and Objectives 
In chapter 1, the original aims and objectives of this work were introduced. It is 
important that now, at the end of the work, these objectives are considered in the 
light of the research that took place, and conclusions made as to whether the 
objectives were met. 
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The four original objectives and their discussions follow: 
• Present a review of British incident management practices. This 
study presented a review of incident management practices in Britain and 
in the US in chapter 2 and satisfied this objective. The Highways 
Agency's approach to incident management in Britain, with particular 
emphasis on the M25 Sphere, was examined in detail, specifically their 
response capabilities through Incident Support Units and Traffic Officers. 
The key stakeholders in incident management on trunk roads were 
identified and their roles and responsibilities at motorway incidents 
investigated. This review has highlighted the importance of 
communication, coordination and cooperation in producing a successful 
incident management partnership, which in turn will return a reduction in 
delay associated with incidents and improve the safety of responders and 
motorists. 
• Produce a critical evaluation of the Incident Support Service on the 
M25 Sphere. A critical evaluation and review of the ISU service on the 
M25 Sphere was conducted using quantitative (analysis of incident data) 
and qualitative examinations (via questionnaire survey) methods and is 
presented in chapter 3. A benefit-cost estimation of the service was also 
presented. 
• A comprehensive analysis of incident characteristics, frequency and 
duration on the M25 Sphere. An analysis of incidents on the M25 
Sphere was undertaken to understand the key characteristics, frequency 
and duration of incidents. The analysis allowed the influence and role of 
ISUs on the M25 Sphere to be fully understood. Several sources of 
incident data were utilised for the analysis, including the collection of 28 
days of data by the author at a police control room on the M25. This 
collected data is one of the most valuable outcomes from this research, as 
such a comprehensive recording of incidents and subsequent incident 
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management operations has not been undertaken until now. Through the 
presentation of the results of this analysis in chapter 4 this objective has 
been satisfied. 
• Provide an optimal deployment strategy for Incident Support Units 
on the M25 Sphere. This objective has been partially satisfied by the 
development of an optimal deployment model for the M25 motorway. 
This was accomplished via computer models which were developed to 
establish the shortest route and minimum travel times between any two 
nodes of the modelled M25 road network. The approach used was to 
model just the M25 motorway (a network with a total of 33 nodes). A 
model of the whole of the M25 Sphere network (236 nodes) was 
discussed in section 7.6 but this was shown to be too computationally 
complex to analyse in this study. Four location strategies, outlined in 
section 7.4.7, were applied to these models with each strategy considering 
a varying number of vehicles. The optimal locations and number of ISU 
vehicles to satisfy the minimum contractual response time to incidents 
was then established, providing an optimal deployment strategy for ISUs 
on the M25. 
8.4 Specific Conclusions 
This section will detail specific points that have emerged during this research. Key 
findings of interest or practical value and benefit will be detailed below. 
1. An overview of the characteristics of incidents attended by ISUs on the M25 
Sphere road network for the period between September 2001 and August 
2003 has been shown. Incident frequency, timings and locations were 
examined. 
• ISUs attended on average 24 incidents per day. However a maximum of 
76 support requests were received on one day, showing the variability of 
demand. 
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• The majority of ISU requests, 24%, were for debris clearance. 
• The average response time for all ISUs was 12.5 minutes. This is 
considerably shorter than the contractually required 20 minute response 
time. 
• The frequency of support requests from the emergency services has 
steadily increased since the introduction of ISUs in September 2001. This 
shows the increasing recognition given to the ISUs by the emergency 
services. 
A positive response towards the ISU service on the M25 Sphere was received 
from the surveyed police officers. Overall feedback regarding the ISUs was 
positive and it can be concluded that the ISU service provided on the M25 
Sphere is of benefit. In addition, valuable feedback was received that could 
be used to improve the service. This has, in turn, been fed back to the service 
provider and these points are listed below: 
• Improvements could be made between ISU operatives and police officers, 
thereby improving efficiency and effectiveness. Additionally further 
training will now be offered to ISU operatives to improve safety. 
• Significant feedback has shown that future developments should focus on 
(1) Improved direct communications; (2) Improved use of mobile variable 
message signs and electric light arrows; and (3) improved integrated 
training between the various emergency and response services. 
• It is suggested that future work should include a repeat of the presented 
survey to continually assess performance. 
The cost effectiveness of the ISU service was investigated using an incident 
impact computer programme, IMPACT, to estimate incident induced delay. 
The model was modified and updated for use on the British motorway 
network and an analysis completed, detailing the impact of ISUs on the M25 
Sphere. The following can be drawn from the analysis: 
• IMPACT can be successfully adapted for use on the UK motorway 
network. 
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. It was estimated that ISUs reduced delay due to attended incident on the 
M25 by approximately 200,000 vehicle hours, or 11%. 
. This estimated delay saving equates to £2.08 million savings per year and 
an approximate benefit/cost ratio of 1.3:1. This shows that the ISU 
service is beneficial and that deployment and support of this service 
should be continued. 
The collection and analysis of motorway incident data on the south western 
part of the M25, from Surrey Police's Godstone motorway control room, was 
examined. Twenty-eight days of daily incident data was collected, through 
observations by the author. The data was examined and incident frequency, 
durations, locations and ISU involvement were established. The following 
are the key points that can be concluded from the analysis undertaken: 
• An average frequency of 16.1 incidents per day was observed, with the 
majority, 64.7%, breakdowns. 
• 31 % of incidents occurred in-lane. 
• ISUs were requested to attend 21.33% of all incidents, including 40% of 
all accidents, and had an average response time of 12 minutes. 
It was shown that it was possible to analyse data collected from motorway 
matrix signal accident activation records. The analysis of this data was 
however very labour intensive, requiring manual identification and summary 
of each incident. 
It was shown that incidents on motorways significantly reduce the available 
capacity of the road, by an amount greater than just the proportion of original 
capacity physically blocked. 
Rubbernecking can significantly reduce the flow and speed of traffic on the 
opposite carriageway to an incident. The safety of operatives and other 
motorists can also be compromised. Several factors were identified to have 
an influence on rubbernecking: 
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• roadway characteristics, 
• number and type of emergency vehicles, 
• vehicle lighting on scene (number of flashing blue lights), 
• severity of incident, 
• whether motorists can actually see the incident, 
• location of incident within carriageway 
• general light levels. 
It has been shown that it is possible to calculate the delay associated with 
motorway incidents. 
Compliance with overhead gantry matrix signals was found to be very 
variable. From a total of 60 incidents and 105 red "X" matrix signal 
activations, 23,788 offences of driving under a red "X" matrix signal were 
recorded, which represented 15.26% of traffic. It was concluded that 
motorway matrix signals are effective for the majority of the time but are 
completely reliant on motorists to comply with their instructions. 
It was shown that motorists do acknowledge the presence of VMS messages 
and in some cases react to them, with up to a 52% increase of flow at 
downstream slip roads recorded, following the activation of a message. 
Optimal deployment strategies for incident support units on the M25 road 
network were investigated. A computer model of the M25 motorway was 
developed and analysed with four different location strategies and different 
number of ISU vehicles. The strategy based on a geographically even 
distribution of ISUs around the road network was found to be the optimum 
strategy for meeting the contractual response time with the minimum number 
of vehicles. 
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8.5 Recommendations for Future Work 
A number of questions have been raised during this study which have been left for 
future research. The following are a selection of research topics that should be 
addressed in the future. 
8.5.1 ISU Qualitative Assessment Questionnaire 
In order to compare and contrast the results from the qualitative survey presented in 
chapter 3, regarding the assessment of the ISU service, the survey should be repeated 
for other Highways Agency areas. This would also help to enable "best practice" to 
be identified and implemented across the network. 
The presented ISU assessment questionnaire should also be repeated on the M25 
Sphere, every couple of years to ensure standard are maintained, if not improved. In 
particular, this would provide valuable information to the service provider regarding 
the quality of the provided service, and alert them to any issues, including concerns 
regarding the safety and the safe conduct of their operatives. Additionally the 
internal opinions and views of their operatives would be established. 
8.5.2 New Data Sources 
The management of traffic on British trunk roads has changed rapidly during this 
research project. The Highways Agency have gone from a network manager-
responsible for maintaining and building roads- to a network operator- becoming a 
first responder to incidents and providing front line incident management support to 
the emergency services. 
This new role has rapidly increased the volume of data that is and will become 
available from sources such as the Regional Control Centres and National Traffic 
Control Centre. These new information sources should be investigated to evaluate 
their value in assessing the incident management process. 
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8.5.3 Effect of Loop Detector Spacing 
Over the majority of the Highways Agency road network, where inductive loops are 
installed, they are spaced nominally at 500 metres. New pilot road projects such as 
the Active Traffic Management pilot have loops installed at 100 meters spacing. The 
effect of this spacing should be investigated. This increased spacing frequency will 
also enable more accurate estimations of the impact of incidents and new traffic 
management techniques and their influence on traffic flow than is currently 
available. 
8.5.4 Optimal Deployment 
An analysis into optimal deployment strategies should be undertaken for the full 
M25 Sphere road network. This would enable a realistic comparison to the actual 
operation to be undertaken. For this full examination, the use of marker posts as 
nodes would significantly increase the accuracy of the assessment. The demand rates 
for each marker post could be calculated, further enhancing the model. However the 
complexity of the network would be increased considerably which may prove 
impractical due to the volume of node definition and connectivity information. 
The accuracy of optimal deployment strategies could be improved with more precise 
estimation of the following factors: 
Influence of speed on response times. Instead of assuming an arbitrary 
speed between locations a realistic average response speed could be 
investigated. The use of new GPS and data logging equipment would 
enable the exact position of an ISU to be recorded, along with the amount 
of time and the route taken to the incident location. 
The amount of delay experienced at junctions. Whenever a responding 
vehicle has to change directions to an opposite carriageway they will 
experience delay. This delay could be estimated again by using new GPS 
tracking data. Delay estimates for each different junction could impact 
the chosen incident deployment strategy. 
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Appendix A RISC FDOT Incentive Towing Contracts 
Consistent with the FDOT Open Roads Policy, Florida's Turnpike Enterprise, who 
maintain Florida's toll roads, has adopted an innovative clearance strategy by 
implementing the Roadway Incident Scene Clearance (RISC) Program in order to 
significantly reduce the time it takes to clear major accidents and incidents. The 
program involves an enhanced contract with recovery operators that include 
incentives for quick clearance and disincentives for delayed clearance. Previously 
recovery operators were paid by the hour for their service with some unscrupulous 
operators "dragging their heals" to get paid more, which was not conducive to quick 
clearance. 
As part of the new contracts the recovery operator should respond to requests for 
vehicle recovery and clearance services within fifteen minutes, 24 hours a day, 7 
days a week. Once the recovery agent confirms the request they must arrive at the 
incident scene with all contractual equipment, personnel and vehicles within one 
hour. All RISC contractors are specially qualified with very heavy duty recovery 
equipment and highly trained operators who know how to safely and quickly clear 
roadways. The RISC program is in addition to the normal rotational tow list 
currently used by FHP for typical incidents on the Turnpike system. 
The contractor's initial response must include (FDOT Turnpike Enterprise, 2005): 
1. One 50-Ton Hydraulic, extendable, fixed boom, ultra heavy duty recovery 
wrecker with a boom structural rating of 100,000 lbs. A minimum of two 
planetary winches with a manufacturers rating of 50,000 lbs. each and 200 ft. 
of 3/4" cable. The boom should extend a minimum of 150" beyond the 
tailgate. The boom shall elevate to a working height of 21 ft. The truck 
chassis shall be a minimum of 62,000 lbs. gross vehicle weight. The unit 
shall be equipped with an under reach tow unit with a capacity of 50,000 lbs. 
The truck chassis must be designed for or reinforced for severe service. The 
drive line shall also be severe service and geared for the low end, high torque 
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applications frequently required for quick clearance and relocation of loaded, 
wrecked heavy trucks - in some cases while they are still overturned. 
One 35-Ton Hydraulic, extendable boom, heavy duty wrecker with a boom 
structural rating of 60,000 lbs. A minimum of two winches each with a 
35,000 lbs. manufacturers rating and 200 ft. of 3/4" cable. The boom shall 
extend beyond the tailgate a minimum of 120". The boom shall elevate to a 
working height of 18 ft. The truck chassis shall be a minimum of 50,000 lbs. 
gross vehicle weight. The unit shall be equipped with an under reach tow 
system with a capacity of 35,000 lbs. 
One Recovery Support Vehicle with an enclosed or utility body and a roof 
mounted DOT approved MUTCD Type B arrow board. The truck should be 
fully equipped with MUTCD traffic control devices (signs, sign stands and 
cones etc.) and the additional tools, equipment and material listed. 
Additionally the following heavy equipment and trucks must be available, if 
required: 
• One heavy-duty skid steer loader with bucket, broom, and fork attachments; 
• One tilt bed, hydraulic, lowboy semi-trailer with a 35 ton capacity, 48 ft. bed 
and a 20,000 lb. winch with 75 ft. of 5/8" cable; 
• I x Tandem axle tractor with a sliding fifth wheel; 
• I x Rubber tired, articulated, heavy construction end loader with a minimum 
2 yard bucket. 
Contractually, each recovery vehicle should carry at least the minimum of the 
following tools, supplies and rigging: 
• Alloy (grade #8) chain: 2 x 3/8"x 10', 2 x 5/8"x 10' and 4 x ½"x 10' 
• Two pair (4), wide profile, 50 ton, nylon recovery straps 
• Four heavy duty snatch blocks (working load matched to the wrecker) 
• Various hooks, clevis' and chokers (matched to the wrecker capacity) 
• 1 x High Pressure air cushion (24"x24") with control module and hose 
• 4 x 4-foot, hardwood timbers (4"0") 
• 8 x 2-foot, hard wood cribbing (4"x4") 
• I x Extension ladder (20ft) 
• I x 36" bolt cutters 
• 2 x BC Fire extinguishers (10 lbs.) 
• I x Long handle axe 
• I x Long handle shovels (flat blade) 
• 2 x Long handle shovels (round blade) 
• 2 x Street brooms 
• 4 x Wheel chocks 
• lx5 ft. Pike bar 
• 1 x Crow bars (36") 
• I x Sledgehammer (10-12 Ibs) 
• 2 x Large capacity trash cans 
• I x Hydraulic jack (20 ton) 
• I x Plug/spill kits, fully stocked 
• Angle iron or aluminium, wide flange various lengths 
• I x Complete brake release kit: (hand tools, hoses, glad hands, numerous 
fittings and brake caging bolts) 
• 2 x Heavy duty, Industrial flashlights 
• 12 x Thirty-six (36) inch, 121b. reflective traffic cones stamped with the 
FDOT certified product number 
• 4 Dozen 30-minute highway flares 
• 120 lbs. or 30 gal. of oil dry or approved absorbent 
• 50 ft. of rope (1/2") 
• 4 x load binders, transport chains and cheater pipe 
• I x Tarpaulin (20 ft x 20 ft.) 
• 2 x Rolls of duct tape 
• 2 x Sewer drain or inlet covers (mud flaps acceptable) 
• I x Complete mechanics hand tool set 
• 1 x Complete first-aid kit 
Also, each recovery support vehicle should carry at least the minimum of the 
following tools, supplies and rigging 
• 60 x Thirty-six (36) inch, 121b. reflective traffic cones stamped with the 
FDOT certified product number 
• 4 x Fabric, MUTCD approved Incident Mgt. Warning signs 
• 4 x Portable sign stands for 48" warning signs (see above) 
• I x Gas powered cut-off saw 
• 4 x 500-watt Auxiliary flood lights w/stands 
• 1 x Portable air compressor 
• I x Air impact wrench with sockets 
• I x Air powered metal chisel 
• I x Acetylene/Oxygen cutting torch 
• 2 x Bolt cutters (36") 
• 4 x Long handle shovels (flat blade) 
• 2 x Long handle shovels (round blade) 
• 2 x Aluminium or plastic coal or grain shovels 
• 4 x Street brooms 
• 1 x Adjustable drum moving dolly 
• 2 x Hand trucks 
• I x Pallet puller 
• i x Dock plate with clamps 
• 2 x Large Tarpaulins (20 ft. x 20 ft.) 
• 12 x 30-minute Highway flares 
• 200 lbs. or 50 gals. of oil dry or approved absorbent 
• 1 Roll of rubber floor runner (36" wide) 
• 10 lbs. of 16D nails 
• Numerous softwood 2x4 studs 
• 2 Rolls of heavy duty (80 gauge) stretch wrap with dispenser 
• 4 Rolls of duct tape 
• Sufficient load binders and securing chain for a 30 ton load 
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. 1 Case of heavy duty, 55 gallon trash bags 
• 1 Roll of heavy gauge plastic sheeting 
• I x Complete first-aid kit 
. 4 x pallets of filled dry sandbags (approximately 200 1/2-filled standard 
woven plastic sandbags). 
Once the recovery contractor has arrived at the incident scene with all contractual 
equipment and within the contractual response time they have ninety minutes, after 
the notice to proceed, to remove and clear all incident involved vehicles, cargo, 
debris and non-hazardous vehicle fluids from all travel lanes and open them to 
traffic. If this is achieved the contractor will receive a flat rate emergency response 
and mobilisation payment of $2,500. This quick clearance incentive is in addition to 
any compensation for actual vehicle recovery and towing services, which the 
recovery contractor would seek from the owner of the vehicle or their insurance 
company. If however the contractor is requested and arrives at the incident scene 
with all contractual equipment and within the contractual response time but are no 
longer required, they will be paid a flat rate service charge of $ 600.00. This 
payment will ensure that the contractor will always respond without the threat of not 
being paid. Any additional equipment that is requested from the recovery contractor 
would incur an additional Trucks and Heavy Equipment Response and Mobilization 
payment of $ 1,000. The contractor would receive no incentive performance 
payment if all travel lanes are not open to traffic ninety minutes after the notice to 
proceed. Also, if the contractor has not completed the removal and clearance of the 
vehicles, non-hazardous cargo, debris, and vehicle fluids after three hours from the 
notice to proceed, and all travel lanes are not open to traffic, they would be fined a 
flat rate of $ 600. An additional $600 would also be levied for each additional hour 
or $10 per minute it takes the contractor to completely open the roadway to traffic. 
The RISC scheme does appear to have many benefits, with recovery contractors 
responding very quickly with all necessary equipment to clear carriageways quickly. 
It is however questionable whether this system would increase safety as recovery 
contractors may "cut corners" to ensure quick clearance and bonus payments. 
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Appendix B Signal Law 
All motorway matrix signals are covered in law by the Traffic Signs Regulations and 
General Directions 2002 (HMSO, 2002) and if not complied with, offences are 
covered by the Road Traffic Act 1988 (HMSO, 1988) and the Road Traffic 
Offenders Act 1988 (HMSO, 1988). 
The Highway Code (HMSO, 2004) states the meaning of a red "X" with red flashing 
lights as "Do not proceed further in this lane" and rule number 232 also states: 
Red flashing lights: 
If red lights on the overhead signals flash above your lane (there 
may also be a red 'X') you must not go beyond the signal in that 
lane. If red lights flash on a signal in the central reservation or at the 
side of the road, you must not go beyond the signal in any lane. 
Within the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2002 a red "X" lane 
closure signal is covered by regulations 10(1), 10(2), 37 and 38 as well as directions 
46, 50, 51, 52 and 56. The signal is shown in diagram 6031.1 and is referred to as 
such within the document. The signal is described as a "light signals for the control 
of vehicular traffic on motorways and all purpose dual carriageway roads" and its 
meaning is expressed as "vehicular traffic proceeding in the traffic lane immediately 
below the signals shall not proceed beyond them in that lane". 
If the instructions of the signal, as detailed in the Traffic Signs Regulations and 
General Directions 2002, are not complied with, section 36 of the Road Traffic Act 
1988 will apply and the offenders will be prosecuted as per instructions within the 
Road traffic Offenders Act 1998 (HMSO, 1988) 
Below are the relevant extracts form the Traffic Signs Regulations and General 
Directions 2002 (HMSO, 2002), Road Traffic Act 1988 (HMSO, 1988) and the Road 
Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (HMSO, 1988). 
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Extracts from the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 
2002 (HMSO, 2002) 
Application of section 36 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 to signs and 
disqualification for offences 
10.- (1) Section 36 of the 1988 Act shall apply to each of the following signs - 
(k) the light signals prescribed by regulation 37 and shown in diagrams 
6031.1 and 6032.1 when indicating one of the prohibitions prescribed by 
regulation 38. 
(2) The following signs are hereby specified for the purposes of column 5 of the 
entry in Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 relating to 
offences under section 36 of the 1988 Act - 
(g) the light signals prescribed by regulation 37 and shown in diagrams 
6031.1 and 6032.1 when indicating one of the prohibitions prescribed by 
regulation 38. 
Light signals for the control of vehicular traffic on motorways and all purpose 
dual carriageway roads 
37. - (1) Subject to paragraph (4), light signals for the control of vehicular traffic 
entering or proceeding along a motorway, shall be - 
of the size, colour and type shown in diagram 6031.1 or 6032.1; and 
operated in accordance with the requirements specified in paragraph (2). 
(2) The requirements are that - 
(a) each lamp shall show an intermittent red light at a rate of flashing of not 
less than 60 nor more than 90 flashes per minute, and in such a manner 
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that the lights of one vertical pair are always shown when the lights of the 
other vertical pair are not shown; and 
(b) the red cross or the white symbol shown in diagram 6031.1 or 6032.1 
shall be illuminated by a steady light when the red lights are flashing. 
Light signals for the control of vehicular traffic entering or proceeding along 
an all-purpose dual carriageway road may also be the size, colour and type 
prescribed by paragraph (1) and operated in accordance with the requirements 
specified in paragraph (2). 
Light signals for the control of vehicular traffic - 
entering a motorway by means of a slip road; or 
entering a motorway which is a roundabout may, instead of complying 
with paragraphs (1) and (2), be of the size, colour and type prescribed by 
regulation 33 or 34. 
Significance of light signals prescribed by regulation 37(1) 
38. - The significance of the light signals prescribed by regulation 37(1) shall be as 
follows - 
when placed beside the carriageway of a road, they shall convey the 
prohibition that vehicular traffic on that carriageway (other than vehicles 
being used in the circumstances described in regulation 36(l)(b)) shall not 
proceed beyond the signals; and 
when displayed on a gantry over the carriageway, they shall convey the 
prohibition that vehicular traffic (other than vehicles being used in the 
circumstances described in regulation 36(1)(b)) proceeding in the traffic 
lane immediately below the signals shall not proceed beyond them in that 
lane, 
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Matrix signs for motorways and all-purpose dual carriageway roads 
46. - (1) a sign for conveying to traffic on a motorway or an all-purpose dual 
carriageway road information or a warning, requirement, restriction, prohibition or 
speed limit - 
(a) relating to or arising out of temporary hazardous conditions on or near 
the motorway or dual carriageway road; 
(5) Where a matrix sign mounted on a gantry or other structure is so placed that a 
traffic lane of the carriageway passes directly beneath it, the warning, 
requirement, restriction, prohibition or speed limit conveyed by the sign shall 
apply only to vehicular traffic facing that sign and proceeding along the traffic 
lane passing directly beneath it. 
Extracts from the Road Traffic Act 1988 (HMSO, 1988) 
Section 36 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 
36. - (1) Where a traffic sign, being a sign- 
of the prescribed size, colour and type, or comply with 
of another character authorised by the Secretary of State under the 
provisions in that behalf of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, 
has been lawfully placed on or near a road, a person driving or propelling a vehicle 
who fails to comply with the indication given by the sign is guilty of an offence. 
(2) A traffic sign shall not be treated for the purposes of this section as having 
been lawfully placed unless either- 
the indication given by the sign is an indication of a statutory prohibition, 
restriction or requirement, or 
it is expressly provided by or under any provision of the Traffic Acts that 
this section shall apply to the sign or to signs of a type of which the sign 
is one; 
ciIiI;1 
and, where the indication mentioned in paragraph (a) of this subsection is of the 
general nature only of the prohibition, restriction or requirement to which the sign 
relates, a person shall not be convicted of failure to comply with the indication unless 
he has failed to comply with the prohibition, restriction or requirement to which the 
sign relates. 
(3) For the purposes of this section a traffic sign placed on or near a road shall be 
deemed - 
to be of the prescribed size, colour and type, or of another character 
authorised by the Secretary of State under the provisions in that behalf of 
the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, and 
(subject to subsection(2) above) to have been lawfully so placed, unless 
the contrary is proved. 
(4) Where a traffic survey of any description is being carried out on or in the 
vicinity of a road, this section applies to a traffic sign by which a direction is 
given— 
to stop a vehicle, 
to make it proceed in, or keep to, a particular line of traffic, or 
to proceed to a particular point on or near the road on which the vehicle is 
being driven or propelled, being a direction given for the purposes of the 
survey (but not a direction requiring any person to provide any 
information for the purposes of the survey). 
(5) Regulations made by the Secretary of State for Transport, the Secretary of 
State for Wales and the Secretary of State for Scotland acting jointly may 
specify any traffic sign for the purposes of column 5 of the entry in Schedule 
2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 relating to offences under this 
section (offences committed by failing to comply with certain signs involve 
discretionary disqualification). 
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Road traffic Offenders Act 1988 (HMSO, 1988) 
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Appendix C M25 Network Node Definition 
Minimising Incident Impact on the M25 Sphere  
Optimal Positioning of Incident Support Units  
Definition of the M25 Sphere as a transport network  
Defining nodes and their coordinates  
Unique junction 
name 








M2531AA 1A A 1 557 748 
M2531BA lB A 2 557 743 
M2532A 2 A 3 554 720 
M2533A 3 A 4 526 678 
M2534A 4 A 5 502 630 
M2535A 5 A 6 496 568 
M2536A 6 A 7 352 528 
M2537A 7 A 8 307 533 
M2538A 8 A 9 257 526 
M2539A 9 A 10 172 574 
M25310A 10 A 11 81 593 
M25311A 11 A 12 39 649 
M25312A 12 A 13 18 677 
M25313A 13 A 14 22 726 
M25314A 14 A 15 36 754 
M25315A 15 A 16 46 793 
M25316A 16 A 17 20 856 
M25317A 17 A 18 31 942 
M25318A 18 A 19 42 961 
M25319A 19 A 20 71 989 
M25120A 20 A 21 78 1015 
M25321A 21 A 22 116 1030 
M25321AA 21A A 23 126 1030 
M25322A 22 A 24 190 1033 
M25323A 23 A 25 225 1000 
M25324A 24 A 26 267 1002 
M25325A 25 A 27 329 1000 
M25326A 26 A 28 406 997 
M25327A 27 A 29 470 1000 
M25128A 28 A 30 569 925 
M25329A 29 A 31 585 884 
M25330A 30 A 32 575 800 
M25331A 31 A 33 575 789 
M2531AB 1A B 34 548 750 
M2511BB lB B 35 549 743 
M2532B 2 B 36 546 722 
M2533B 3 B 37 520 682 
M2534B 4 B 38 494 633 
M2535B 5 B 39 488 574 
M2516B 6 B 40 351 536 
M2537B 7 B 41 306 542 
M2538B 8 B 42 259 535 
M2539B 19 	 1 B 43 	1 175 	1 582 
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Appendix D Extract of M25 Network Node Connectivity 
Minimising Inddent Impact on the M25 Sphere  
I 	I 	I 
Optimal Positioning of Incident Support Units 
I 	I 	I I 














Free flow speed 
between nodes / 
kmph 
Free flow speed 







incident on link 
M25)1A.A 1 M2511BA 2 M25)1A)1B 96 60 1.6 1 0.0011 
M25318A _2_ M2532A 3 P425)15)2 96 60 1.6 1 0.0048 
M25)2A 3 M25)3A 4 M25J2)3 96 60 5.28 3.3 0.0107 
M2533A 4 M2534A 5 P425)3)4 96 60 6.4 4 0.0059 
M2514A - - M25)5A 6_ - P425)4)5 96 60 6.4 4 00080 
M2535A 6_ - M2516A 7 - P425)5)5 96 60 15.68 9.8 0.0267 
M2536A 7 - M2517A B - M25)6)7 96 60 4.8 3 0.0112 
M2537A S M2518A 9 - - M2537)8 96 60 5.28 3.3 0.0117 
M2518A - 9 M25)9A 10 P425)8)9 96 60 12 7.5 0.0470 
M25)9A 10 M25310A 11 P425)9)10 96 60 9.6 6 0.0379 
M25)10A 11 M25311A 12 P425)10)11 96 60 8 5 0.0288 
M25)11A 12 M25)12A 13 P425)11)12 96 60 3.68 2.3 0.0123 
M25)12A 13 M25)13A 14 M25112)13 96 60 5.28 3.3 0.0230 
M25)13A 14 M25314A 15 M25)13114 96 60 3.2 2 0.0160 
M25114A 15 M25)15A 16 P425)14)15 96 60 3.2 2 0.0149 
M25)15A 16 M25)16A 17 P425)15)16 96 60 8.8 5.5 0.0171 
M25)16A 17 M25317A 18 M25)16)17 96 60 9.28 5.8 0.0208 
M25)17A 18 M25)1BA 19 M25)17)18 96 60 2.4 1.5 0.0048 
M25)18A 19 M25)19A 20 P425)18)19 96 60 4 2.5 0.0128 
M25)19A 20 M25)20A 21 M25)19)20 96 60 2.08 1.3 00037 
M25320A 21 M25)21A 22 M25320J21 96 60 4.8 3 0.0032 
M25)21A 22 P425)21AA 23 M75)21121A 96 50 1.28 0.8 0.0016 
M75121AA 23 M25J22A 24 M25321A322 96 60 7.2 4.5 0.0085 
M25)22A 24 M25)23A 25 P425322123 96 60 4.8 3 0.0048 
M25323A 25 M25324A 26 M25)23)24 96 60 4.48 2.8 0.0117 
M25J24A 26 M25325A 27 M25)24)25 96 60 8.8 5.5 0.0288 
M25125A 27 M25126A 28 P425)25)26 96 60 6.08 3.8 0.0128 
M25126A 28 M25127A 29 M25326327 96 60 7.2 4.5 0.0310 
M25327A 29 M25328A 30 M25327328 96 60 12.8 8 0.0262 
M25J28A 30 M25329A 31 P425)28)29 96 60 4.48 2.8 0.0267 
M25329A 31 M25)30A 32 M25329330 96 60 8.8 5.5 0.0251 
M25)30A 32 M25)31A 33 P425)30)31 96 60 1.28 _0. 0.0059 
M25331A 33 M2511AA 1 M25131)1A 96 60 3.2 7 - 0.0069 
M2531A8 34 P425)316 66 M25)1A331 96 60 3.2 2 - 0.0000 
M25)1B8 35 M25J1AB 34 M25)18)1A 96 60 1.6 1 - 0.0000 
M2532B 36 M25)166 35 P42532)18 96 60 1.6 1 - 0.0149 
M2533B 37 M2512B 36 P4251332 96 60 5.28 3.3 0.0000 
P425348 38 M25)3B 37 M2534)3 96 60 6.4 4 0.0064 
P425)58 39 M2514B 38 M25)5)4 96 60 6.4 4 0.0080 
M2516B 40 M25)56 39 P425)6)5 96 60 15.68 9.8 0.0304 
P425378 41 M2516B 40 P425)7)6 96 60 4.8 1 	3 0.0166 
M2538B 42 P425175 41 M25)8)7 96 60 5.28 3.3 0.0251 
M25)9B 43 M25)8B 42 P425)9)8 96 60 12 7.5 0.0464 
3108 44 P425196 43 P425)10)9 96 60 9.6 6 0.0262 
M25)1 18 45 P425)108 44 M25)11)10 96 60 8 5 0.0262 
M25312B 46 P425)119 45 P425)12)11 96 60 3.68 2.3 0.0112 
M25)138 47 P425112B 46 P425)13)12 96 60 5.28 3.3 0.0133 
M253148 48 M25)13B 47 P425)14)13 96 60 3.2 2 0.0166 
V25J158 49 P425)14B 48 P425)15)14 96 60 3.2 2 0.0128 
M251168 50 M25)156 49 P425)16)15 96 60 8.8 5.5 0,0278 
M25J178 51 M25116B 50 M25117)16 96 60 9.28 5.8 0.0133 
M2 5)18B 52 P4253178 51 M25)18)17 96 60 2.4 1.5 0.0069 
M25)19B 53 M25)1813 52 M25)19)18 96 60 4 2.5 0.0053 
-1:125 3208, 54 M25)19B 53 P425)20)19 96 60 2.08 1.3 0.0016 
3215 55 M25)20B 54 M25)21)20 96 60 4.8 3 0.0037 
)21AB 56 M2 	21B 55 M25)21A)21 96 60 1.28 0.8 0.0021 
3225 57 M25)21A5 56 M25122J21A 96 i 	60 7.2 4.5 0.0027 
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Appendix E MATLAB Network Analysis Script 
% Optimal positioning of Incident Support Units (ISU's) 
'& Definition of the M25 Sphere as a transport network - Defining 
nodes and their coordinates 
clear 
% Import nodal coordinates from Exce195 worksheet into MATLAB 
variables 
excelfile=' C: \Documents 	 and 
Settings\s9738758\Desktop\Optimal\MATLAB\M 25 .xls'; 
sheetname= ' node definition'; 
[numdata,txtdata]=xlsread(excelfile, sheetname); 
Extract nodal names and nodal coordinates matrix from imported 
worksheet 
nodenames=txtdata( [8: size(txtdata, 1)] .2); 
coords=numdata([1:size(numdata,l)] , [2 3)); 
clear txtdata numdata 





isunodes=[3 5 6 8 9 11 16 20 23 25 27 28 30] 
dia=20; 
for n=l:size(istmodes,2) 
isucoords(n, [1:2]) = [ (coords (isunodes (n) ,l)+coords(isunodes (n) +33,1)) 
/2-dia/2 (coords(isunodes(n),2)+coords(isunodes(n)+33,2))/2-dia/21 
h=rectangle(position, [isucoords(n,l) 	isucoords(n,2) 	dia 
dia) , 'curvature', [1 1]); 





char (nodenames (n))]); 
end 
set(nodelabels, fontname', 'verdana', 	'fontsize', 	[8], color', [0.5 
0.5 0.51) 
% Import connectivity information from Exce195 worksheet into MATLAB 
variables 
sheetname= 'node_connectivity'; 
[numdata, txtdata] =xlsread(excelfile, sheetname); 
connect(:,l)=numdata(:,l) 
connect (: , 2) =numdata (: , 3) 
connect (: , 3) =numdata (: , 5); 
connect (: , 4) =numdata (: , 6); 
connect (: , 5) =numdata (: , 7); 
connect (: , 6) =numdata (: , 8) 
connect (: , 7) =numdata(: , 9); 
connect (: , 8) =numdata ( 
connect (: , 9) =numdata (: ,12) 
connect ( , 10) =numdata (: , 13) 
connect (: ,ll) =numdata ( : ,14); 
connect (: , 12) =numdata ( : , 15); 
connect=connect ([1: size (connect, 1)) , [1 2 3 5 7 8 9 11]); 
% Extract connectivity information from imported worksheet 
%connect=numdata([l: size (numdata,1)], [2 4 6 8 10 12 13 15]); 
%clear txtdata numdata 
% Plot links as lines between nodes 
head=5; 	% size of arrowhead 
splay=0.3; % gradient of arrowhead 
314 
maxinc=max(connect([1:size(connect,1)],5)); 
for n=l : size (connect, 1) 
if -isnan(connect(n,2)) 
fromnode=connect (n, 1); 
tonode].=connect (n, 2); 
xcoords= ( [coords (fromnode, 1) coords (tonodel, 1)]); 
ycoords=( [coords (frornnode, 2) coords (tonodel, 2)1) 
inc= (connect (n, 5) /ma.xinc); 
% draw link 
arrowfunc ( [xcoords ycoords head splay mc]); 
L=(connect(n,4)*1000) 
% max speed on that link /km/h 
speedkm=connect (n, 3); 
speedm=speedkm* (1000/3600); 
% calculate duration / s 
duration=L/speedm; 
linklabels (n) =text(sum(xcoords) /2, sum (ycoords) /2, 
char ( [int2str(duration) s 
write the durations for routes between adjacent nodes 
(every individual link) 
routetimes (fromnode, tonodel) =duration; 
%if there is a second link from the node 
if -.isnan(connect(n,6)) 
tonode2=connect (n, 6); 
xcoords= ( [coords (fromnode, 1) coords (tonode2, 1)]); 
ycoords= ( [coords(fromnode, 2) coords(tonode2, 2)]); 
% draw link 
inc=0; 
arrowfunc ( [xcoords ycoords head splay mc]); 
L= (connect (n, 8) *1000) 
% max speed on that link /km/h 
speedkm=connect (n, 7); 
speedm=speedkm* (1000/3600); 
% calculate duration / s 
duration=L/ speedm; 
linklabels (n+size (connect, 1) )=text(sum(xcoords)/2,surn(ycoords)/2, 
char ( [int2str(duration) 'S'])); 








set (linklabels, 'fontname', 'verdana' 





set (mapfig, color', [1 1 11 
pause 
% Produce the connectivity matrix 
nodes are adjacent to each other?) 
for n=l : size (routetimes, 1) 
for o=l:size(routetimes,2) 
if routetimes(n,o)-..=0 
onelinks (n, o) =1; 
else 
onelinks (n, 0) =0; 
end 
end 
'fontsize', 	[8] , 'color', [0.5 
for 1-link routes (i.e. which 
end 
% Add n-link route durations to the existing 1-link route times in 
the route times matrix 
solved=0; 
pow=2; 
disp ( [ ' Please wait while route times are calculated...']) 
while solved==0 
solved=l; 
morel inks=onel inks pow; 
pow=pow+l; 
for n=l : size (onelinks, 1) 
for o=l:size(onelinks,2) 
if n-=o % if not a diagonal element 
316 
if routetimes(n,o)==O & morelinks(n,o)-=O 
solved=O; 
fastestroute=inf; 
% parse elements q in row n of routetimes matrix 
and column o of routetimes matrix 
for q=1:size(routetimes,2) 
% if neither element q in row n of matrix a 
nor element q in column o of matrix b are 0 then find fastest route 
possible 
if routetimes(n,q)-=O & routetimes(q,o)-=0 & 
routetimes (n, q) +routetimes (q, o) <fastestroute 
% write fastest route into routetimes 
matrix 
fastestroute=routetimes (n, q) +routetimes (q, 0); 
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Abstract 
To date, previous studies of accidents on British motorways have been very limited. As part of a 
study into the role of Incident Support Units on the M25, the London orbital motorway, an analysis 
of road traffic accidents was undertaken. Historical accident data was obtained from motorway 
matrix signal databases, from two control rooms around the M25. The databases were manually 
analysed with 38,755 matrix signal activations and 3,399 accidents identified, for the study period 
between January 2000 until December 2002. Accident frequency, durations and locations were 
then examined. 
It was found that the average frequency was 3.1 accidents per day or 0.05 accidents per mile for 
the study area. The highest occurrence of accidents was found to be between 5pm and 6pm. On 
average the recorded accidents lasted 1 hour 1 minute and 22 seconds long with those occurring 
between 10pm and 8am lasting the longest. The distribution of accidents along the 62.5 mile long 
study area showed that the section between junction 7 and 8 had the highest accident rate of 85.31 
accidents per mile for the study period. 
Introduction 
Road traffic accidents are an unfortunate part of road travel. It has to be accepted that accidents 
will happen whatever programs are introduced to reduce the chance of an accident occurring. With 
this in mind, the best ways of mitigating the effects of an accident must be discovered and 
implemented. This study will facilitate a better understanding of where and when accidents happen 
on the M25. 
The M25 motorway (figure 1) is approximately 117 miles in length with some sections carrying 
more than 200,000 vehicles a day. As Europe's busiest motorway, congestion is a major problem. 
Each year, traffic congestion leads to millions of hours of vehicle delays and causes significant 
losses in productivity, increases in fuel consumption and environmental pollution. 
The rising demand for use of motorway networks has not been met with corresponding increases in 
capacity. This has led to an ever-increasing level of daily congestion. Recurring congestion from 
excess volume of vehicles is expected but non-recurring or "incident" congestion is unpredictable. 
Incidents cause bottlenecks, slowing and frequently stoppages in the flow of vehicles. As the flow 
of traffic slows following an accident, a queue builds upstream of the incident, and continues until 
the blockage is cleared and flow restored. Additionally "rubbernecking" can reduce the flow in 
opposing lanes. Due to the backlog of vehicles it can take a long time after the incident for the 
accumulated traffic to dissipate. This issue can be compounded with the problem of secondary 
incidents. Incident management programs have been developed to mitigate non-recurring 
congestion from incidents. The purpose of these programs is to rapidly detect, verify and clear 
temporary obstructions from roads to restore normal traffic flow as quickly as possible. This non 
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recurring congestion can be minimised by clearing incidents as quickly as possible or by diverting 
traffic before vehicles are caught in the traffic backup. 
To mitigate non-recurrent congestion, rapid response and clearance is essential. To assist in this 
the Highways Agency has deployed a fleet of Incident Support Units (ISUs) on the M25 and other 
congested roads throughout England. 
This investigation of accidents on the M25 has been undertaken as part of a study into the role of 
ISUs on the road network. It is the intention to study the frequency, duration and location of 
accidents, and ultimately reduce traffic impacts of accidents through the allocation of ISUs and 
personnel. 
+ 
Figure 1 Map of roads within M25 Sphere (Highways Agency, 2003). 
Background 
There is limited literature on accident analysis on motorways in Britain. However, more is available 
on US freeway incident and accident characteristics (Pal et al (1988), Skabardonis et al (1997), 
Giuliano (1996), Jones et al (1995), Golob et al (1987), Skabardonis (1999)). Other studies for 
major cities in the US have been useful sources of information as reported traffic conditions are 
similar to that of the M25. However, many were carried out in the 1960's and 1970's (Skabardonis 
et al (1997)) when drivers and vehicles were very different. More recent studies into the 
characteristics of incidents were undertaken in Seattle (Jones et al (1995)) and Los Angeles 
(Skabardonis et al (1997), Giuliano (1996), Golob et al (1987), Skabardonis (1999)). These studies 
used archived accident records as data with Skabardonis et al (1997 and 1999) collecting 
comprehensive field data to determine incident and accident patterns. 
Data Description 
The data for this paper was taken from matrix signal settings archives, in a database format, for 
two control rooms on the M25, made available by the Highways Agency. Godstone and Heston 
control rooms record signal settings for the southern part of the M25, between junction 2 and 17, 
covering approximately 62.5 miles in total length. The databases were supplied in monthly form 
with all signal activations recorded. In total the data covered all days from 1st  January 2000 to 31 st 
December 2002 - 1,096 days. 
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The signal settings archive databases contain all information relevant to the setting of the signal: 
Log counter, 
• On date and time, 
• Operator who set the signals, 
• Signal location (Motorway, marker post, direction, lane) 
• 	Signal setting, 
• 	Reason for setting (Accident, congestion, incident, debris, etc.) 
• Off date and time. 
Queries were run on the settings archive databases and all activations for accident only reasons 
were extracted. The extracted data was then manually analysed to separate individual accidents. 
In total, 38,755 matrix signal activation were examined and 3,399 accidents were identified. 
Matrix Signals 
Motorway matrix signals are electronic signs that are used to inform motorists about speed 
restrictions, lane closures, or even adverse weather conditions. These motorway traffic control 
signals are usually set for safety reasons. They are a simple method of incident management and 
allow the police to control traffic and warn motorists from control rooms before any responding 
vehicles get to the incident scene. 
'urro(tak) 1_r' 
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Figure 2 Example of gantry matrix signals. 
On the M25 there are two basic types of mounting for matrix signals - gantry based and central 
reservation post mounted. The gantry based system, usually on busier road sections, provides 
control for each lane of traffic and is more flexible as there is a different signal for each lane on the 
road. Figure 2 shows an example of gantry based matrix signals on the M25. The signals in figure 
2 are displaying a warning of queuing traffic ahead, signified by a 'Q". Figure 3 shows an example 
of a central reservation post mounted matrix signal. The post mounted signals cannot display as 
much information as a gantry system as there is only one signal to provide information to all 3 or 4 
lanes. 
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Figure 3 Example of central reservation post mounted matrix signal. 
A wide variety of information can be displayed on the matrix signals. The signs can be used to 
display temporary reduced speed restrictions to try and control speeds near incident scenes. 
Emergency lane closures can also be achieved using the signals before responders and any 
proper traffic management (cones and warning signs) arrives at an incident scene. This is helpful 
in order to protect stranded motorists and warn of debris blocking a lane of the carriageway. A 
graphic showing most of the available directions is shown in figure 4. The information displayed on 
the signals is enforceable; motorists disobeying their messages can be prosecuted. 
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Figure 4 Examples of matrix signal messages. (Roads Service, 1999). 
M25 - London Orbital Motorway 
The M25 motorway is the orbital motorway (beltway) that encircles London (Figure 1). It is not 
quite a full circle - the only break is to the east of London, when it crosses the river Thames via the 
Dartford Crossing (consisting of two tunnels and a bridge). The M25 was designed as a bypass for 
London and the surrounding towns giving substantial traffic relief for communities, particularly from 
heavy goods traffic. 
It is approximately 117 miles in length and is dual three lane carriageway or dual four lane 
carriageway in the busier areas. It also has left lane hard shoulders over the majority of its length. 
Since its completion in 1986 it has become one of the busiest motorways in Europe, coming under 
ever increasing strain. The busiest western section of the M25 regularly carries up to 200,000 
vehicles per day. 
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Incident Support Units 
With sections of the M25 carrying an average of 200,000 vehicles a day even a minor accident can 
bring traffic to a halt very quickly. To help mitigate the impact of incidents on the road users of the 
M25, a new joint initiative by the Highways Agency, Mouchel and Carillion has been initiated. A 
fleet of sixteen ISUs are on standby 24 hours a day, 365 days a year to solve problems on the M25 
and adjoining roads (known as the M25 Sphere). These vehicles are dedicated maintenance 
vehicles that do small maintenance activities on the network, but are available whenever an 
incident occurs or their presence is requested by the emergency services. These vehicles are 
placed at strategic locations around the road network and are monitored by GPS allowing the 
nearest vehicle to be dispatched. They are manned by specialist two man crews, equipped with 
cones, warning signs, environmental protection packs and suitable equipment to deal with most 
situations and carry out emergency maintenance and repairs. 
The aim of this service is to provide assistance to the emergency services and reduce the impact of 
an incident on the road network. The role of Carillions Incident Support Units (ISUs) is to: 
. Provide immediate response to incidents on the network, 
• Provide emergency, short term lane closures, 
• Deal immediately with minor, incident related debris. 
Accident Data Analysis 
Accident Frequency 
Analysis showed that for the period of the study, there were 3,399 recorded matrix signal accidents 
activations (table 1). In 2000 and 2001 there were 1120 accidents - exactly the same number. In 
2002 however, the number of accident signal activations increased to 1,1 59. 
Table I Comparison of accident data for different years. 
Year 
All = 2000 2001 2002 
Total Number of Matrix Signal 
Accident Activations  
- 1120 1120 1159 
Mean Duration (Mins) 01:01:22 - 00:59:28 05934 01:05:04 
Standard Deviation (Mins) 01:49:59 - 01:56:35  01:50:46 
Median Duration (Mins) 00:33:26 - 00:30:08 32:49 00:37:22 
The increase in the number of accidents is contrary to expectation as several incident management 
programs have been instigated or modified over the 3 year study period. 
The average accident frequency was found to be 1,133 per year, 94.42 per month and 3.1 per day 
for the study area. Over the 62.5 miles of the study area this equates to an average of 18.13 
accidents per mile per year, 1.51 accidents per mile per month and 0.05 accidents per mile per 
day. 
Figure 5 shows the variability of recorded accidents by days of the week. The plot of data for all 
years shows that the larger number of accidents occurs on Fridays with 582 accidents or 17.1% of 
all accidents in the study period. It can also be seen from figure 5 that, as expected, there are 
fewer accidents on Saturdays and Sundays. This is because there are fewer vehicles using the 
motorway at the weekend. The individual years data, also plotted, is fairly consistent giving 
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Figure 5 Graph of accidents by day of the week. 
Examination of the accidents by month showed some interesting variability, as shown in figure 6. 
The months in the spring season (Feb - May) were the lowest for the combined data with the 
period from October to January recording the highest number of accidents. Individual year's data 
shows greater variability however. In January there were 44 accidents between 2000's records 
and 2001's records. There were also 51 accidents between 2000 and 2002 in October. This 
variability requires further investigation as influencing factors, such as weather, were not available 
to this study. 
Comparison of Incidents by Month 
Figure 6 Graph of accidents by month. 
A review of accident rates per year and per day for each day of the week and every month was 
carried out. It was found that the worst day for accidents was a Monday in December with an 
average of 21.67 accidents per year or 4.643 accidents per day for the study area of the M25. In 
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contrast the minimum accident rate is a Saturday in May, with 5.67 accidents per year and 1.417 
per day. 
Table 2 Distribution of accidents by time of day. 
Time of Day 
Total Number of 
Accidents 
Average Accident Rate 
(Accidents per Day) 
00:00 to 01:00 65 0 . 059 
01:00to02:00 44 0.040 
02:00 to 03:00 44 0.040 
03:00 to 04:001 38 0.035 
04:00 to 05:00 34 0.031 
05:00 to 06:00 69 0.063 
06:00to07:00 119 0.109 
07:00 to 08:00 139 0.127 
08:00to09:00 160 0.146 
09:00 to 10:00 179 0.163 
10:00to11:00 167 0.152 
11:00 to 12:00 220 0.201 
12:00to13:00 204 0.186 
13:00to14:00 200 0.182 
14:00to15:00 190 0.173 
15:00to16:00 216 0.197 
16:00 to 17:00 259 0.236 
17:00 to 18:00 288 0.263 
18:00to19:00 234 0.214 
19:00to20:00 185 0.169 
20:00to21:00 123 0.112 
21:00to22:00 91 0.083 
22:00 to 23:00 65 0.059 
23:00 to 24:00 65 0.059 
The number of accidents changes throughout the day. Table 2 and figure 7 show the variability of 
all accidents during the day. It can be seen that the higher level of accidents occurred between 
5pm and 6pm. The total of 288 accidents, or 8.5% of all accidents, during the evening peak period, 
has a rate of 0.263 accidents per day. The minimum number of accidents occurs between 4am 
and 5am with only 34 accidents over the study period. The data shown generally follows the 
number of vehicles on the road with the majority of all accidents when the road network is near or 
exceeding capacity. Further work has to be done on the timings of accident occurrence, as the 
influence of traffic flows has not been examined. 
Accidents by Time of Day 
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Figure 7 Graph of number of accidents by time of day for all years. 
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Accident Durations 
For the 3,399 accidents, the total accident duration was calculated as the difference between the 
time that the first signal was activated until the last signal was deactivated. The average duration 
of all accidents was ihour, iminute and 22seconds. For the year 2000 the average accident 
duration was 59 minutes, 28 seconds, in 2001 the average was 59 minutes, 34 seconds and in 
2002 it was 1 hour, 5 minutes and 4 seconds. 
Distribution of Accident Durations 
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Figure 8 Comparison of accident duration distributions. 
Figure 8 shows the distribution of durations for all accidents. The distribution shows that 
approximately 50% of all accidents last less than 40 minutes, 75% of all accidents last less than 80 
minutes and 90% of all accidents last less than 120 minutes. 
Table 3 Comparison of A-D test results for duration distributions. 
A-D Test Value = Year - - 
Fitted Distribution 2000 2001 2002 
ognorm - 1.708 - 3.249 - 2.605 
lnvGauss 2151 3.663 3.313 
Pearson5 3.589 5.562 4.694 
Expon 29.96 18.95 18.2 
ExtValue +lnftnity 39.06 4027 
Logistic +lnfinity +Infinity 57.92 
Triang 1970 1800 1649 
Uniform 2652 2483 2352 
Student 7634 7686 8109 
Pareto2 +lnfinity +lnfinity +Infinity 
Rayleigh +lnfinity +lnfinity +Infinity 
Pareto +lnfintty +lrifinity +Infinity 
Normal -s.lnfinity +lnfinity +lnfinity 
Erf - +lnfinity I I 	+lnfinity I - +Infinity 
Theoretical statistical distributions were fitted against the recorded accident durations. A selection 
of fourteen distributions were examined and the Anderson-Darling (A-D) test used to measure the 
goodness of fit between the data and the theoretical distributions. In the A-D test, the lower the 
number indicates a better fit. A review of the A-D test results for the trialled distributions is shown 
in Table 3. It can be seen that the lognormal distribution provides the best fit to the recorded 
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accident durations. This agrees with previous American studies (Giuliano (1996), Jones et al 
(1995), Golob et al (1987), Skabardonis (1999)) of incident analysis. 
A review of average accident durations by day of the week and month showed that on average the 
longest accidents are on Sundays in August at 2 hours 6 minutes 18 seconds in length and the 
shortest are Saturdays in December at 29 minutes 54 seconds. On average Wednesdays have the 
shortest accidents and Sundays have the longest durations. During a day the average duration of 
accidents varies by as much as 1 hour 56 minutes 57 seconds as shown in figure 9. The average 
duration is reasonably constant between 8am and 10pm but between 10pm and 8am the durations 
are greatly increased with the maximum average duration between lam and 2am of 2 hours 43 
minutes 33 seconds. Extended durations through the night time period could be due to the extra 
time additional equipment can take to reach an accident scene, but is more likely to be. It could 
also be because accidents may be more severe at night. Unfortunately severity data was not 
made available to this study. 
Average Duration of Accidents Throughout the Day 
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Figure 9 Graph of average duration throughout the day for all years. 
Accident Locations 
The matrix signal databases included the marker post location of the activated signal. The location 
of the first activated signal was extracted and then manually sorted into junction-by-junction groups. 
The number of accidents by junction locations is shown in figure 10. Also shown is the line of the 
normalized accidents or accidents per mile - the number of accidents in each section have been 
divided by the mileage of the section. It can be seen that for s straight count of accidents then the 
section between junctions 5 and 6 has the highest occurrences of accidents. However, this section 
is one of the longest in the sample, so when it is normalized then it is below the average accident 
rate. The highest rate of accidents per mile is for the section between junctions 7 and 8, which is 
85.31 accidents per mile for the study period. 
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Figure 10 Graph of accident locations by junctions. 
Application of Findings 
The results from this study will enable the current incident management program currently in 
operation on the M25 to be re-evaluated. It will also allow the standby locations of the ISUs to re-
examined thus enabling response times to be lowered. 
Conclusions 
This paper has shown an overview of the characteristics of accidents on the southern part of the 
M25 London orbital motorway for the period between January 2000 and December 2002. Accident 
frequency, durations and locations were examined. 
It was found that: 
• The average frequency of accidents was 3.1 accidents per day or 0.05 accidents 
per mile per day for the study area. The majority of recorded accidents occurred 
on a Friday. The spring months were found to have the lowest number of 
occurrences and the winter months were found to be the highest. Between 5pm 
and 6pm was found to have the highest occurrence of accidents. 
• The average accident duration for the study period was 1 hour 1 minute 22 
minutes. Accident durations increased over the study period. A lognormal 
distribution was shown to fit recorded durations. Sundays in August were shown 
to have the longest durations. Accident durations through the day were examined 
with the longest accident durations between 10pm and 8am. 
• The spatial distribution of accidents was established across the southern section of 
the M25. The majority of accidents have occurred between junctions 5 and 6 but 
between junctions 7 and 8 had the highest accident rate of 85.31 accidents per 
mile for the study period. 
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ABSTRACT 
To date, previous studies of incidents on British motorways have been very limited. 
As part of a study into the role of Incident Support Units on the M25, the London 
orbital motorway, an analysis of road traffic incidents was undertaken. Motorway 
incident data was collected through CCTV observations at Surrey Police's Godstone 
motorway control room. The collected data covered the Surrey Police section of the 
M25 between Clacket Lane services and junction 14, for a 4 week period between 5th 
November 2003 until 11th  December 2003. Incident frequency, durations, locations, 
detection times, notification methods and Incident Support Unit involvement were 
examined. 
It was found that the average incident frequency was 16.1 incidents per day for the 
study area and the highest occurrence of incidents was found to be between 11:00 and 
12:00. On average the recorded incidents lasted I hour 9 minutes, with those 
occurring in the evening peak period lasting the longest. The distribution of accidents 
along the study area showed that the section between Junction 9 and 10 had the 
highest incident rate for the study period. 
A comparison of incident characteristics between US and UK studies was also 
conducted. Incident rates between Britain and the US were found to be substantially 
different and Incident durations in the UK were found to be between double and triple 
those of the US. Possible reasons for these differences are discussed in the text. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Road traffic incidents are an unfortunate part of road travel. Incidents are random 
events that reduce the capacity of a road and include accidents, breakdowns, spilled 
loads and any other event that could cause delay. 
It has to be accepted that incidents will happen whatever programs are introduced to 
reduce the chance of an incident occurring. With this in mind, the best ways of 
mitigating the effects of an incident must be discovered and implemented. This study 
will facilitate a better understanding of where and when incidents happen on the M25. 
The M25 motorway is the orbital motorway that encircles London (figure 1). It was 
designed as a bypass for London and the surrounding towns giving substantial traffic 
relief for communities, particularly from heavy goods vehicle traffic. It is 
approximately 117 miles in length and is dual three lane carriageway or dual four lane 
carriageway in the busier areas. It also has left lane hard shoulders over the majority 
of its length. Since its completion in 1986 it has become one of the busiest 
motorways in Europe, coming under ever increasing strain. The busiest western 
section of the M25 regularly carries up to 200,000 vehicles per day. As Europe's 
busiest motorway, congestion is a major problem. Each year, traffic congestion leads 
to millions of hours of vehicle delays and causes significant losses in productivity, 
increases in fuel consumption and environmental pollution. 
The rising demand for use of motorway networks has not and cannot be met with 
corresponding increases in capacity. This has led to an ever-increasing level of daily 
congestion. Recurring congestion from excess volume of vehicles is expected but 
non-recurring or "incident" congestion is unpredictable. Incidents cause bottlenecks, 
slowing and frequently stoppages in the flow of vehicles. As the flow of traffic slows 
following an incident, a queue builds upstream of the incident, and continues until the 
blockage is cleared and flow restored. Additionally "rubbernecking" can reduce the 
flow in opposing lanes. Due to the backlog of vehicles it can take a long time after 
the incident for the accumulated traffic to dissipate. This issue can be compounded 
with the problem of secondary incidents. Incident management programs have been 
developed to mitigate non-recurring congestion from incidents. The purpose of these 
programs is to rapidly detect, verify and clear temporary obstructions from roads to 
restore normal traffic flow as quickly as possible. This non-recurring congestion can 
be minimized by clearing incidents as quickly as possible or by diverting traffic 
before vehicles are caught in the traffic backup. 
To mitigate non-recurrent congestion, rapid response and clearance is essential. To 
assist in this the Highways Agency has deployed a fleet of Incident Support Units 
(ISUs) on the M25 and other congested roads throughout England. 
This investigation of incidents on the M25 has been undertaken as part of a study into 
the role of ISUs on the road network. It is the intention to study the frequency, 
duration and location of incidents, and ultimately reduce traffic impacts of incidents 
through the allocation of equipment and personnel. 
This study compares UK data with US data due to the limited research available on 
British motorways. 
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BACKGROUND 
There is limited literature on incident analysis on motorways in Britain, with the 
exception of Roberts et a! (1). Their study, in 1992 and 1993, provides a review of 
incidents on British motorways. They assessed incidents at 10 motorway control 
rooms, to establish incident rates and durations on motorway links for the British 
Department of Transportation. Multi-channel time-lapse video from CCTV cameras 
and historical police records were used. 
There is more information available on US freeway incident characteristics (Pal et al 
(2), Skabardonis et al (3), Giuliano (4), Jones et al (5), Golob et a! (6), Skabardonis et 
al (7) and Bertini et al (8)). Other studies for major cities in the US have been useful 
sources of information as reported traffic conditions are similar to that of the M25. 
However, many were carried out in the 1960's and 1970's (3) when drivers and 
vehicles were very different. More recent studies into the characteristics of incidents 
were undertaken in Seattle (5), Portland (8) and Los Angeles (3, 4, 6, 7). These 
studies used archived accident records as data with Skabardoms et al (3 and 7) 
collecting comprehensive field data, using probe vehicles, to determine incident and 
accident patterns. This data will be referred to in more detail within the analysis and 
comparison. 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
The data, for this paper, was collected through observations, using closed-circuit 
television (CCTV), at Surrey Police's Godstone Motorway Control Room. A total of 
four weeks (28 days) of incident data were collected from between November 5th to 
December 11th. Every day, incident information was collected for a 12 hour period 
between 7am and 7pm. 
Godstone Motorway Control Room manages Surrey Police's strategic roads which 
include the M25, M23, M3 and other major trunk roads. This paper is only concerned 
with incidents that occurred on their section of the M25, between Clacket Lane 
Motorway Services (marker post 4335) and junction 14 (marker post 4919), 58.4 
kilometers (36.3 miles). The AADT over the study area ranged from 140,000 to 
200,000 vehicles per day. 
The complete survey area is covered by an extensive network of CCTV cameras, 
emergency roadside telephones (EMT) and gantry matrix signals for speed and lane 
controls. The matrix signals are used by the Motorway Incident Detection and 
Automatic Signaling (MIDAS) system. The MIDAS system covers the area between 
junction 6 and junction 16 and uses information on flows, speed and occupancy from 
a large number of loop detectors, spaced at approximately 300 and 500 meters, to 
trigger and impose speed limits on that section through the overhead gantry matrix 
signals and VMS. This is known as the variable speed limit zone and attempts to 
"smooth-out" the traffic flow, therefore reducing the stop-start and wave effect 
brought on by heavy traffic flow. In theory, this should create a more efficient 
network, keep congestion at a minimum and improve safety. The data recorded from 
loop detectors used by the MIDAS system have also been collected 
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When an incident was notified to the control room, the following information was 
recorded on incident characteristics: 
• Time of notification, 
• Type of incident (Breakdown, Accident, Debris, Vehicle Fire, Animal, etc.), 
• Time travel lanes were cleared, 
• Time incident was cleared, 
• Day of week, 
• Method of notification, 
• Location (Marker post, direction, junctions, lane), 
• Number of lanes blocked, 
• Weather conditions, 
• Light conditions, 
• Road conditions, 
• Length of queue (if available), 
• Occurrence of secondary accidents, 
• Whether an ISU was required, 
• Time of ISU request and arrival, 
• Type and number of vehicles involved, 
• Any other relevant details (times of matrix signal activations, VMS messages 
and timings, Type, number and timings of emergency and recovery vehicles at 
incident scene, etc.). 
A total of 450 incidents were recorded for the study area throughout the study period. 
INCIDENT SUPPORT UNITS 
With sections of the M25 carrying an average of 200,000 vehicles a day even a minor 
incident can bring traffic to a halt very quickly. To help mitigate the impact of 
incidents on the road users of the M25, a new joint initiative by the Highways 
Agency, Mouchel Parkman and Carillion has been implemented. A fleet of sixteen 
ISUs are on standby 24 hours a day, 365 days a year to solve problems on the M25 
and adjoining roads (known as the M25 Sphere). These vehicles are dedicated 
maintenance vehicles that do minor maintenance activities on the network, but are 
available whenever an incident occurs or their presence is requested by the emergency 
services. The ISUs are placed at strategic locations around the road network and are 
monitored by GPS, allowing the nearest vehicle to be dispatched. They are manned 
by specialist two man crews, equipped with cones, warning signs, environmental 
protection packs and suitable equipment to deal with most situations and carry out 
emergency maintenance and repairs. They are neither allowed nor responsible for 
removing vehicles from travel lanes, but do provide emergency traffic management to 
protect incident scenes. 
The aim of this service is to provide assistance to the emergency services and reduce 
the impact of an incident on the road network. The role of Carillion's Incident 
Support Units is to: 
• 	Provide immediate response to incidents on the network, 
• Provide emergency, short term lane closures, 
• 	Deal immediately with minor, incident related debris. 
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INCIDENT DATA ANALYSIS 
INCIDENT FREQUENCY 
The incident records were analyzed to derive the incident type proportions and 
summary statistics are shown in table I and figure 2. 
Figure 2 shows the breakdown of incident types. For the study period there were 291 
breakdowns that accounted for approximately 64.7% of all incidents and were 
followed by accidents at 20.2% and debris with 9.1 % of the total 450 incidents. The 
estimated incident rate for the study area was 2.32 incidents per million vehicle km 
(3.74 incidents per million vehicle miles). In comparison Bertini et a! (8) found that 
breakdowns accounted for 50% and accidents accounted for 15% of all incidents and 
Skabardonis et al (7) found 86.6% of incidents were breakdowns and 6.5% were 
accidents. As Skabardonis et a! (7) used probe vehicles instead of CCTV, for data 
capture, they will have witnessed more breakdowns than this study as only 
breakdowns notified to the control room were logged. 
Table I illustrates the type and the lateral locations of incidents on the carriageway. 
The locations are classified as where the incident was first observed, so it may have 
occurred in the live lanes but by the time it was detected and verified the incident may 
have cleared to the shoulder. It can be seen that the predominant incident type 
recorded was breakdowns on the hard shoulder, approximately 55% of all incidents. 
In-lane accidents accounted for 45.1% of all accidents and 9.1% of all incidents. 
Approximately 29.3% of all recorded incidents occurred in-lane and had the potential 
to cause delay to motorists. The majority of accidents, 66.11 %, involve only two 
vehicles and 80% of accidents involve three vehicles. 50.5% of accidents involved a 
Large Goods Vehicle (LGV) and 34% of all accidents included a foreign LGV, which 
is very concerning as they comprise less than 10% of the LGV traffic. Foreign LGV's 
however only accounted for 1.37% of all breakdowns with LGV's accounting for 
5.84%. 
In contrast, Skabardonis et al (7) observed that the proportion of in-lane incidents was 
about 10.7% on 1-10, Skabardonis et al (3) on 1-880 showed 4.6% occurred in-lane 
and FHWA (Lindley (9)) also presented values of approximately 4%. Bertini et a! (8) 
however observed 29.3% in-lane incidents using historical data from the Portland 
area. Roberts et al (1) estimated that 6% of incidents occurring on the motorway 
network had the potential to interfere with free-flowing traffic in the running lanes. 
Skabardonis et a! (3) do admit that if CCTV had been used to observe incidents, rather 
than probe vehicles, the number of in-lane incidents would have been higher. 
Shown in figure 3 are the percentage breakdowns of lanes blocked by noted incidents. 
As shown, 69% of incidents blocked only the hard shoulder and only 7.6% of lane 
blocking incidents blocked two or more lanes. Less than 1% of incidents blocked 3 or 
more lanes which is much lower than Bertini et a! (8) who reported that 3% of 
incidents blocked all lanes. 
An average of 16.1 incidents/day was observed during the study period, within the 
study area, with an average of 10.39 breakdowns and 3.25 accidents per day. For 
each collection day there were on average 2.32 incidents per million vehicle-km (3.73 
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incidents per million vehicle-miles). The number of incidents was approximately the 
same for each direction of the study area with only 3.5% difference between 
clockwise and anti-clockwise carriageways. 
Figure 4 shows the variability of recorded accidents by days of the week. The plot of 
data shows, for weekdays, that the larger numbers of incidents occur on Fridays with 
74 incidents or 16.4% of all incidents in the study period. This is expected as more 
vehicles use the M25 on a Friday than on any other day and gives an incident rate of 
2.41 incidents per million vehicle-km (3.88 incidents per million vehicle-miles). It 
can also be seen from figure 4 however that, unexpectedly, there are more incidents 
on a Tuesday 
Also unexpectedly there are more incidents on Saturdays than any other day of the 
week giving an incident rate of 3.36 incidents per million vehicle-km (5.42 incidents 
per million vehicle-miles). With Sunday also very high compared to weekdays, this 
may be due to the fact that motorists using the M25 at the weekend may be less 
prepared or experienced for driving on an extremely busy motorway, compared to 
weekday commuters. It should also be noted that the majority of incidents on 
weekends were breakdowns, 72% of all incidents compared to an average of 61.5% 
on weekdays. Even though there were more incidents at weekends, less of them 
occurred in-lane: on average 21.8% of incidents in-lane compared to 35.4% on 
weekdays. Vehicle fires also occurred more often at weekends than on weekdays. 
The number of incidents changes throughout the day and generally corresponds to the 
number of vehicles on the road, with the majority of all incidents when the road 
network is near or exceeding capacity, shown graphically in figure 5. There are 
however two exceptions to this between 11:00 - 12:00 and 14:00— 15:00 where the 
incident rates are higher than expected. Further work has to be done on the timings of 
incident occurrence, as the discrepancies occur in uncongested low flow periods. The 
temporal variation in the occurrence of incidents can be used to enhance the ISU 
program by optimizing staffing shift patterns. 
Figure 6 illustrates the different ways that incidents were notified to the motorway 
control room. As can be seen, emergency roadside telephones (EMT) are the most 
frequent method of notification with 236 uses or 52.4%. This is then followed by 999 
(British 911 emergency number) emergency calls with 25.1 % and then police patrols 
with 5.8%. The remainder of incidents were either observed by CCTV from the 
control room or reported by the Highways Agency, including ISUs, other emergency 
services or various breakdown agencies. 
For the entire study period there were only 4 secondary accidents and all were very 
minor, damage only accidents. Other incidents types however had even fewer 
secondary effects with only two debris incidents struck before clearance. This may be 
a result of the MIDAS system quickly reducing speed limits, following incidents, and 
stopping other vehicles meeting stationary queues at high speed. 
INCIDENT DURATIONS 
For the 450 incidents observed, the total accident duration was calculated as the 
difference in the time from when the incident was first observed until all lanes, 
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including the hard shoulder were cleared. The average duration of all incidents was 1 
hour, 9 minutes. This duration is approximately three times that of Skabardonis et a! 
(7) incident duration of 20.7 minutes and double the duration of Bertim et al (8) study 
in Portland at 33 minutes. The British study by Roberts et al (1) found the average 
incident duration of 46 minutes for several UK motorways. This longer duration may 
be due to many locations on the M25 being rural and having longer distances between 
junctions compared to other study areas as emergency and recovery vehicles having to 
travel further to an incident scene. The average duration of a travel lane being 
blocked was 32 minutes. The longest incident duration, and travel lane blockage 
duration, observed was 6 hours 40 minutes and involved extensive infrastructure 
damage that had to be repaired immediately for safety reasons. Accidents had the 
longest durations of all incidents, at 81 minutes, approximately 6 minutes longer than 
breakdowns, at 75 minutes. Debris incidents in general lasted 19 minutes and all 
other incidents, including vehicle fires, animals and pedestrians, lasted approximately 
49 minutes on average. 
Figure 7 shows the distribution of durations for all incidents. The distribution shows 
that approximately 50% of all incidents last less than 60 minutes, 75% of all incidents 
last less than 90 minutes and 90% of all incidents last less than 140 minutes. 
During a day the average duration of incidents varies by as much as 37 minutes, as 
shown in figure 8. Also shown in figure 8 are lane closure durations throughout the 
day with the period between 13:00-14:00 hours having the greatest average duration 
of 58 minutes. The duration of an accident was affected by the number of lanes 
blocked (severity) with one lane accidents having an average duration of 85 minutes 
and lane closure duration of 29 minutes. Two lane accidents had an average duration 
of 92minutes and lane closure duration of 39 minutes. Three lanes and over accidents 
had an average duration of 283 minutes and lane closure duration of 209 minutes 
though the sample size was very small for more severe accidents. 
As this study was constantly observing traffic flows, using CCTV, several incidents 
were actually observed before the control room had been notified. This enabled 
approximate detection times to be established. For the incidents that were discovered 
there was on average 5 minutes between the incidents occurring and the control room 
being notified. 
INCIDENT LOCATIONS 
The location of each incident was recorded to the nearest marker post. These are 
spaced at 100 meter intervals along the full length of the study area. The spatial 
distribution of incidents, organized by junctions, is shown in figure 9. 
It can be seen that for a straight count of incidents, then the section between junctions 
8 and 9 has the highest occurrences of incidents. However, when incident rates are 
considered, the section between junctions 9 and 10 has the highest rate of incidents at 
2.87 incidents per million vehicle km (4.63 incidents per million vehicle-miles). This 
information can be used to enhance the ISU program as the standby locations can be 
altered in relation to the spatial locations of incidents. 
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INCIDENT SUPPORT UNIT INVOLVEMENT 
Incident support units were requested to attend 21.33% of all incidents during the 
study period. They attended 44% of all accidents, 5% of breakdowns and 63.41% of 
debris incidents. After being requested, the ISUs had an average response time of 12 
minutes over 96 incidents. Further research will have to be conducted to fully 
understand the influence of ISUs on the M25 road network. 
COMPARISON BETWEEN UK AND US INCIDENT DATA 
Table 2 shows a comparison between this study's findings regarding incident 
characteristics and three other studies: Roberts et al (1), Skabardonis et al (7) and 
Bertini et al (8). It can be seen that there are few similarities between studies. 
Average incident duration varies by as much 28 minutes between the M25 and 
Interstate 10. Durations in the UK are between double and triple those of the US. 
Does this imply that US incident management practices are better than UK practices? 
Incident rates between Britain and the US are vastly different with an average incident 
rate of 6.91 incidents per million vehicle kilometers from Britain compared to 92.8 in 
the US. This may be due to different driving styles, vehicles, vehicle regulations, 
driving distances, weather and many other factors such as incident recording. The 
difference between percentages of in-lane incidents appears to increase with more 
recent studies. Very minor incidents may not have been captured in this study thus 
increasing the in-lane percentage. The percentage in this study and the Portland study 
(8) are however both greater than the two older studies in the comparison. The 
differences could also be due to different traffic densities. The percentage of 
accidents could also be due to the age of the study, again with the two more recent 
studies having greater percentages of accidents occurring. The lower accident 
percentages may also be due to the total number of incidents as the studies with the 
higher incident rates have lower percentages. Again the age of studies may be the 
cause of the differences between studies as more modern vehicles are less prone to 
breaking down. 
APPLICATION OF FINDINGS 
The results from this study will enable incident management programs currently in 
operation on the M25 to be re-evaluated. The findings will also be used to investigate 
impact of incidents on traffic flow and the associated delays. The influence of 
incident management strategies will also be investigated. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has shown an overview of the characteristics of incidents on the south 
western part of the M25 London orbital motorway for the period between 5 "  
November 2003 until 1 1th  December 2003. Incident frequency, durations and 
locations were examined. 
It was found that: 
• The average frequency of incidents was 16.1 incidents per day or 2.32 incidents 
per million vehicle-km (3.74 incidents per million vehicle-miles) for the study 
B 2005 Annual Meeting CD-ROM 	 Paper revised from original submittal. 
Rodgers, Wadsworth, Smith and Forde 	 10 
area. The majority of recorded accidents occurred on a Saturday. Between 
11:00 and 12:00 was found to have the highest occurrence of accidents. 
The average incident duration for the study period was found to be 1 hour, 
9minutes. 
• The spatial distribution of accidents was established across the study section of 
the M25. The majority of incidents occurred between junctions 8 and 9 but 
between junctions 9 and 10 had the highest incident rate for the study period. 
• Incident characteristics between US and UK studies were compared. 
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Incidents by Time of Day 
FIGURE 5 Incidents by time of day. 
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FIGURE 7 Distribution of durations for all incidents 
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FIGURE 9 Incident locations organized by junctions. 
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TABLE 1 Overall Incident Type Frequency and Locations 
Type of Incident K/S ln-Lane Slip Road % Unknown 1 Total % 
Breakdowns 247 54.9% 39 13.4% 5 17% 0 0.0% 291 64.7% 
Accidents 49 53.8% 41 45.1% 1 - 1.1% 0 00% 91 20.2% 
Debris - - 7.3% 35 85.4% 1 24% 2 4.9% 41 91% 
Pot Holes 0 00% 9 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 9 2.0% 
Animals 1 20.0% 3 60.0% 0 0.0% 1 20.0% 5 1.1% 
Vehicle Fire 2 40.0% 1 	3 60.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 5 1.1% 
Medical 3 loo.0%1 0 0.0% 0 0,0% 0 0,0% - 0.7% 
Pedenan 2 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% - 0.4% 
Abandoned Vehicles 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 100.01/6 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 
Obstruction 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 
Suicide 0 0.0% 1 100,0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 02% 
Total = 307 68.2% 132 29.3% 8 1.8% 3 0.7% 450 	1 100.0% 
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23 
TABLE 2 Comparison of Study Results 
Title of Stud y London - British Motorways Los Angeles Portland Metropolitan 
(Reference) M25 (1) 
1-10 (7) 
 Area (8) 
Year of Study = 2003 199211993 1996 2001 
Average Incident 69 46 20.7 33 
Duration (Minutes) 
Incident Rate 
(Incidents per million 2.32 11.49 92.8 N/A 
vehicle kilometres) - 
Percentage In-Lane 31.1 6 10.7 29.3 
Incidents (%) 
Percentage 20.2 4.7 6.5 15 
Accidents(%) 
Percentage 64.7 78.6 86.6 50 
Breakdowns (%) 
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S. Rodgers, B. Wadsworth, S. D. Smith and M. C. Forde 
To date, studies of incidents on British motorways have 
been very limited. As part of a study into the role of 
Incident Support Units (ISUs) on the M25, the London 
orbital motorway, an analysis of road traffic incidents 
was undertaken. Motorway incident data were collected 
through closed circuit television (CCTV) observations at 
Surrey Police's Godstone Motorway Control Room. The 
collected data covered the Surrey Police section of the 
M25 motorway between Clacket Lane Services and 
Junction 14, for a four-week period between 5 
November and II December 2003. Incident frequency, 
durations, locations, detection times, notification 
methods and ISU involvement were examined. It was 
found that the average incident frequency was 161 
incidents per day for the study area, and the highest 
occurrence of incidents was found to be between I l00 
am and 12-00 pm. On average the recorded incidents 
lasted I h 9 mm, with those occurring in the evening 
peak period lasting the longest. The distribution of 
incidents along the study area showed that the section 
between Junctions 9 and 10 had the highest rate for the 
study period. A comparison of incident characteristics 
between US and UK studies was also conducted. 
Incident rates between the M25 and the US were found 
to be substantially different, and incident durations were 
found to be between double and triple those of the US. 
Possible reasons for these differences are discussed in 
the text. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Road traffic incidents are an unfortunate part of road travel. 
Incidents are random events that reduce the capacity of a road, 
and include accidents, breakdowns, spilled loads and any other 
event that could cause delay. 
It has to be accepted that incidents will happen whatever 
programmes are introduced to reduce the chance of an incident 
occurring. With this in mind, the best ways of mitigating the 
effects of an incident must be discovered and implemented. 
This study will facilitate a better understanding of where and 
when incidents happen on the M25. 
The M25 motorway is the orbital motorway that encircles 
London (Fig. 1). It was designed as a bypass for London and 
the surrounding towns, giving substantial traffic relief for 
rflr 	 ''i li;sv 'r))(k 	)Hr 	rfiu It  
is approximately 118 miles (190 km) in length, and is dual 
three-lane carriageway or dual four-lane carriageway in the 
busier areas. It also has left-lane hard shoulders over the 
majority of its length. Since its completion in 1986 it has 
become one of the busiest motorways in Europe, coming under 
ever-increasing strain. The busiest south-western section of the 
M25 regularly carries 200000 vehicles per day. Traffic 
congestion is a major problem: each year, it leads to millions 
of hours of vehicle delays, and causes significant losses in 
productivity, increases in fuel consumption and environmental 
pollution. Any strategy to reduce congestion could be viewed 
as part of a sustainability programme. 
The rising demand for use of motorway networks has not and 
cannot be met with corresponding increases in capacity. This 
has led to an ever-increasing level of daily congestion. 
Recurring congestion from excess volume of vehicles is 
expected, but non-recurring or 'incident' congestion is 
unpredictable. Incidents cause bottlenecks, slowing and 
frequently stoppages in the flow of vehicles. As the flow of 
traffic slows following an incident, a queue builds upstream of 
the incident, and continues until the blockage is cleared and 
flow restored. Additionally, 'rubbernecking' can reduce the 
flow in opposing lanes. Owing to the backlog of vehicles it can 
take a long time after the incident for the accumulated traffic 
to dissipate. This issue can be compounded by the problem of 
secondary incidents. Incident management programmes have 
been developed to mitigate non-recurring congestion from 
incidents. The purpose of these programmes is to rapidly 
detect, verify and clear temporary obstructions from roads to 
restore normal traffic flow as quickly as possible. This non-
recurring congestion can be minimised by clearing incidents as 
quickly as possible or by diverting traffic before vehicles are 
caught in the traffic backup. 
To mitigate non-recurrent congestion, rapid response and 
clearance are essential. To assist in this, the Highways Agency 
has deployed a fleet of Incident Support Units (ISUs) on the 
M25 and other congested roads throughout England. 
This investigation of incidents on the M25 has been undertaken 
as part of a study into the role of ISUs on the road network. It 
is the intention to study the frequency, duration and location 
of incidents, with the aim of ultimately reducing the traffic 
impacts of incidents through the allocation of equipment and 
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major trunk roads. This paper is concerned only with incidents 
4M25 ...,:%25 
	 starow 	that occurred on their section of the M25, which is between 
 Clacket Lane Motorway Services (marker post 4335) and 
Junction 14 (marker post 4919) and is approximately 58'4 km
(36-3 miles) long. The annual average daily traffic over the  
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2. BACKGROUND 
There is limited literature on incident analysis on motorways in 
Britain, with the exception of Roberts et at.' Their study for the 
then UK Department of Transport, in 1992 and 1993, provided 
a review of incidents on British motorways. They assessed 
incidents at 10 motorway control rooms, to establish incident 
rates and durations on motorway links. Multi-channel time-
lapse video from CCTV cameras and historical police records 
were used. 
There is more information available on US freeway incident 
characteristics.` Other studies for major cities in the US have 
been useful sources of information, as reported traffic 
conditions are similar to those of the M25. However, many 
were carried out in the 1960s and 1970s, when drivers and 
vehicles were very different. More recent studies into the 
characteristics of incidents were undertaken in Seattle, 6 
Portland' and Los Angeles. 3 - 467 These studies used archived 
incident records as data, with Skabardonis et al. 37 collecting 
comprehensive field data, using probe vehicles, to determine 
incident and accident patterns. These data will be referred to in 
more detail within the analysis and comparison. 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The data for this paper were collected through observations, 
using closed-circuit television (CCTV), at Surrey Police's 
Godstone Motorway Control Room. A total of four weeks (28 
days) of incident data were collected between 5 November and 
II December 2003. Every day, incident information was 
collected for a 12 h period between 7 am and 7 pm. This time 
period was chosen as it covered the majority of the morning 
and evening travel peaks. 
Godstone Motorway Control Room manages Surrey Police's 
straleitic roads, which include the M2 5. M23. M3 and other 
The complete survey area is covered by an extensive network 
of CCTV cameras, emergency roadside telephones (ERT), gantry 
matrix signals for speed and lane controls, and variable 
message signs (VMS). The matrix signals are used by the 
Motorway Incident Detection and Automatic Signalling 
(MIDAS) system. The MIDAS system covers the area between 
Junction 6 and Junction 16, and uses information on flows, 
speed and occupancy from a large number of loop detectors, 
spaced at approximately 300 and 500 m, to trigger and impose 
speed limits on that section through the overhead gantry 
matrix signals and VMS. This is known as the variable speed 
limit zone; it attempts to 'smooth out' the traffic flow, thereby 
reducing the stop-start and wave effect brought on by heavy 
traffic flow. In theory, this should create a more efficient 
network, keep congestion at a minimum, and improve safety. 
The data recorded from loop detectors used by the MIDAS 
system have also been collected. 
When an incident was notified to the control room, the 
following information was recorded on incident characteristics 
time of notification 
type of incident (breakdown, accident, debris, vehicle fire, 
animal, etc.) 
time travel lanes were cleared 
time incident was cleared 
day of week 
method of notification 
location (marker post, direction, junctions, lane) 
number of lanes blocked 
weather conditions 
(jl light conditions 
(k) road conditions 
(1) length of queue (if available) 
(rn) occurrence of secondary accidents 
(is) whether an ISU was required 
time of ISU request and arrival 
type and number of vehicles involved 
any other relevant details (times of matrix signal 
activations and settings. VMS messages and timings, type, 
number and timings of emergency and recovery vehicles at 
incident scene, etc.). 
A total of 450 incidents were recorded for the study area 
throughout the study period. 
4. INCIDENT SUPPORT UNITS 
With sections of the M25 carrying an average of 200 000 
vehicles a day, even a minor incident can bring traffic to a halt 
very quickly. To help mitigate the impact of incidents on the 
road users of the M25, a new joint initiative by the Highways 
Agency, Mouchel Parkman and Carillion plc has been 
implemented. A fleet of 16 ISUs are on standby 24 h a day, 365 
days a year, to solve problems on the M25 and adjoining roads 
(known is the M25 Sphere). These vehicles are dedicated 
maintenance vehicles that do minor maintenance activities on 
the network, but are available whenever an incident occurs or 
their presence is requested by the emergency services. The ISUs 
are placed at strategic locations around the road network and 
are monitored by GPS, allowing the nearest vehicle to be 
dispatched. They are manned by specialist two-man crews, 
equipped with cones, warning signs, environmental protection 
packs and suitable equipment to deal with most situations and 
carry out emergency maintenance and repairs. They are neither 
allowed nor responsible for removing vehicles from travel 
lanes, but do provide emergency traffic management to protect 
incident scenes. 
The aim of this service is to provide assistance to the 
emergency services and reduce the impact of an incident on 
the road network. The role of Carillion's Incident Support Units 
is to 
provide immediate response to incidents on the network 
provide emergency, short-term lane closures 
deal immediately with minor, incident-related debris. 
S. INCIDENT DATA ANALYSIS 
The data collected and described above can be investigated and 
analysed to provide greater insight into the occurrence of 





Incident Support Unit involvement. 
Each of these four areas will be discussed below, with 
conclusions where applicable. 
5.1. Incident frequency 
The incident records were analysed to derive the incident type 
proportions, and summary statistics are shown in Table I and 
Fig. 2. 
Figure 2 shows the breakdown of incident types. For the study 
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approximately 64•7% of all incidents and were followed by 
accidents at 202% and debris with 9- 1% of the total 450 
incidents. The estimated incident rate for the study area was 
2'32 incidents per million vehicle km (3-74 incidents per 
million vehicle miles). In comparison, in the US. Bertini er al. 8 
found that breakdowns accounted for 50% and accidents for 
15% of all incidents, and Skahardonis et al.' found that 86.6% 
of incidents were breakdowns and 65% were accidents. As 
Skabardonis et al.' used probe vehicles, patrolling the highway 
looking for incidents, instead of CCTV for data capture, they 
will have witnessed more breakdowns than this study. On the 
M25 only breakdowns notified to the control room were 
logged: hence the smaller number of breakdowns. This 
highlights a difference in the recording of the incident data. 
Table I illustrates the type and the lateral locations of incidents 
on the carriageway. The locations are classified as where the 
incident was first observed, so it may have occurred in the live 
lanes but by the time it was detected and verified the incident 
may have cleared to the shoulder. It can be seen that the 
predominant incident type recorded was breakdowns on the 
hard shoulder: approximately 55 of all incidents. In-lane 
accidents accounted for 45-1°t of all accidents and 91°/ó of all 
incidents. Approximately 293% of all recorded incidents 
occurred in-lane and had the potential to cause delay to 
motorists. The majority of accidents, 6160/b, involved only one 
or two vehicles, and 80.20/0 of accidents involved three or fewer 
vehicles. A total of 50-5°it of accidents involved a large goods 
vehicle (LGV), and 34% of all accidents included a foreign 
Type of incident H/S In-lane Slip road Unknown Total 
No. No. No. No. No. 
Breakdowns 247 849 39 13.4 5 17 0 00 291 64-7 
Accidents 49 538 41 451 I I-I 0 0-0 91 202 
Debris 3 73 35 854 I 24 2 4•9 41 9-I 
Potholes 0 00 9 bOO 0 00 0 0-0 9 2-0 
Animals I 200 3 60-0 0 00 I 200 5 1.1 
Vehicle fire 2 400 3 600 0 00 0 00 5 I-I 
Medical 3 1000 0 0-0 0 00 0 00 3 07 
Pedestrian 2 100-0 0 0.0 0 00 0 0-0 2 04 
Abandoned 0 0-0 0 0-0 I 1000 0 0-0 I 0-2 
vehicles 
Obstruction 0 0-0 I 100-0 0 00 0 0-0 I 02 
Suicide 0 00 I bOO 0 0-0 0 0-0 I 02 
Total 307 682 132 293 8 18 3 07 450 100.0 
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LGV, which is very concerning as they constitute less than 10% 
of the LGV traffic. Foreign LGVs. however, accounted for only 
1-37% of all breakdowns, with all LGVs accounting for 584%. 
In contrast, in the US, Skabardonis et al. 1 observed that the 
proportion of in-lane incidents was approximately 10-7% on 
1-10; Skahardonis eta!) on 1-880 showed that 4-6% occurred 
in-lane, and the FHWA 9 also presented values of approximately 
4%. Bertini ci al., 8 however, observed 293% in-lane incidents 
using historical data from the Portland area. Roberts eta!) 
estimated that 6% of incidents occurring on the motorway 
network had the potential to interfere with free-flowing traffic 
in the running lanes. Skabardonis et al.' do admit that if CCTV 
had been used to observe incidents, rather than probe vehicles, 
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Shown in Fig. 3 are the percentage breakdowns of lanes blocked 
by noted incidents. As shown, 69% of incidents blocked only the 
hard shoulder, and only 7-6% of lane-blocking incidents 
blocked two or more lanes. Less than 10/0 of incidents blocked 
three or more lanes, which is much lower than Bertini et al.,8 
who reported that 3% of incidents blocked all lanes. 
An average of 161 incidents/day was observed during the 
study period, within the study area, with an average of 1039 
breakdowns and 325 accidents per day. For each collection 
day there were on average 232 incidents per million vehicle-
km (3.73 incidents per million vehicle-miles). The number of 
incidents was approximately the same for each direction of the 
study area, with only 35% difference between the clockwise 
and anti-clockwise carriageways. 
Figure 4 shows the variability of recorded accidents by days of 
the week. The plot of data shows, for weekdays, that a large 
number of incidents occur on Fridays, with 74 incidents or 
16-4% of all incidents in the study period. This is expected, as 
more vehicles use the M25 on a Friday than on any other day, 
and gives an incident rate of 2-41 incidents per million vehicle-
km (3-88 incidents per million vehicle-miles). It can also be 
seen from Fig. 4, however, that, unexpectedly, there is an 






increase of incidents on a Tuesday. This requires further 
investigation with a larger data set to fully understand the 
influence of days of the week on the frequency of incidents. 
Also unexpectedly there are more incidents on Saturdays than 
any other day of the week, giving an incident rate of 3-36 
incidents per million vehicle-km (5-42 incidents per million 
vehicle-miles). With Sunday also very high compared with 
weekdays, this may be due to the fact that motorists using the 
M25 at the weekend may be less prepared for or experienced in 
driving on an extremely busy motorway, compared with 
weekday commuters. It should also be noted that the majority of 
incidents at weekends were breakdowns, 720/0  of all incidents 
compared with an average of615% on weekdays. Even though 
there were more incidents at weekends, fewer of them occurred 
in-lane: on average 2l8% of incidents in-lane compared with 
354% on weekdays. Vehicle fires also occurred more often at 
weekends than on weekdays, possibly confirming that less well 
maintained vehicles were being used at the weekend. 
The rate of incident occurrence changes throughout the day and 
generally corresponds to the number of vehicles on the road, 
with the majority of all incidents occurring when the road 
network is near or exceeding capacity, as shown graphically in 
Fig. 5. There are, however, two exceptions to this, between 1100 
and 12:00 and between 14-00 and 15-00, when the incident rates 
are higher than expected. Further work has to he done on the 
timings of incident occurrence, as the discrepancies occur in 
uncongested low-flow periods. The temporal variation in the 
occurrence of incidents can be used to enhance the ISU 
programme by optimising staffing shift patterns. 
Figure 6 illustrates the different ways in which incidents were 
notified to the motorway control room. As can be seen, 
emergency roadside telephones (ERT) are the most frequent 
method of notification, with 236 uses or 52-40ib. This is then 
followed by 999 (British emergency number) emergency calls, 
with 25-1%, and then police patrols with 5-8%. The remainder 
of incidents were either observed by CCTV from the control 
room or reported by the Highways Agency, including ISUs, 
other emergency services or various breakdown agencies. 
For the entire study period there were only four secondary 
accidents, and all were very minor, damage-only accidents. 
Other incident types, however, had even fewer secondary 
effects, with only two incidents of debris being struck before 
clearance. Ihtc may he a result of the MIDAS systeni (1Ulck1y 
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Method of notification 
reducing speed limits following incidents, and preventing other 
vehicles from meeting stationary queues at high speed. 
5.2. Incident durations 
For the 450 incidents observed, the total accident duration was 
calculated as the difference in the time from when the incident 
was first observed until all lanes, including the hard shoulder, 
were cleared. The average duration of all incidents was I h 
9 mm. This duration is approximately three times that of 
Skabardonis et al. 's' incident duration of 207 mm, and double 
the duration of Bertini ci al. 's' study in Portland at 33 mm. The 
British study by Roberts eta!) found an average incident 
duration of 46 min for several UK motorways. This longer 
duration may be due to many locations on the M25 being rural 
and having longer distances between junctions compared with 
other study areas, as emergency and recovery vehicles have to 
travel further to an incident scene. The average duration of a 
travel lane being blocked was 32 mm. The longest observed 
40 mm, and involved extensive infrastructure damage that had 
to be repaired immediately for safety reasons. Accidents had 
the longest durations of all incidents, at 81 mm, approximately 
6 min longer than breakdowns, at 75 mm. Debris incidents in 
general lasted 19 mm, and all other incidents, including vehicle 
fires, animals and pedestrians, lasted approximately 49 min on 
average. 
Figure 7 shows the distribution of durations for all incidents. 
The distribution shows that approximately 50°/u of all incidents 
last less than 60 mm, 75% of all incidents last less than 90 mm, 
and 90% of all incidents last less than 140 mm. 
During a day the average duration of incidents varies by as 
much as 37 mm, as shown in Fig. 8. Also shown in Fig. 8 are 
lane closure durations throughout the day, with the period 
between 13'00 and 1400 hours having the greatest average 
duration of 58 mm. The duration of an accident was affected 
by the number of lanes blocked (severity), with one-lane 
accidents having an average duration of 85 min and lane 
closure duration of 29 min. Two-lane accidents had an average 
duration of 92 min and lane closure duration of 39 mm. 
Accidents affecting three lanes or more had an average 
duration of 283 min and lane closure duration of 209 mm, 
though the sample size was very small for more severe 
accidents. 
As this study was constantly observing traffic flows, using 
CCTV, several incidents were actually observed before the 
control room had been notified. This enabled approximate 
detection times to be established. For the incidents that were 
discovered there was on average 5 min between the incidents 
occurring and the control room being notified. 
S.3. Incident locations 
The location of each incident was recorded to the nearest 
marker post. These are spaced at 100 m intervals along the full 
length of the study area. The spatial distribution of incidents. 
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It can be seen that, for a straight count of incidents, the section 
between Junctions 8 and 9 has the highest occurrence of 
incidents. However, when incident rates are considered, the 
SeCtion hCIWCCTI Jitticlintis 9 and 10 has ifie highCsl rate cd 
incidents, at 2-87 incidents per million vehicle-km (4-63 
incidents per million vehicle-miles). This information can be 
used to enhance the ISU programme, as the standby locations 
can be altered in relation to the spatial locations of incidents. 
5.4. Incident Support Unit involvement 
Incident support units were requested to attend 2133% of all 
incidents during the study period. They attended 44% of all 
accidents, 5% of breakdowns and 63-41% of debris incidents. 
After being requested, the ISUs had an average response time 
of 12 min over 96 incidents. Further research will have to be 
conducted to fully understand the influence of ISUs on the 
M25 road network. 
6. COMPARISON BETWEEN UK AND US INCIDENT 
DATA 
Table 2 shows a comparison between this study's findings 
regarding incident characteristics and three other studies. 1,18  It 
can be seen that there are few similarities between the studies. 
Average incident duration varies by as much 28 min between 
the M25 and Interstate 10. Durations in the UK are between 
double and triple those of the US. Does this imply that US 
incident management practices are better than UK practices? 
Incident rates between Britain and the US are vastly different, 
with an average incident rate of 6-91 incidents per million 
vehicle-km from Britain compared with 928 in the US. This 
may be due to different driving styles, vehicles, vehicle 
regulations, driving distances, weather and many other factors 
such as incident recording. The difference between percentages 
of in-lane incidents appears to increase with more recent 
studies. Very minor incidents may not have been captured in 
this study, thus increasing the in-lane percentage. The 
percentages in this study and the Portland study8  are, however, 
both greater than in the two older studies in the comparison. 
The differences could he due to different traffic densities. The 
percentage of accidents could also be due to the age of the 
slid)—again, the two more recent studies have greater 
Title of study London M25 British motorways' Los Angeles I- 107 Portland 
Metropolitan Area  
Year of study 2003 199211993 1996 2001 
Average incident duration: min 69 46 207 33 
Incident rate: incidents per million vehicle-km 232 11-49 92-8 N/A 
Percentage in-lane Incidents: % 311 6 10-7 29-3 
Percentage accidents: % 20-2 47 65 15 
Percentage breakdowns: % 64-7 78-6 86-6 50 
percentages of accidents occurring. The lower accident 
percentages may also be due to the total number of incidents, 
as the studies with the higher incident rates have lower 
percentages. Again, the age of the studies may be the cause of 
the differences between studies, as more modern vehicles are 
less prone to breaking down. The differences between studies 
may also have been due to the method of detection of the 
incidents. This study recorded incidents reported to the police 
control room and through observations on CCTV, whereas 
Skabardonis el 	used probe vehicles, and Pal el al., 2 
Giuliano et at., Jones et al.,' Golob et al.' and Bertini em al. 8 
used historical operational data. 
7. APPLICATION OF FINDINGS AND FUTURE 
WORK 
The results from this study will enable incident management 
programmes currently in operation on the M25 to be re-
evaluated. In addition, there is now a base case for current 
operations, which will allow future improvements to be 
quantified. 
The findings of this study will be used to investigate the impact 
of incidents on traffic now and the associated delays. As 
accurate incident locations and on-scene activities have now 
been recorded they can be matched to archived traffic flow 
data. The effectiveness of motorway matrix lane control signals 
can also be evaluated. This study will also allow a better 
understanding of the influence of incident management 
strategies on the M25 to be achieved. In the short term, ISU 
staffing and vehicle standby locations can be optimised in 
order to increase the impact and influence of their service. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has provided an overview of the characteristics of 
incidents on the south-western part of the M25 London orbital 
motorway for the period between 5 November and 11 
December 2003. Incident frequency, durations and locations 
were examined, from which the following observations were 
made. 
A total of 450 incidents were observed, giving an average 
frequency of 161 incidents per day or 2-32 incidents per 
million vehicle-km (3-74 incidents per million vehicle-
miles) for the study area. The majority of recorded 
incidents, 64-7%, were breakdowns. 
69% of incidents blocked just the hard shoulder, and only 
76' hlncknil Iwo or n1ot' Iin 
Saturday had both a higher incident frequency and a 
higher incident rate than any other day of the week. 
The highest occurrence of incidents and highest rate during 
the day were found to be between 11-00 and 12-00. 
Emergency roadside telephones were the most frequent 
method of incident notification. 
The average incident duration for the study period was 
found to be 1 h 9 mm. 
Approximately 50% of incidents lasted lass than 60 mm, 
and the average travel lane blockage was 32 mm. The 
longest incident durations were recorded between 1500 
and 1600, and the longest lane closure durations were 
between 13-00 and 14-00. 
The majority of incidents occurred between Junctions 8 
and 9, but the highest incident rate was between Junctions 
9 and 10. 
(1) Incident Support Units attended 2133% of all incidents 
and had an average response time of 12 mm. 
(j) Incident characteristics between US and UK studies were 
compared and found to be different. 
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